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   During	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  the	  penetration	  of	  industrial	  capitalism	  
into	  southern	  Appalachia	  fundamentally	  altered	  the	  region’s	  economy.	  	  Historians	  
have	  thoroughly	  studied	  this	  period’s	  coal	  and	  timber	  industries,	  but	  little	  scholarly	  
attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  iron	  industry.	  Iron	  production	  also	  made	  great	  strides	  
in	  both	  output	  and	  scale	  as	  railroads	  and	  mining	  increased	  demand	  for	  iron	  
products.	  	  The	  growth	  of	  Birmingham’s	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry	  has	  dominated	  the	  
studies	  of	  iron	  that	  have	  been	  done,	  but	  between	  the	  1880s	  and	  1920s	  the	  iron	  
industry	  of	  southwest	  Virginia	  and	  east	  Tennessee	  also	  were	  thoroughly	  
modernized.	  The	  consolidation	  of	  the	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  
(VIC&CC)	  provides	  an	  excellent	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  observe	  this	  region’s	  
industrial	  transformation.	  	  At	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  the	  VIC&CC	  
consolidated	  ownership	  and	  management	  of	  practically	  all	  of	  this	  region’s	  iron	  
industry,	  and	  for	  decades	  management	  attempted	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  national	  iron	  
market.	  	  This	  thesis	  examines	  the	  conditions	  that	  made	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  
VIC&CC	  possible,	  the	  company’s	  attempt	  to	  profitably	  produce	  iron,	  and	  the	  
activities	  of	  two	  businessmen	  (one	  a	  native	  of	  Virginia	  and	  prominent	  player	  in	  the	  
state’s	  iron	  industry,	  and	  the	  other	  a	  New	  Yorker	  and	  seasoned	  veteran	  of	  Wall	  
Street)	  that	  both	  played	  integral	  roles	  in	  this	  company’s	  business.	  	  During	  the	  
studied	  timeframe,	  coal	  came	  to	  dominate	  the	  company’s	  interests	  over	  iron,	  and	  
shortly	  after	  World	  War	  I,	  management	  dissolved	  its	  iron	  department.	  	  Although	  the	  




Introduction	  –	  Interpreting	  the	  New	  South	  and	  Industrial	  Expansion	  
As	  a	  period	  and	  process,	  the	  New	  South	  emerged	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  
Reconstruction	  as	  a	  rush	  of	  industrial	  development	  rapidly	  reshaped	  the	  agrarian	  
economy	  and	  landscape	  of	  the	  former	  Confederacy.	  	  In	  many	  ways	  sharecropping,	  
low	  wages,	  and	  racial	  segregation	  maintained	  the	  basic	  dynamics	  of	  economic	  
production	  and	  social	  order	  that	  defined	  the	  southern	  plantation	  economy,	  but	  the	  
rise	  of	  heavy	  industry	  and	  manufacturing	  fundamentally	  set	  the	  post-­‐
Reconstruction	  South	  apart	  from	  the	  antebellum	  South.	  	  A	  rapidly	  expanding	  rail	  
network,	  telecommunications	  systems,	  textile	  industries	  and	  manufacturing,	  and	  an	  
influx	  of	  northeastern	  and	  English	  capital	  all	  reintegrated	  Dixieland	  into	  the	  
American	  economy	  as	  it	  had	  never	  been	  before.	  
The	  New	  South’s	  industrial	  evolution	  drew	  from	  both	  new	  and	  old	  
enterprises,	  cheap	  sources	  of	  labor,	  and	  a	  host	  of	  largely	  untouched	  natural	  
resources.	  	  The	  textile	  and	  tobacco	  industries	  flourished	  within	  the	  South’s	  agrarian	  
heritage	  and	  were	  largely	  financed	  by	  southern	  money,	  while	  capitalists	  from	  the	  
northeast	  and	  England	  often	  financed	  heavy	  and	  extractive	  industries.	  	  Outside	  
investment	  capital	  generally	  included	  the	  timber,	  fertilizer,	  iron	  and	  steel,	  and	  coal	  
industries	  that	  required	  large	  sums	  of	  financing	  or	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  technical	  
organization	  for	  operation.	  	  Late	  nineteenth	  century	  industrialization	  across	  the	  
South	  was	  not	  uniform	  in	  pace,	  and	  neither	  was	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  happened.1	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The best works to consult on the New South include C. Vann Woodward’s Origins of the New South 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951); Gavin Wright’s Old South, New South (New York: 
Basic Books Inc., 1986); and Edward L. Ayer’s The Promise of the New South (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992). 
2	  
	  
Historians	  have	  generally	  emphasized	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  coal	  and	  timber	  
industries	  in	  explaining	  the	  Appalachian	  economy	  in	  the	  New	  South,	  but	  have	  
frequently	  overlooked	  or	  cast	  aside	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  iron	  industry	  in	  interpreting	  
the	  New	  South.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  iron	  industry	  has	  been	  absent	  from	  
historical	  studies,	  but	  few	  works	  dedicate	  large	  attention	  to	  an	  industry	  that	  until	  
the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  grew	  as	  rapidly	  as	  the	  timber	  and	  coal	  industries.	  	  
As	  an	  industry	  that	  largely	  relied	  on	  slave	  labor	  and	  increasingly	  antiquated	  
technology	  prior	  to	  the	  Civil	  War,	  by	  studying	  the	  growth	  and	  modernization	  of	  the	  
iron	  industry	  in	  southern	  Appalachia	  one	  can	  offer	  another	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  
view	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  New	  South.2	  
Until	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  American	  and	  southern	  historians	  accepted	  
a	  general	  narrative	  of	  the	  New	  South	  that	  reinforced	  “the	  pretensions	  of	  the	  South’s	  
self-­‐proclaimed	  leaders.”3	  	  During	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century,	  C.	  Vann	  Woodward’s	  
Origins	  of	  the	  New	  South	  offered	  a	  new	  interpretation	  of	  post-­‐Reconstruction	  South’s	  
and	  sparked	  a	  historical	  debate	  on	  the	  New	  South’s	  economy	  that	  has	  continued	  into	  
the	  present	  day.	  	  Woodward’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  now-­‐cornerstone	  series	  A	  History	  
of	  the	  South	  includes	  his	  colonial	  thesis	  pertaining	  to	  the	  revolution	  in	  the	  southern	  
economy.	  	  To	  Woodward,	  the	  New	  South	  represented	  a	  period,	  beginning	  
approximately	  with	  the	  end	  of	  Reconstruction,	  in	  which	  the	  region’s	  new	  timber,	  
mineral,	  and	  textile	  industries	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  new	  class	  of	  Southern	  businessmen	  
who	  increasingly	  “acted	  as	  agents,	  retainers,	  and	  executives,	  [but]	  rarely	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For a thorough study of the antebellum iron industry see Ronald Lewis’s Coal, Iron, and Slaves 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979).  Wright’s Old South, New South also offers an insightful analysis 
of the southern iron industry’s post-bellum transformation. 
3 Ayers, The Promise of the New South, vii. 
3	  
	  
principals.”4	  	  Although	  textile	  and	  tobacco	  industries	  arose	  with	  southern	  money	  
and	  ingenuity,	  outside	  capital	  largely	  financed	  the	  railroads,	  mineral,	  and	  timber	  
industries	  and	  this	  represented	  a	  distinct	  break	  from	  the	  sources	  and	  modes	  of	  the	  
region’s	  economic	  production.	  	  With	  the	  shift	  of	  land	  and	  enterprise	  ownership	  from	  
the	  landed,	  planter	  elite	  to	  a	  body	  of	  absentee	  owners	  concentrated	  in	  the	  American	  
northeast	  and	  England,	  the	  South’s	  resources	  and	  profit	  increasingly	  flowed	  out	  of	  
the	  region.	  	  This	  only	  exacerbated	  poverty	  and	  racial	  segregation	  in	  the	  region	  and	  
characterized	  the	  former	  Confederacy	  well	  into	  the	  twentieth	  century.5	  
While	  the	  colonial	  thesis	  has	  taken	  a	  strong	  foothold	  in	  New	  South	  
historiography,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  macro-­‐level	  interpretation	  of	  industry	  and	  
economy	  to	  influence	  the	  field’s	  historiography.	  	  Barrington	  Moore	  offered	  his	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  South’s	  industrial	  revolution	  in	  Social	  Origins	  of	  Dictatorship	  
and	  Democracy.	  	  Moore	  used	  a	  Marxist	  framework	  to	  comparatively	  explain	  global	  
industrial	  modernization	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  democratic	  and	  communist	  regimes.	  	  More	  
specifically,	  he	  seeks	  to	  explain	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  rural	  populations	  were	  
brought	  into	  these	  regimes.	  	  In	  comparing	  the	  capitalist	  democracies	  that	  arose	  in	  
England,	  France,	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  Moore	  uses	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  to	  
explain	  the	  American	  relationship	  between	  agrarian	  and	  industrial	  elites.	  	  His	  
Prussian	  Road	  thesis	  implied	  both	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  traditional	  agrarian	  social	  
structure	  and	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  growing	  bourgeois-­‐industrial	  class	  that	  resulted	  in	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Woodward, Origins of the New South, 292. 
5 Woodward’s colonial economy thesis has influence a long line of scholarship.  Among the most 
influential are David Carlton’s Mill and Town in South Carolina 1880-1920 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1982).  Carlton concludes that the rise of Southern towns allowed for the opening of a 




top-­‐down	  modernization	  of	  the	  former	  Confederacy.	  	  This	  top-­‐down	  modernization	  
allowed	  for	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  landed,	  planter	  elites’	  control	  over	  the	  South	  and	  in	  
many	  ways	  hindered	  the	  region’s	  growth	  for	  decades.6	  
The	  Woodward	  and	  Moore	  theses	  have	  left	  indelible	  marks	  on	  New	  South	  
historiography	  since	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century.	  	  Woodward’s	  thesis	  has	  largely	  
withstood	  the	  test	  of	  time,	  and	  sparked	  the	  revision	  of	  New	  South	  economic	  
development.	  	  Moore’s	  thesis	  has	  been	  largely	  criticized,	  but	  scholars	  such	  as	  
Jonathan	  M.	  Wiener	  and	  Dwight	  B.	  Billings,	  Jr.	  have	  supported	  it.7	  	  Scholars	  such	  as	  
Alex	  Lichtenstein,	  James	  Cobb,	  and	  Gavin	  Wright	  have	  credited	  Woodward’s	  thesis,	  
but	  have	  downplayed	  “the	  wholesale	  demise	  of	  the	  planters	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  upstart	  
businessmen	  and	  industrialists,”	  and	  instead	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  
continued	  sources	  of	  cheap	  labor	  in	  determining	  the	  path	  of	  New	  South	  economic	  
development.8	  	  James	  Cobb	  has	  also	  criticized	  the	  continuity-­‐versus-­‐discontinuity	  
debate	  that	  pits	  planter	  against	  industrialist	  as	  being	  “the	  lost	  cause	  of	  southern	  
historiography	  as	  the	  New	  South	  enter[ed]	  its	  second	  century.”9	  	  Despite	  slight	  
differences	  in	  the	  emphasis	  in	  factors	  that	  limited	  Southern	  industry,	  historians	  also	  
generally	  agree	  that	  “federal	  banking	  policy,	  railroad	  freight	  rates,	  absentee	  
ownership,	  reliance	  on	  outside	  expertise,	  high	  interest	  rates,	  cautious	  state	  
governments,	  [and	  a]	  lack	  of	  industrial	  experience”	  all	  limited	  the	  industrial	  growth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 111-
154. 
7 Jonathan M. Wiener, Social Origins of the New South: Alabama 1860-1885 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1978); Dwight Billings, Planters and the Making of a “New South”: Class, Politics, 
and Development in North Carolina, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979). 
8 James C. Cobb, “Beyond Planters and Industrialists: A New Perspective on the New South,” The Journal 
of Southern History Vol. 54, no. 1 (February. 1988): 47. 
9 Cobb, “Beyond Planters and Industrialists,” 68. 
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of	  the	  South.10	  	  By	  the	  1880s	  industrialization	  in	  the	  South	  was	  willingly	  being	  
undertaken	  by	  southerner,	  northerner,	  and	  Englishman	  alike.	  	  This	  period	  marked	  a	  
significant	  shift	  in	  Appalachian	  political	  discourse.	  	  Ronald	  L.	  Lewis	  states,	  “The	  
penetration	  of	  industrial	  capitalism	  into	  the	  back-­‐counties	  also	  fractured	  previous	  
political	  alignments	  and	  stimulated	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  political	  culture.	  	  The	  
old	  Confederate-­‐Democrat	  versus	  Yankee-­‐Republican	  split	  was	  replaced	  by	  pro-­‐	  
versus	  anti-­‐industrialist	  factions	  in	  both	  parties,	  and	  the	  industrial	  factions	  
generally	  prevailed.”11	  
	  The	  interpretations	  of	  Woodward,	  Wright,	  and	  Cobb	  have	  influenced	  this	  
thesis.	  	  As	  Cobb	  states,	  “There	  is	  considerable	  irony	  in	  the	  persistent	  tendency	  to	  
associate	  the	  South	  much	  more	  closely	  with	  the	  defense	  of	  tradition	  than	  with	  the	  
pursuit	  of	  progress.	  	  In	  fact,	  industrial	  development	  became	  the	  consuming	  passion	  
of	  regional,	  state,	  and	  local	  leaders	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Reconstruction	  South.”12	  	  Regional	  
geography,	  raw	  materials	  distribution,	  and	  cheap	  labor	  had	  as	  much	  to	  do	  with	  
patterns	  of	  industrialization	  as	  did	  the	  traditions	  of	  the	  landed	  elite	  or	  absentee	  
owners.	  	  In	  southern	  Appalachia’s	  experience	  with	  industrial	  economy	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  
see	  patterns	  of	  Woodward’s	  colonial	  thesis.	  	  While	  much	  of	  the	  former	  planter	  elite	  
fueled	  growth	  in	  the	  textile	  and	  tobacco	  industries	  that	  arose	  in	  the	  southern	  
piedmont	  and	  lowlands,	  the	  mineral	  and	  timber	  industries	  that	  canvassed	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Edward Ayers, The Promise of the New South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 104. 
11 Ronald L. Lewis, Transforming the Appalachian Countryside (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1998), 8.	  
12 James Cobb, Industrialization and Southern Society: 1877-1984 (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1984), 2. 
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South’s	  mountainous	  regions	  were	  extractive	  in	  nature	  and	  dominated	  by	  outside	  
finance.	  	  	  
Prior	  to	  the	  final	  quarter	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  southern	  Appalachia	  was	  
sparsely	  populated	  and	  operated	  outside	  of	  the	  American	  cash	  economy,	  as	  the	  
region’s	  small	  communities	  were	  almost	  entirely	  dependent	  upon	  subsistence	  
agriculture,	  local	  trading,	  and	  bartering.	  	  Beginning	  in	  the	  1880s,	  agents	  
representing	  northern	  timber,	  railroad,	  and	  mineral	  enterprises	  cheaply	  purchased	  
or	  rented	  large	  tracts	  of	  land	  and	  backcountry	  from	  families	  and	  individuals	  who	  
saw	  opportunity	  in	  making	  an	  easy	  profit	  off	  selling	  the	  trees	  and	  minerals	  that	  
were	  abundant	  and	  underground	  and	  supposedly	  would	  not	  disturb	  their	  agrarian	  
way	  of	  life.13	  	  	  
The	  rapid	  extraction	  of	  the	  region’s	  resources	  began	  as	  huge	  tracts	  of	  land	  
were	  consolidated	  under	  the	  control	  of	  single	  industrial	  enterprises.	  	  Logging	  camps	  
nomadically	  moved	  across	  the	  region	  to	  clear-­‐cut	  huge	  virgin	  timber-­‐stands.	  	  
Massive	  log	  drives	  moved	  the	  cut	  timber	  downriver,	  to	  sawmills	  for	  manufacture	  
into	  rail	  ties,	  furniture,	  and	  construction	  lumber.	  	  Promoters	  and	  boosters	  drew	  
railroads	  into	  the	  mountainous	  regions	  to	  extract	  the	  region’s	  rich	  coal,	  iron	  ore,	  and	  
mineral	  deposits.	  	  During	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  the	  once	  sparsely	  populated	  
mountains	  saw	  an	  influx	  of	  business	  and	  population	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  logging	  camps,	  
railroad	  depots,	  company	  towns,	  and	  cities	  that	  all	  fundamentally	  transformed	  the	  
regional	  economy	  in	  an	  extraordinarily	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ronald D. Eller, Miners, Millhands, and Mountaineers: Industrialization of the Appalachian South, 
1880-1930 (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee, 1982). 
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With	  this	  social	  and	  economic	  transformation	  came	  a	  revolution	  in	  
enterprise	  structure	  and	  scale.	  	  While	  textile	  industries	  did	  penetrate	  southern	  
Appalachia,	  logging,	  iron,	  coal,	  and	  railroad	  companies	  brought	  the	  most	  dramatic	  
change	  to	  the	  region’s	  landscape.	  	  The	  expansion	  of	  the	  region’s	  iron	  industry	  
provides	  an	  excellent	  perspective	  to	  view	  this	  regional	  transformation.	  	  By	  the	  turn	  
of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  several	  large	  mergers	  of	  Appalachia’s	  coal	  and	  iron	  
enterprises	  rapidly	  consolidated	  ownership	  of	  region’s	  industrial	  capacities.	  	  Many	  
of	  these	  companies	  were	  structured	  similarly	  to	  the	  oft	  studied	  Tennessee	  Coal,	  
Iron,	  and	  Railroad	  Company.	  	  The	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  (VIC&CC)	  
was	  one	  such	  consolidation,	  and	  it	  was	  set	  apart	  from	  many	  of	  the	  other	  coal	  and	  
coke	  operations	  by	  consuming	  a	  vast	  majority	  of	  their	  coke	  in	  their	  local	  iron	  
furnaces,	  which	  produced	  products	  for	  their	  coal	  operations	  as	  well	  as	  outside	  
purchasers.	  	  This	  makes	  the	  VIC&CC	  a	  dynamic	  case	  study	  of	  the	  region’s	  social	  and	  
economic	  transformation	  as	  southern	  Appalachia	  quickly	  integrated	  into	  the	  
American	  industrial	  economy	  as	  a	  source	  of	  energy	  and	  raw	  materials.14	  
Southwest	  Virginia	  and	  east	  Tennessee	  were	  the	  source	  of	  large	  deposits	  of	  
iron	  ore	  and	  coal,	  but	  the	  region’s	  mountainous	  terrain,	  agrarian	  economies,	  and	  
sparse	  population	  all	  limited	  industrial	  exploitation	  of	  the	  region.	  	  There	  were	  small	  
charcoal	  furnaces	  in	  the	  region,	  but	  these	  remained	  close	  to	  rivers	  and	  limited	  in	  
function.	  	  By	  1880,	  a	  flood	  of	  capital	  investment	  from	  the	  northeast	  and	  England	  
poured	  into	  the	  region	  to	  finance	  the	  expansion	  of	  railroads	  and	  exploit	  the	  mineral	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Eller’s Miners, Millhands, and Mountaineers offers the most comprehensive study of industrialization in 
Southern Appalachia.  For a description of the Tennessee, Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company see Greg 
Robert’s Origin and Development of the Tennessee, Coal, Iron and Railroad Company (New York: 
Newcomen Society of England, American Branch, 1948). 
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wealth	  of	  the	  region.	  	  More	  than	  a	  dozen	  modern,	  coke	  fueled	  iron	  furnaces	  were	  
constructed	  throughout	  southwest	  Virginia	  and	  east	  Tennessee	  to	  serve	  the	  
railroads	  and	  growing	  iron	  manufacturing	  and	  coal	  industries.	  	  Rapid	  increases	  in	  
economic	  output	  and	  activity	  characterized	  the	  region	  for	  much	  of	  the	  late	  
nineteenth	  century.	  	  The	  man	  responsible	  for	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  VIC&CC,	  
George	  L.	  Carter,	  played	  an	  integral	  part	  in	  the	  iron	  industry’s	  growth	  during	  this	  
time	  and	  his	  life	  and	  career	  represents	  the	  region’s	  transformation	  from	  agrarian	  
economy	  to	  industrial	  economy.	  
Born	  to	  a	  respected	  Carroll	  County	  farming	  family	  in	  1857,	  George	  L.	  Carter	  
found	  work,	  not	  on	  the	  farm,	  but	  in	  the	  region’s	  growing	  mineral	  industry.	  	  Proving	  
to	  be	  an	  adept	  clerk	  and	  manager,	  he	  became	  associated	  with	  a	  contractor	  for	  the	  
Norfolk	  and	  Western	  Railway,	  and	  together	  they	  entered	  the	  iron	  industry	  by	  
constructing	  the	  Dora	  Iron	  Furnace	  in	  Pulaski,	  Virginia.	  	  Carter’s	  successes	  at	  Dora	  
and	  association	  with	  the	  Norfolk	  &	  Western	  led	  him	  to	  expand	  his	  business	  by	  
purchasing	  a	  large	  furnace	  in	  the	  rapidly	  growing	  railroad	  and	  manufacturing	  city	  of	  
Roanoke.	  	  Although	  Carter	  had	  accumulated	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  wealth	  and	  was	  himself	  
an	  ambitious	  businessman,	  he	  stretched	  his	  finances	  to	  the	  limit	  by	  expanding	  his	  
iron	  enterprise.	  	  This	  took	  Carter	  to	  New	  York	  in	  search	  of	  additional	  financing,	  and	  
he	  became	  connected	  with	  the	  investment	  firm	  of	  Moore	  &	  Schley.	  	  Moore	  &	  Schley	  
was	  looking	  to	  form	  a	  large	  consolidated	  iron	  enterprise,	  and	  in	  Carter	  the	  firm	  
thought	  they	  had	  found	  what	  they	  wanted.	  	  Even	  though	  Moore	  &	  Schley’s	  ambitions	  
were	  beyond	  those	  of	  Carter’s,	  Carter	  agreed	  to	  their	  proposal	  to	  consolidate	  nearly	  
the	  entire	  iron	  industry	  of	  southwest	  Virginia	  and	  east	  Tennessee.	  	  In	  doing	  this,	  
9	  
	  
Carter	  sold	  his	  Carter	  Coal	  and	  Iron	  Company	  to	  Moore	  &	  Schley	  and	  agreed	  to	  
preside	  over	  the	  much	  larger	  consolidated	  company	  as	  president.15	  	  	  
The	  resulting	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  (VIC&CC)	  was	  organized	  
in	  1899	  and	  owned	  or	  leased	  over	  one	  hundred	  thousand	  acres	  of	  mineral	  lands,	  
multiple	  collieries,	  over	  a	  dozen	  iron	  furnaces,	  foundries	  and	  casting	  facilities,	  a	  
sawmill,	  grist	  mills,	  and	  a	  small	  railroad	  to	  link	  their	  most	  valuable	  ore	  and	  coal	  
properties	  with	  their	  iron	  furnaces.	  	  With	  Carter’s	  expertise	  and	  intimate	  knowledge	  
with	  the	  region’s	  iron	  industry	  at	  the	  helm	  of	  the	  $10,000,000	  company,	  the	  VIC&CC	  
seemed	  poised	  to	  become	  a	  powerful	  player	  in	  the	  American	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry.	  	  
The	  company’s	  management	  structure	  consisted	  of	  a	  seven	  member	  Board	  of	  
Directors	  that	  steered	  the	  company’s	  general	  direction,	  while	  the	  president,	  vice-­‐
president	  and	  general	  manager,	  secretary	  and	  treasurer,	  and	  assistant	  secretary	  
controlled	  the	  logistical	  and	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations	  of	  the	  company.16	  
Carter	  was	  unable	  to	  effectively	  manage	  the	  company	  to	  Moore	  &	  Schley’s	  
expectations,	  and	  within	  two	  years	  Carter	  was	  forced	  out	  and	  the	  VIC&CC	  was	  
placed	  under	  the	  control	  of	  court	  appointed	  receivers.	  	  One	  of	  the	  receivers,	  Henry	  
K.	  McHarg,	  personally	  invested	  heavily	  in	  the	  company,	  was	  elected	  company	  
president	  after	  the	  receivership,	  and	  spent	  the	  next	  decade	  trying	  to	  turn	  the	  
VIC&CC	  into	  a	  profitable	  iron	  enterprise.	  	  Neither	  iron	  nor	  steel	  would	  ever	  produce	  
the	  profits	  the	  VIC&CC	  organizers	  hoped	  for,	  and	  by	  the	  1920s	  coal	  production	  
became	  the	  company’s	  primary	  focus.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Willie Nelms,  “George Lafayette Carter: Empire Builder,” Virginia Cavalcade 30, no. 1 (Summer 
1980): 12 – 21. 
16 Virginia Iron, Coal and Coke Company, Annual Report of The Virginia Iron, Coal, and Coke Company 
and Virginia & Southwestern Railway Company, (Roanoke, VA: The Company, 1905), 3. 
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It	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  examine	  the	  patterns	  of	  industrialization	  
and	  growth	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  southern	  Appalachia	  that	  created	  the	  
conditions	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  VIC&CC,	  and	  explain	  why	  the	  company	  ultimately	  
failed	  to	  produce	  the	  results	  promised	  at	  its	  organization	  in	  1899.	  	  The	  VIC&CC	  also	  
provides	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  southern	  Appalachia’s	  integration	  into	  American	  
industrial	  economy	  of	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  and	  the	  
region’s	  function	  as	  a	  colonial	  supplier	  of	  energy	  and	  raw	  materials	  for	  the	  larger	  
American	  economy.	  	  Although	  its	  origins	  were	  heavily	  tied	  to	  a	  southerner,	  George	  
L.	  Carter,	  he	  himself	  arose	  in	  the	  industry	  through	  strong	  ties	  to	  Norfolk	  &	  Western,	  
which	  Philadelphia	  interests	  financially	  backed.	  	  New	  Yorkers	  financially	  supported	  
the	  VIC&CC,	  and	  it	  produced	  pig	  iron	  that	  the	  company	  itself	  consumed	  or	  was	  sold	  
outside	  the	  region,	  although	  for	  a	  time	  it	  did	  conduct	  business	  in	  Birmingham.	  	  The	  
company’s	  coal	  was	  also	  sold	  primarily	  to	  the	  major	  rail	  networks	  in	  the	  region,	  as	  
well	  as	  in	  the	  northeast,	  and	  manufacturers	  in	  the	  Midwest.	  
Primary	  evidence	  is	  derived	  from	  several	  sources	  and	  contextualized	  with	  
the	  secondary	  sources	  referenced	  in	  the	  historiographical	  footnotes.	  	  Multiple	  
volumes	  of	  the	  Directory	  to	  the	  Iron	  and	  Steel	  Works	  of	  the	  United	  States	  published	  
by	  the	  American	  Iron	  and	  Steel	  Association	  help	  to	  trace	  the	  national	  pattern	  of	  
growth	  the	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry	  experienced	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  	  The	  
available	  Annual	  Reports	  of	  the	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  between	  the	  
years	  1905-­‐1922	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  company’s	  operations	  and	  its	  relationship	  
with	  stockholders.	  	  A	  1916	  Report	  on	  Examination	  of	  Financial	  Condition	  and	  
Operations	  for	  the	  13½Years	  Ended	  June	  30,	  1916	  provide	  in	  depth	  financial	  and	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production	  numbers	  during	  the	  primary	  years	  of	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  iron	  operations.	  	  The	  
New	  York	  Times	  and	  Washington	  Post	  also	  help	  to	  detail	  large	  events	  during	  the	  
company’s	  history.	  	  
Chapter	  One	  provides	  roughly	  fifty	  years	  of	  historical	  context	  regarding	  the	  
growth	  of	  the	  American	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry	  before	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  Chapter	  
Two	  specifically	  examines	  industrial	  modernization	  in	  southern	  Appalachia	  and	  the	  
growth	  and	  emergence	  of	  the	  companies	  that	  became	  the	  VIC&CC	  between	  1880	  
and	  1900	  before	  detailing	  the	  tumultuous	  first	  years	  of	  the	  company’s	  operation.	  	  
Chapter	  Three	  examines	  the	  years	  between	  1903	  and	  1911	  when	  the	  reorganized	  
VIC&CC	  slowly	  turned	  its	  focus	  from	  iron	  to	  coal	  production	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  
Henry	  K.	  McHarg.	  	  Chapter	  Four	  covers	  the	  years	  between	  1912	  and	  approximately	  
1922	  when	  the	  VIC&CC	  ceased	  to	  produce	  pig	  iron	  and	  focused	  almost	  all	  of	  its	  
energies	  on	  coal	  production	  and	  sales.	  	  It	  concludes	  with	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  
years	  between	  1940	  and	  1970	  when	  the	  company	  functioned	  as	  a	  lessor	  of	  coal	  
properties	  before	  being	  absorbed	  by	  a	  larger	  manufacturing	  group.	  	  A	  conclusion	  
returns	  to	  the	  company’s	  origins	  for	  a	  final	  analysis	  of	  why	  the	  company	  failed	  as	  an	  
iron	  producer,	  but	  managed	  to	  succeed	  as	  a	  producer	  of	  coal	  during	  much	  of	  the	  
early	  twentieth	  century	  while	  serving	  as	  a	  colonial	  supplier	  of	  raw	  materials	  in	  the	  
much	  larger	  American	  industrial	  economy.
	  
	  
Chapter	  One	  –	  Nineteenth	  Century	  Modernization	  and	  Growth	  of	  the	  American	  
Iron	  and	  Steel	  Industries	  
Advances	  in	  the	  iron	  and	  steel	  industries	  were	  central	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  
American	  economy	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  	  The	  
production	  of	  iron	  and	  iron	  products	  in	  the	  United	  States	  had	  historically	  been	  a	  
small-­‐scale	  enterprise	  that	  drew	  from	  relatively	  local	  resources	  and	  demand,	  but	  by	  
the	  close	  of	  the	  Civil	  War	  a	  dramatic	  change	  in	  the	  industry	  was	  well	  underway.	  	  
This	  change	  began	  primarily	  in	  the	  American	  northeast	  during	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  
century	  while	  the	  American	  South	  became	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	  cotton	  and	  
agricultural	  production.	  	  Technological	  advances	  made	  primarily	  in	  Pennsylvania	  
and	  New	  York,	  and	  an	  increasing	  raw	  materials	  base	  stimulated	  growth	  in	  the	  scale	  
and	  complexity	  of	  the	  country’s	  iron	  and	  infant	  steel	  industries.	  	  The	  growth	  of	  iron	  
and	  steel	  consuming	  industries	  also	  drove	  the	  expansion.	  	  	  
During	  the	  decades	  preceding	  the	  Civil	  War	  the	  North’s	  industrial	  economy	  
and	  South’s	  agrarian	  economy	  grew	  increasingly	  apart	  as	  the	  regions’	  differing	  
systems	  of	  labor	  organization	  allowed	  for	  a	  fundamental	  distinction.	  	  In	  the	  years	  
following	  Reconstruction	  free	  labor	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  industry	  narrowed	  this	  
distinction	  and	  differences	  between	  north	  and	  south	  were	  increasingly	  cultural	  
rather	  than	  economic.	  	  The	  antebellum	  coal	  industries	  of	  Pennsylvania	  and	  Virginia,	  
which	  shared	  similar	  resource	  endowments	  but	  differing	  political	  and	  cultural	  
heritages,	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  recent	  historical	  scholarship	  investigating	  this	  
divergence	  between	  the	  northern	  and	  southern	  economies.	  	  Sean	  Patrick	  Adams’	  
recent	  analysis	  of	  the	  divergent	  paths	  taken	  by	  these	  two	  states	  concludes	  that	  the	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gap	  originated	  as	  much	  from	  pivotal	  “state-­‐level	  solons	  that	  in	  some	  instances	  aided	  
entrepreneurial	  initiatives	  and	  other	  time	  stood	  squarely	  in	  the	  way	  of	  them”	  as	  it	  
did	  from	  the	  more	  laissez-­‐fair	  market	  revolution	  associated	  with	  the	  era.17	  	  The	  
antebellum	  legislative	  inhibitions	  of	  southern	  states	  were	  clearly	  a	  thing	  of	  the	  past	  
during	  the	  final	  twenty	  years	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  and	  the	  South	  experienced	  a	  
period	  of	  rapid	  industrial	  development.	  	  Particularly	  in	  southern	  Appalachia,	  much	  
of	  this	  industrial	  modernization	  came	  from	  northern	  and	  English	  investors	  seeking	  
to	  capitalize	  on	  the	  modernization	  of	  the	  region’s	  iron	  and	  coal	  industries.	  	  This	  
chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  American	  iron	  industry’s	  growth	  in	  the	  northeast	  during	  the	  
mid-­‐nineteenth	  century	  and	  the	  subsequent	  modernization	  of	  the	  southern	  iron	  
industry	  during	  the	  years	  following	  Reconstruction.	  
Charcoal	  fueled	  iron	  furnaces	  almost	  without	  exception	  until	  the	  mid	  
nineteenth	  century.	  	  The	  slow	  transition	  from	  charcoal	  fueled	  furnaces	  to	  coke18	  
fueled	  furnaces	  helps	  explain	  the	  huge	  rise	  in	  furnace	  output	  during	  the	  period.	  	  
Even	  though	  English	  ironmasters	  began	  utilizing	  coke	  in	  the	  production	  of	  iron	  in	  
the	  1730s,	  American	  iron	  masters	  did	  not	  begin	  to	  make	  the	  transition	  until	  the	  19th	  
century.	  	  Historian	  Stewart	  Holbrook	  accredits	  this	  slow	  transition	  to	  American	  
“pigheadedness”	  as	  ironmasters’	  clung	  to	  the	  charcoal	  method	  “until	  the	  receding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Sean Patrick Adams, Old Dominion, Industrial Commonwealth: Coal, Politics, and Economy in 
Antebellum America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 9. 
18 Although charcoal and anthracite coal both produced superior pig iron, both were limited in availability.  
Charcoal is essentially timber and anthracite was limited by quantity and location, but bituminous coal 
deposits are abundant in comparison to both.  Impurities in bituminous deposits countered its advantage in 
abundance until the coking process was perfected.  By cooking either bituminous or anthracite coal in an 
airtight furnace, many of these impurities are removed.  What remains is coke.  It is nearly pure carbon and 
provides a consistent and hot flame that is suitable for iron furnaces. 
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forest	  forced	  them	  to	  [coke].”19	  	  Although	  the	  attitude	  of	  ironmasters	  certainly	  
matters,	  the	  development	  and	  availability	  of	  efficient	  modes	  for	  utilizing	  other	  fuels	  
in	  the	  production	  process	  offers	  better	  reasoning	  for	  the	  transition.	  
By	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century	  the	  design	  of	  charcoal	  furnaces	  were	  little	  
changed	  since	  the	  seventeenth	  century.	  	  Historian	  William	  Hogan	  describes	  these	  
charcoal	  furnaces	  as	  being	  stone	  structures,	  
built	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   truncated	   pyramid	   into	   which	   the	   iron	   ore,	  
charcoal	  and	  limestone	  were	  charged	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  pig	  iron.	  .	  .	  .	  
To	  facilitate	  charging	  raw	  materials	  many	  furnaces	  were	  built	  next	  to	  
a	  hillside	  with	  a	  bridge	  connecting	  the	  hill	  with	  the	  top	  of	  the	  furnace.	  	  
Combustion	  was	  aided	  by	  a	  blast	  of	  cold	  air	  blown	  in	  at	  the	  base	  of	  the	  
furnace	  through	  an	  opening	  called	  a	  tuyere.20	  
	  
Charcoal	  furnaces’	  voracious	  appetite	  for	  wood	  limited	  both	  the	  size	  and	  output	  of	  
these	  furnaces	  and	  it	  would	  be	  the	  introduction	  of	  furnaces	  fueled	  by	  anthracite	  and	  
coke	  beginning	  in	  the	  1840s	  that	  marked	  the	  rapid	  growth	  and	  would	  characterize	  
the	  American	  iron	  industry	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  
The	  location	  of	  both	  anthracite	  and	  bituminous	  coals	  has	  played	  a	  primary	  
role	  in	  the	  concentration	  of	  the	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry	  since	  its	  entrance	  as	  a	  
primary	  fuel	  supply.	  	  Coal	  is	  abundant	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  deposits	  are	  located	  
in	  thirty-­‐eight	  of	  the	  present	  fifty	  states.	  	  The	  largest	  concentrations	  of	  bituminous	  
and	  anthracite	  coals	  are	  located	  along	  the	  Appalachian	  range	  in	  Pennsylvania,	  Ohio,	  
West	  Virginia,	  Virginia,	  Maryland,	  Kentucky,	  Tennessee,	  Georgia,	  and	  Alabama.	  	  
Practically	  all	  deposits	  of	  anthracite	  coal	  in	  the	  United	  States	  are	  located	  in	  
northeastern	  Pennsylvania,	  although	  small	  deposits	  are	  located	  in	  Arkansas,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Stewart H. Holbrook, Iron Brew (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1939), 12. 
20 William T. Hogan, Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry in the United States, Volume 1 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1971), 4. 
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Colorado,	  Virginia	  and	  New	  Mexico.	  	  Bituminous	  coal	  deposits	  along	  the	  
Appalachian	  range	  occur	  in	  all	  the	  states	  previously	  mentioned.	  	  Anthracite	  coal	  was	  
the	  first	  fuel	  to	  begin	  replacing	  charcoal	  because	  of	  its	  high	  carbon	  content,	  but	  coke	  
from	  bituminous	  coal	  came	  to	  dominate	  the	  industry’s	  fuel	  source	  by	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century.21	  
Eastern	  Pennsylvania	  ironmasters	  utilized	  anthracite	  coal	  on	  a	  small	  scale	  for	  
years	  prior	  to	  its	  large-­‐scale	  use	  by	  the	  iron	  industry.	  	  Problems	  with	  igniting	  and	  
controlling	  the	  temperature	  of	  burning	  anthracite	  were	  solved	  during	  the	  late	  
eighteenth	  and	  first	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  	  During	  the	  1830s	  a	  group	  of	  
American	  ironmasters	  traveled	  to	  Wales,	  were	  anthracite	  also	  occurs	  and	  was	  in	  
common	  use,	  to	  attract	  an	  English	  ironmaster	  to	  the	  United	  States	  to	  build	  an	  
anthracite	  hot-­‐air	  blast	  furnace.	  	  In	  1840,	  the	  first	  of	  these	  furnaces	  was	  successfully	  
opened	  near	  Allentown,	  Pennsylvania.	  	  Hot	  air	  blast	  furnaces	  used	  a	  small	  engine	  to	  
circulate	  hot	  air	  from	  the	  top	  of	  the	  furnace	  to	  the	  bottom	  via	  iron	  pipes.	  	  This	  
development	  led	  to	  an	  explosive	  growth	  of	  the	  iron	  industry	  in	  northeast	  
Pennsylvania	  as	  the	  abundant	  deposits	  of	  anthracite	  fueled	  a	  booming	  industry	  in	  
this	  region	  for	  much	  of	  the	  remaining	  nineteenth	  century.22	  	  
Even	  though	  the	  successful	  implementation	  of	  anthracite	  as	  fuel	  spurred	  a	  
dramatic	  boost	  to	  northeast	  Pennsylvania’s	  iron	  industry,	  it	  would	  be	  the	  successful	  
development	  of	  coking	  technology	  for	  bituminous	  coal	  that	  reshaped	  the	  entire	  
American	  iron	  industry.	  	  Bituminous	  coal	  has	  a	  lower	  carbon	  content	  than	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Carmen DiCiccio, Coal and Coke in Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical and 
Museum Commission), 7-11. 
22 DiCiccio, Coal and Coke, 9-11, 27. 
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anthracite,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  a	  suitable	  fuel	  for	  iron	  production,	  the	  volatile	  
matters	  must	  be	  cooked	  out.	  	  These	  matters	  include	  tar,	  oils,	  and	  gases	  that	  give	  
bituminous	  coal	  high	  amounts	  of	  phosphorous	  and	  sulfur	  that	  leave	  it	  unsuitable	  for	  
use	  in	  iron	  production.	  	  The	  earliest	  methods	  of	  coking	  coal	  involved	  cooking	  the	  
coal	  in	  a	  turf-­‐covered	  mound,	  but	  this	  wasteful	  process	  limited	  coke’s	  use.	  	  It	  would	  
be	  the	  development	  of	  the	  beehive	  oven	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  coke’s	  success	  in	  
reshaping	  the	  iron	  industry.	  	  The	  process	  was	  fairly	  simple:	  	  bituminous	  coal	  was	  
placed	  inside	  an	  airtight	  beehive	  oven	  and	  the	  coal	  was	  baked	  with	  an	  exterior	  heat	  
source.	  	  This	  heating	  drives	  off	  the	  impurities,	  and	  leaves	  behind	  coke.23	  	  Iron	  
masters	  in	  Connellsville,	  Pennsylvania	  produced	  the	  first	  dome-­‐shaped	  beehive	  coke	  
ovens	  in	  Connellsville,	  Pennsylvania	  during	  the	  1830s,	  and	  by	  the	  1860s	  they	  were	  
the	  primary	  means	  of	  producing	  coke.24	  
	  	   The	  first	  iron	  blast	  furnace	  to	  successfully	  use	  coke	  was	  the	  Clinton	  Furnace	  
near	  Pittsburgh,	  which	  began	  using	  Connellsville	  coke	  in	  1860.	  	  The	  results	  were	  so	  
positive	  that	  furnace	  management	  secured	  a	  continuous	  supply	  of	  Connellsville	  
coke,	  and	  set	  off	  a	  boom	  that	  would	  make	  the	  Connellsville	  district	  the	  country’s	  
largest	  source	  of	  coke	  for	  much	  of	  the	  remaining	  nineteenth	  century.	  	  The	  beehive	  
ovens	  used	  to	  produce	  coke	  were,	  
[A]rched-­‐roof	   circular	   brick	   room	   constructed	   of	   masonry	   firebrick	  
and	  tile	  with	  an	  opening	  at	  the	  top.	  	  The	  space,	  between	  the	  lining	  and	  
the	   outside	  walls,	  was	   filled	  with	  waste	   brick	   and	   other	  material	   to	  
prevent,	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  the	  loss	  of	  heat	  to	  the	  exterior.	  	  On	  the	  top	  
of	   each	   oven	   was	   a	   twelve-­‐inch	   circular	   opening	   called	   the	   trunnel	  
head	   or	   ’eye,’	   which	   could	   be	   covered	   with	   a	   metal	   led.	   	   Coal	   was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The bituminous coal did not burn inside the beehive oven because there was no air.  After the impurities 
of coal tar and coal oils were removed, what remained was nearly pure carbon, or coke.  
24 DiCiccio, Coal and Coke, 28. 
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emptied	   into	  each	  oven	   through	   these	  openings.	   	  The	   interior	  of	   the	  
oven	  was	  shaped	   like	  a	  beehive,	  measuring	  about	   twelve	   feet	  across	  
the	   base	   and	   seen	   feet	   high,	   and	   was	   lined	   with	   heat-­‐resistant	  
refractory	  firebricks.25	  
	  
These	  ovens	  were	  built	  in	  rows	  and	  often	  by	  the	  hundred.	  	  This	  basic	  design	  and	  
method	  of	  producing	  coke	  changed	  little	  until	  ovens	  and	  methods	  began	  to	  render	  
beehive	  ovens	  irrelevant	  during	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  	  But	  during	  the	  
nineteenth	  century,	  the	  superior	  quality	  and	  price	  of	  coke	  produced	  at	  Connellsville	  
by	  beehive	  ovens	  was	  one	  reason	  why	  Pittsburgh	  became	  an	  iron	  and	  steel	  center.	  	  
Although	  Connellsville,	  Pennsylvania	  dominated	  coke	  production,	  the	  fuel	  was	  also	  
produced	  in	  mass	  quantities	  in	  Ohio,	  Illinois,	  Indiana,	  several	  southern	  Appalachian	  
states,	  and	  Colorado	  by	  the	  twentieth	  century.26	  
The	  development	  of	  anthracite	  and	  coke	  fuels	  accompanied	  with	  the	  
perfection	  of	  hot	  air	  blast	  furnaces	  led	  to	  an	  entirely	  new	  type	  of	  furnace	  by	  1860.	  	  
These	  new	  larger,	  cylindrical	  iron	  shell	  furnaces	  were	  now	  constructed	  on	  level	  
ground,	  lined	  with	  firebrick,	  and	  relied	  on	  hoists	  to	  raise	  the	  raw	  materials	  to	  the	  
furnace	  top	  to	  be	  hand	  fed	  into	  the	  fire.27	  	  These	  new	  furnaces	  allowed	  for	  larger	  
loads	  of	  raw	  materials	  to	  be	  fed	  into	  the	  furnace	  and	  the	  more	  compact	  and	  
powerful	  coke	  aided	  the	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  furnace	  output.	  	  Stronger,	  more	  
efficient	  stoves	  utilizing	  steam	  engines	  to	  operate	  the	  bellows28	  also	  aided	  the	  
heating	  process.	  	  The	  development	  of	  the	  Whitwell	  and	  Cowper	  furnaces	  allowed	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 DiCiccio, Coal and Coke, 43. 
26 DiCiccio, Coal and Coke, 38-46. 
27 Hogan, Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry, 5, 27-29. 
28 Bellows are mechanized systems for delivering controlled bursts of pressurized air. 
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the	  more	  efficient	  circulation	  of	  hot	  air	  in	  the	  much	  larger	  furnace	  stacks.	  	  The	  
Whitwell	  stove	  were	  typically	  installed	  in	  sets	  of	  three	  and;	  
contained	   fire-­‐brick	  chambers,	  within	  which	   the	  waste	  gases	  burned	  
for	  a	  period,	  until	  the	  fire-­‐bricks	  were	  at	  a	  red	  heat.	   	  The	  gases	  were	  
then	  turned	  off	  to	  the	  alternate	  stove,	  and	  the	  air	  for	  the	  blast-­‐furnace	  
was	   driven	   in	   through	   the	   heated	   stove	   until	   the	   other	   one	   had	  
become	  sufficiently	  heated.29	  
	  
This	  aided	  in	  doubling	  the	  output	  of	  iron	  without	  requiring	  much	  more	  energy,	  and	  
in	  many	  cases	  the	  output	  increased	  much	  more	  than	  that.	  	  With	  the	  basic	  coking	  
process	  understood	  and	  the	  ignition	  problems	  associated	  with	  it	  overcome	  by	  
improvements	  to	  stoves	  and	  bellows,	  coke	  iron	  quickly	  began	  reshaping	  the	  
American	  iron	  industry.	  30	  
Although	  coke	  became	  the	  primary	  fuel	  used	  in	  iron	  and	  steel	  production	  by	  
1880,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  neither	  charcoal-­‐	  nor	  anthracite-­‐fueled	  furnaces	  
ceased	  to	  produce	  pig	  iron.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  both	  essentially	  maintained	  their	  
production	  rates	  over	  the	  next	  twenty	  years.	  	  They	  were	  simply	  outpaced	  by	  
growing	  iron	  and	  steel	  industries	  in	  bituminous	  coal	  regions.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  1880	  
anthracite-­‐fueled	  furnaces	  produced	  1,807,651	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron,	  while	  charcoal	  
fueled	  furnaces	  produced	  537,558	  tons	  of	  iron,	  and	  1,950,205	  of	  pig	  iron	  were	  
produced	  in	  bituminous	  coke	  fueled	  furnaces.	  	  By	  1900,	  anthracite	  and	  charcoal	  
fueled	  furnaces	  respectively	  produced	  1,879,293	  and	  380,658	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron	  
whereas	  bituminous	  coke	  fueled	  furnaces	  produced	  13,134,927	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron.	  	  
This	  dramatic	  increase	  over	  20	  years	  of	  673.5	  percent	  in	  pig	  iron	  produced	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 R.H. Richards, “The Hot Blast in Making Iron,” Science 3, no. 50 (January 18, 1884): 72. 




bituminous	  coke	  fueled	  furnaces	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  exploding	  scale	  of	  American	  
iron	  and	  steel	  industries	  and	  the	  limited	  quantity	  of	  anthracite	  and	  timber.31	   	  
	   As	  the	  United	  States	  expanded	  westward,	  so	  too	  did	  the	  iron	  industry’s	  ore	  
supply	  and	  manufacturing	  centers.	  	  Accompanied	  with	  Connellsville	  coke,	  this	  shift	  
in	  ore	  supply	  heavily	  influenced	  the	  growing	  concentration	  of	  the	  American	  iron	  and	  
steel	  industry	  in	  southwest	  Pennsylvania	  by	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  The	  
opening	  of	  new	  ore	  fields	  during	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  in	  the	  Lake	  Superior	  
and	  Alabama	  region	  had	  the	  largest	  impact	  on	  reshaping	  the	  industry.32	  
	   Iron	  ores	  from	  the	  Lake	  Superior	  region	  of	  Michigan,	  Minnesota,	  and	  
Wisconsin	  have	  been	  utilized	  since	  1852.	  	  During	  the	  closing	  decades	  of	  the	  19th	  
century	  this	  region’s	  ores	  became	  the	  primary	  source	  for	  the	  country’s	  furnaces	  and	  
steel	  mills.	  	  William	  Burt	  first	  discovered	  the	  huge	  ore	  deposits	  in	  this	  region	  in	  
1844,	  the	  transportation	  of	  the	  iron	  ores	  via	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  was	  dramatically	  
improved	  by	  bypassing	  the	  rapids	  of	  the	  St.	  Mary’s	  River	  between	  Lake	  Superior	  and	  
Lake	  Huron	  with	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  Sault	  Ste.	  Marie	  canal	  in	  1855.	  	  Michigan’s	  Upper	  
Peninsula	  held	  an	  abundance	  of	  ore	  that	  was	  low	  in	  phosphorous,	  which	  was	  best	  
suited	  for	  the	  Bessemer	  conversion	  process,	  and	  by	  1880	  Michigan	  was	  well	  on	  its	  
way	  to	  overtaking	  Pennsylvania	  as	  the	  leading	  ore	  producing	  state	  because	  of.33	  	  The	  
opening	  of	  the	  Mesabi	  Range	  in	  Minnesota	  during	  the	  1880s	  would	  only	  add	  to	  the	  
Lake	  Superior	  region’s	  importance	  as	  a	  supplier	  of	  iron	  ore.	  	  As	  more	  and	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Hogan, Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry, 205. 
32 Hogan, Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry, 25. 
33 Hogan, Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry, 18-20. 
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eastern	  ore	  mines	  were	  depleted,	  the	  country’s	  iron	  and	  steel	  manufactures	  became	  
increasingly	  dependent	  on	  ores	  mined	  in	  the	  Lake	  Superior	  region.	  
	   The	  opening	  of	  the	  Minnesota	  iron	  ore	  fields	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  
reshaping	  the	  industry’s	  ore	  supply.	  	  These	  ores	  were	  ideally	  suited	  for	  the	  growing	  
iron	  and	  steel	  industry.	  	  The	  iron	  ore	  deposits	  were	  abundant	  and	  near	  the	  earth’s	  
surface,	  and	  therefore	  cheaply	  extracted.	  	  They	  contained	  a	  high	  iron	  content	  and	  
low	  phosphorous	  level,	  but	  they	  were	  of	  a	  much	  softer	  composition	  than	  ores	  that	  
had	  been	  previously	  used.34	  	  The	  soft	  composition	  of	  the	  Mesabi	  Range	  ores	  initially	  
kept	  them	  from	  primary	  use	  because	  these	  softer	  ores	  would	  clog	  furnaces	  designed	  
to	  handle	  much	  harder	  and	  more	  rocklike	  ores,	  but	  furnaces	  were	  quickly	  refitted	  to	  
handle	  these	  softer	  ores	  and	  only	  these	  softer	  ores.	  	  With	  the	  refitting	  of	  furnaces	  to	  
handle	  these	  ores,	  production	  of	  pig	  iron	  grew	  so	  that	  by	  1890	  American	  pig	  iron	  
production	  would	  outpace	  British	  production	  of	  pig	  iron	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  	  And	  in	  
recovering	  from	  the	  economic	  depression	  caused	  by	  the	  Panic	  of	  1893,	  it	  would	  be	  
the	  ores	  from	  the	  Michigan	  and	  Minnesota	  fields	  that	  would	  provide	  a	  majority	  of	  
the	  pig	  iron	  for	  finished	  iron	  and	  steel	  production	  in	  the	  United	  States.35	  	  By	  1900,	  
Minnesota	  produced	  9,834,399	  tons	  of	  iron	  ore,	  far	  outpacing	  the	  1,515,992	  tons	  of	  
ore	  mined	  in	  Virginia	  and	  Tennessee	  during	  the	  same	  year.36	  
Pittsburgh	  became	  the	  nation’s	  steel	  center	  for	  several	  reasons.	  	  The	  city’s	  
location	  served	  as	  an	  economically	  central	  point	  for	  meeting	  coke	  from	  western	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 If too high, phosphorous content in iron ore can render the hardened iron and steel too brittle for effective 
use making the use of high phosphorus ores unpractical until oxidizing technologies were developed to 
reduce high levels. 
35 Hogan, Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry, 184. 
36 Hogan, Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry, 196. 
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Pennsylvania	  and	  iron	  ore	  from	  the	  Lake	  Superior	  region.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  sharpest	  
minds	  in	  the	  industry	  were	  already	  in	  Pennsylvania	  because	  of	  the	  state’s	  long	  
established	  iron	  industry	  and	  its	  strong	  ties	  with	  English	  ironmasters.	  	  Pittsburgh’s	  
centrality	  to	  a	  wealth	  of	  natural	  resources	  and	  mental	  capital	  made	  the	  city’s	  
meteoric	  rise	  during	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  possible.	  	  Skyrocketing	  demand	  for	  
steel	  rail	  also	  fueled	  Pittsburgh’s	  growth	  as	  the	  United	  States	  rapidly	  expanded	  
westward	  and	  the	  country’s	  rail	  network	  grew	  annually	  at	  often	  astonishing	  rates.	  	  
Historian	  Kenneth	  Warren	  notes	  that	  while	  Pittsburgh	  did	  not	  produce	  steel	  rails	  in	  
1875,	  “by	  1878	  it	  rolled	  13.13	  percent	  of	  the	  total,	  and	  in	  the	  late	  1890s	  it	  rolled	  as	  
much	  as	  29	  percent.”37	  	  He	  also	  notes	  similar	  gains	  in	  the	  production	  of	  pig	  iron	  and	  
it	  was	  during	  this	  time	  that	  men	  such	  as	  the	  Carnegies	  and	  Henry	  Clay	  Frick	  came	  to	  
dominate	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry	  and	  controlled	  much	  of	  the	  industry	  by	  the	  turn	  of	  
the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  Much	  of	  Pittsburgh’s	  growth	  can	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  superiority	  
of	  the	  ore	  coming	  from	  the	  Lake	  Superior	  districts.	  
The	  ore	  from	  these	  districts	  were	  not	  only	  seemingly	  abundant,	  but	  had	  a	  
much	  higher	  metallic	  content	  than	  ores	  from	  practically	  anywhere	  else	  in	  the	  
country.	  	  Moving	  the	  ore	  by	  water	  helped	  to	  keep	  the	  cost	  of	  transportation	  low	  and	  
when,	  “Lake	  Superior	  ore	  reached	  its	  destination	  in	  northeastern	  Ohio	  or	  
southwestern	  Pennsylvania,	  its	  favorable	  chemical	  characteristics	  paid	  off.”38	  	  This	  
advantage	  came	  from	  these	  ores’	  suitability	  to	  the	  primary	  steel	  making	  process	  of	  
the	  day,	  Bessemer-­‐steel	  conversion.	  	  Unlike	  ores	  from	  southern	  states,	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Kenneth Warren, Triumphant Capitalism: Henry Clay Frick and the Industrial Transformation of 
America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 22. 
38 W. David Lewis, Sloss Furnaces and the Rise of the Birmingham District (Tuscaloosa: The University of 
Alabama Press, 1994), 92. 
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contained	  high	  concentrations	  of	  phosphorus	  and	  silica,	  the	  northern	  operators	  
could	  easily	  use	  Lake	  Superior	  pig	  iron	  in	  Bessemer	  converters.39	  
Three	  men,	  two	  English	  and	  one	  American,	  mastered	  the	  Bessemer	  steel	  
conversion	  process	  during	  the	  mid	  1850’s.40	  	  They	  discovered	  a	  method	  to	  force	  air	  
through	  molten	  pig	  iron	  so	  that	  the	  oxygen	  would	  combine	  with	  the	  carbon	  in	  the	  
pig	  iron	  to	  form	  steel,	  which	  is	  both	  stronger	  and	  more	  flexible	  than	  wrought,	  or	  cast	  
iron.	  	  Skilled	  laborers	  were	  able	  to	  gauge	  when	  the	  appropriate	  levels	  of	  carbon	  
were	  reached	  by	  pouring	  molten	  pig	  iron	  into	  an	  oval	  shaped	  iron	  vessel	  lined	  with	  
firebrick	  and	  blasting	  air	  through	  a	  number	  of	  tuyeres	  in	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  vessel.	  	  
As	  simple	  as	  this	  process	  is	  in	  principle,	  it	  was	  also	  incredibly	  costly,	  dangerous,	  and	  
limited	  to	  very	  specific	  types	  of	  pig	  iron.41	  	  Iron	  ores	  found	  in	  the	  region	  stretching	  
from	  Virginia	  to	  Alabama	  are	  largely	  red	  hematites	  or	  brown	  ores,	  which	  contain	  
levels	  of	  phosphorus	  too	  high	  for	  use	  in	  Bessemer	  converters.42	  	  As	  previously	  
stated,	  it	  would	  be	  the	  Great	  Lake	  ores	  that	  contained	  the	  appropriate	  levels	  of	  
phosphorus	  for	  conversion	  through	  the	  Bessemer	  process	  and	  be	  one	  of	  the	  
determining	  reasons	  why	  the	  manufacturing	  belt	  along	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  and	  
Pennsylvania	  developed	  in	  the	  manner	  that	  it	  did.	  	  	  
Regardless	  of	  the	  Bessemer’s	  shortcomings,	  the	  advantages	  of	  steel	  over	  iron	  
were	  immediately	  clear	  and	  it	  would	  be	  the	  production	  of	  steel	  rails	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Lewis, Sloss Furnaces, 91,92. 
40 Hogan hypothesizes that the Englishmen and American came up with the same basic method at roughly 
the same time, but who mastered what first is not the focus of this work.   
41 The specific limitations to pig iron suitable for the Bessemer process were largely tied to the phosphorus 
levels within the iron ore.  Too high and the end product will be too brittle for intended use.  Phosphorus 
levels do need to be well under 1 percent, but to be more precise than this is, at the moment, beyond the 
author’s comfort level. 
42 Edwin C. Eckel,  “The Iron and Steel Industry of the South,” The American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 153 (January 1931): 55-56. 
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seemingly	  ever-­‐expanding	  railroad	  systems	  that	  would	  drive	  much	  of	  steel’s	  rapid	  
rise.	  	  Historian	  William	  Hogan	  states	  that,	  “by	  1880	  the	  picture	  had	  changed	  as	  
larger	  mills	  were	  built	  and	  the	  steel	  rail	  outdistanced	  its	  iron	  rival	  two	  to	  one.”43	  	  It	  
would	  not	  be	  until	  modern	  open-­‐hearth	  furnaces	  were	  constructed	  that	  southern	  
steel	  industries	  could	  become	  legitimate	  competitors	  to	  their	  northern	  
counterparts.	  	  Southern	  steel	  production	  would	  never	  come	  to	  seriously	  challenge	  
northern	  production.	  
Technological	  innovation,	  such	  as	  the	  Bessemer	  converters	  and	  open	  hearth	  
furnaces,	  the	  utilization	  of	  efficient	  but	  costly	  coke,	  the	  opening	  of	  new	  ore	  fields	  
along	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  and	  reaching	  southern	  ore	  fields	  via	  railroads,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
country’s	  expansion	  westward	  and	  growth	  in	  population	  would	  all	  be	  forces	  in	  
driving	  the	  rapidly	  expanding	  American	  steel	  industry.	  	  It	  would	  be	  advances	  in	  the	  
iron	  and	  steel	  consuming	  industries	  that	  largely	  drive	  the	  coming	  of	  the	  American	  
century.	  	  By	  the	  1870’s,	  railroads	  were	  well	  established	  as	  the	  principal	  iron	  
consuming	  industry	  within	  the	  country,	  and	  rail’s	  conversion	  from	  iron	  components	  
to	  steel	  components	  would	  coincide	  directly	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Bessemer	  
conversion	  process.	  	  The	  first	  year	  any	  steel	  rails	  would	  be	  produced	  within	  the	  
United	  States	  was	  1867	  at	  which	  time	  British	  imports	  of	  iron	  and	  steel	  rails	  still	  
countered	  American	  producers’	  inability	  to	  match	  the	  country’s	  skyrocketing	  
demand	  for	  railroads.	  	  The	  production	  of	  steel	  rails	  would	  come	  to	  outpace	  the	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domestic	  production	  of	  iron	  rails	  in	  1877,	  and	  from	  there	  on	  would	  only	  continue	  to	  
replace	  iron	  rails.44	  
Besides	  the	  growth	  or	  railroads	  and	  the	  conversion	  from	  iron	  to	  steel	  rails,	  a	  
growing	  number	  of	  applications	  for	  iron	  and	  steel	  also	  helped	  boost	  the	  industry’s	  
rapid	  expansion.	  	  Much	  of	  this	  came	  from	  rise	  of	  agriculture	  in	  the	  newly	  settled	  
Midwestern	  and	  western	  portions	  of	  the	  country	  and	  a	  growing	  demand	  for	  
agricultural	  implements.	  	  Farmers	  increasingly	  utilized	  plows,	  cultivators,	  harrows,	  
shovels,	  hoes,	  hayforks,	  and	  any	  number	  of	  other	  farm	  tools	  as	  the	  country’s	  
population	  continued	  to	  expand.	  	  Factories	  producing	  components	  such	  as	  these	  
tended	  locate	  themselves	  in	  areas	  where	  the	  cheapest	  sources	  of	  raw	  materials	  
could	  be	  attained.	  	  To	  a	  lesser	  degree	  this	  occurred	  in	  the	  South	  as	  well.	  	  As	  late	  as	  
1886,	  the	  Edinburg	  Agricultural	  Works	  of	  the	  Shenandoah	  Valley	  produced	  plows	  
and	  harrows	  from	  entirely	  locally	  produced	  materials.45	  	  Increasingly	  more	  
structural	  steel	  companies,	  wire	  rolling	  mills,	  machine	  shops,	  assembly	  plants,	  
construction	  components,	  and	  more	  positioned	  themselves	  as	  closely	  as	  possible	  to	  
the	  cheapest	  and	  most	  accessible	  ores.	  	  This	  concentration	  also	  placed	  the	  skilled	  
labor	  force	  increasingly	  in	  the	  northern	  regions	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  with	  most	  
southern	  ores	  unfit	  for	  early	  steel	  conversion	  processes,	  southern	  industries	  were	  
hampered	  during	  a	  crucial	  time	  in	  the	  American	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry’s	  
development.46	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Despite	  these	  trends,	  the	  production	  of	  wrought	  iron	  pipe	  would	  be	  one	  of	  
the	  southern	  Appalachia’s	  primary	  finishing	  industries.	  	  As	  oil	  fields	  were	  tapped	  at	  
an	  increasingly	  rapid	  pace	  and	  more	  and	  more	  American	  cities	  installed	  modern	  
waterworks	  and	  sewage	  systems,	  the	  demand	  for	  wrought	  iron	  and	  cast	  iron	  
pipeline	  skyrocketed.	  	  The	  construction	  of	  more	  and	  more	  wrought	  and	  cast	  iron	  
pipe	  mills	  in	  the	  South	  took	  place	  at	  the	  same	  time	  steel	  mills	  were	  developed	  in	  
northern	  communities.47	  
Even	  though	  during	  the	  later	  nineteenth	  century	  Pittsburgh	  and	  the	  Great	  
Lakes	  rapidly	  became	  the	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry’s	  premier	  manufacturing	  center,	  
the	  Birmingham	  district	  of	  Alabama	  emerged	  practically	  overnight	  as	  the	  South’s	  
major	  iron	  and	  steel	  producing	  center.	  	  While	  Pittsburgh’s	  growth	  was	  aided	  by	  a	  
variety	  of	  forces,	  the	  Birmingham	  district	  of	  Alabama	  held	  the	  richest	  deposits	  of	  the	  
necessary	  raw	  materials	  for	  iron	  production	  in	  the	  country.	  	  In	  the	  years	  following	  
the	  Civil	  War,	  largely	  because	  of	  nearby	  concentration	  of	  raw	  materials,	  Birmingham	  
rapidly	  became	  the	  United	  States’	  second	  largest	  iron	  producing	  center,	  and	  much	  of	  
southern	  Appalachia	  saw	  comparable	  investment	  in	  smaller,	  but	  comparable	  
industries.48	  
Although	  the	  ores	  and	  coals	  that	  drove	  Birmingham’s	  rise	  were	  less	  suitable	  
for	  the	  Bessemer	  steel-­‐making	  process	  and	  beehive	  oven	  coking	  processes	  of	  the	  
day,	  technological	  adaptations	  and	  the	  sheer	  abundance	  of	  the	  materials	  helped	  
counter	  these	  deficiencies.	  	  The	  close	  concentration	  of	  red	  hematite	  and	  brown	  iron	  
ores,	  bituminous	  coal	  suitable	  for	  coking,	  dolomite	  and	  limestone	  for	  fluxing,	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combined	  with	  Birmingham’s	  close	  proximity	  to	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Mexico,	  western	  states,	  
and	  south	  also	  lent	  to	  the	  city’s	  booming	  iron	  industry	  from	  its	  formation	  in	  1871	  to	  
the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.49	  	  Birmingham’s	  early	  development	  as	  an	  iron	  
center	  has	  been	  heavily	  linked	  to	  investment	  from	  Virginia.	  	  W.	  David	  Lewis	  details	  
this	  complex	  pattern	  of	  intraregional	  investment	  and	  development	  in	  the	  years	  
following	  the	  Civil	  War.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  Sloss	  Furnaces	  are	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  
Richmond’s	  “economic	  outreach”	  during	  the	  later	  nineteenth	  century.50	  	  
Prior	  to	  the	  Civil	  War	  Richmond,	  Virginia	  was	  the	  most	  industrialized	  
southern	  city,	  and	  although	  much	  of	  the	  city	  burned	  during	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  
Confederacy,	  former	  Confederate	  and	  city	  leaders	  led	  a	  rapid	  post-­‐war	  recovery	  that	  
quickly	  restored	  Richmond’s	  position	  as	  a	  manufacturing	  and	  investment	  center.	  	  
Many	  ex-­‐Confederates,	  like	  and	  including,	  the	  same	  men	  who	  rebuilt	  Richmond	  
quickly,	  put	  their	  energy	  into	  industrializing	  the	  South.	  	  These	  men	  continued	  to	  
work	  intimately	  with	  antebellum	  business	  connections	  in	  cities	  such	  as	  Baltimore	  
and	  New	  York	  City	  for	  financial	  support	  in	  constructing	  railroads	  while	  money	  for	  
factories,	  mills,	  and	  furnaces	  largely	  came	  from	  southern	  interests.	  	  Railways	  and	  
iron	  producers	  only	  became	  more	  interrelated	  in	  the	  South	  during	  this	  time,	  and	  the	  
relationship	  between	  Birmingham’s	  emerging	  steel	  industries	  and	  the	  rail	  network	  
that	  became	  the	  Southern	  Railway	  exemplifies	  this.	  	  This	  connection	  primarily	  came	  
through	  a	  Richmond	  industrialist,	  Joseph	  Bryan,	  a	  promoter	  for	  the	  Georgia	  Pacific	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(the	  predecessor	  of	  the	  Southern	  Railway),	  whose	  syndicate	  purchased	  the	  
struggling	  Sloss	  Furnaces	  in	  1886.51	  	  	  
Sloss	  was	  the	  largest	  iron-­‐producing	  group	  in	  Birmingham	  until	  a	  Tennessee	  
firm	  bought	  its	  way	  into	  the	  city	  about	  the	  same	  time	  as	  Bryan	  and	  his	  associates	  
did.	  	  Birmingham’s	  rapid	  rise	  to	  prominence	  was	  aided	  by	  this	  company’s	  entrance,	  
and	  as	  historian	  Gavin	  Wright	  notes,	  
[A]s	   late	  as	  1886,	  Chattanooga	  (Tennessee)	  was	  still	  regarded	  as	   the	  
‘centre	  of	  iron-­‐making	  in	  the	  South,’	  in	  that	  same	  year	  the	  Tennessee	  
Coal	   Iron	   and	   Railway	   Company	   (TCI)	   bought	   its	   way	   into	   the	  
Birmingham	  area,	  and	  over	  the	  succeeding	  years,	  TCI	  and	  Birmingham	  
came	  to	  dominate	  the	  southern	  industry.52	  
	  
With	  the	  TCI	  and	  Sloss	  operations	  continuing	  to	  fuel	  growth	  and	  steel	  demand	  
gradually	  supplanting	  iron,	  the	  Birmingham	  district	  entered	  steel	  production	  in	  
1898	  at	  Ensley.	  	  Although	  TCI	  would	  be	  bought	  by	  U.S.	  Steel	  Corporation	  in	  1907,	  
the	  company	  was	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  and	  most	  powerful	  examples	  of	  vertically	  
integrated	  producers	  of	  pig	  iron	  and	  iron	  products.53	  
Although	  Alabama	  seemed	  well	  prepared	  to	  become	  a	  dominating	  iron	  and	  
steel	  region,	  several	  factors	  delayed	  the	  growth	  of	  their	  industry,	  and	  for	  the	  most	  
part	  they	  coincide	  with	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  much	  smaller	  iron	  industries	  in	  
Virginia	  and	  Tennessee.	  	  The	  ores	  mined	  in	  Alabama	  were	  often	  inconsistent	  in	  
composition,	  but	  would	  be	  smelted	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  regardless.	  	  This	  would	  
produce	  inferior	  pig	  iron	  and	  it	  would	  not	  be	  until	  1890	  that	  furnaces	  began	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regularly	  analyzing	  the	  ore	  they	  fired.54	  	  Another	  problem	  faced	  by	  Alabama’s	  iron	  
industries	  were	  high	  phosphorus	  levels	  that	  rendered	  Bessemer	  converters	  
impossible	  to	  use.	  	  It	  would	  not	  be	  until	  the	  Alabama	  Iron	  and	  Steel	  Company	  rebuilt	  
their	  facilities	  in	  1883	  that	  the	  open-­‐hearth	  method	  of	  converting	  iron	  to	  steel	  made	  
the	  conversion	  of	  southern	  ores	  possible.55	  	  Alabama’s	  failure	  to	  emerge	  as	  a	  leading	  
steel	  producing	  center	  until	  well	  into	  the	  twentieth	  century	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  
this	  work,	  but	  its	  iron	  and	  steel	  shops	  built	  during	  the	  1880’s	  and	  1890’s	  would	  
provide	  ample	  competition	  for	  Virginia	  and	  Tennessee	  iron	  and	  steel	  works.	  
Several	  smaller	  regional	  centers	  in	  the	  southern	  Appalachians	  emerged	  in	  
the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  to	  produce	  iron	  by	  bringing	  together	  locally	  mined	  coal	  
and	  iron	  ore.	  	  Chattanooga,	  Tennessee	  became	  one	  such	  city	  in	  the	  years	  following	  
the	  Civil	  War.	  	  The	  area	  immediately	  surrounding	  Chattanooga	  held	  a	  high	  
concentration	  of	  iron	  and	  coal	  deposits,	  “[and]	  by	  1885	  the	  city	  boasted	  nine	  
furnaces	  with	  seventeen	  foundries	  and	  machine	  shops.”56	  	  The	  city	  was	  responsible	  
for	  nearly	  half	  of	  Tennessee’s	  total	  outputs	  of	  rolled	  iron,	  steel	  rails,	  blooms	  and	  
forges.	  	  Chattanooga’s	  iron	  and	  steel	  boom	  would	  peak	  at	  roughly	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century	  as	  steel	  production	  in	  the	  North	  began	  to	  rapidly	  outpace	  
southern	  competition.57	  
Bristol,	  Tennessee	  would	  experience	  a	  similar	  iron	  and	  steel	  boom	  in	  the	  late	  
nineteenth	  century.	  	  Bisected	  by	  the	  Virginia	  and	  Tennessee	  border,	  the	  city	  would	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rise	  as	  a	  regional	  center	  for	  manufacturing,	  wholesale	  distribution,	  and	  retail.	  	  It	  
became	  an	  iron	  center	  with	  the	  opening	  of	  southwest	  Virginia’s	  coalfields	  and	  
northeast	  Tennessee’s	  iron	  ore	  deposits.58	  This	  would	  be	  a	  determining	  reason	  for	  
the	  management	  of	  the	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  to	  locate	  their	  
company	  headquarters	  on	  the	  Tennessee	  side	  of	  the	  city.	  	  Bristol’s	  largest	  problem	  
would	  be	  high	  transportation	  costs.	  	  Historian	  Tom	  Lee	  notes	  that,	  	  
[A]fter	  1887	  the	  Interstate	  Commerce	  Commission	  gave	  legal	  sanction	  
to	  the	  classifications	  and	  freight	  rate	  differentials	  institutionalized	  by	  
America’s	   railways	   during	   the	   1870s	   and	   1880s.	   	   As	   a	   result	   of	   the	  
system	   of	   regions	   established	   by	   the	   railroads,	   southern	   producers	  
paid	   higher	   rates	   to	   ship	   good	   to	   the	   far	   larger	   markets	   of	   the	  
northeastern	  United	  States	  than	  to	  points	  in	  the	  South.59	  
	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  railroads	  were	  necessarily	  trying	  to	  retard	  southern	  industrial	  
growth,	  but	  that	  southern	  industrial	  development	  did	  not	  begin	  in	  the	  region	  until	  
late	  and	  railroads	  were	  investing	  much	  of	  their	  resources	  into	  the	  area,	  and	  charging	  
higher	  rates	  in	  return.	  	  
The	  growth	  of	  Roanoke,	  Virginia	  was	  as	  impressive	  as	  any	  of	  the	  southern	  
Appalachian	  industrial	  cities.	  	  With	  the	  coming	  of	  the	  Norfolk	  and	  Western	  Railroad	  
in	  the	  early	  1880’s,	  what	  had	  once	  been	  a	  stop	  along	  the	  line	  connecting	  Lynchburg,	  
Virginia	  and	  Bristol,	  Virginia	  quickly	  grew	  as	  a	  junction	  for	  commerce	  between	  
southwest	  Virginia,	  the	  Shenandoah	  Valley,	  and	  the	  eastern	  port	  city	  of	  Norfolk.	  	  
Roanoke’s	  first	  iron	  works	  were	  built	  in	  the	  late	  1880’s.	  	  Within	  a	  few	  years	  blast	  
furnaces	  were	  operational,	  but	  like	  many	  of	  the	  blast	  furnaces	  in	  southwest	  Virginia	  
and	  northeast	  Tennessee,	  they	  were	  sold	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  1893	  economic	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University of Tennessee Press, 2005), 47. 
59 Lee, The Tennessee-Virginia Tri-Cities, 58. 
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depression	  after	  iron	  prices	  plummeted	  and	  many	  of	  the	  newly	  established	  blast	  
furnaces	  were	  unable	  to	  remain	  in	  business.60	  In	  addition,	  Roanoke	  would	  serve	  as	  
the	  company	  headquarters	  for	  the	  Norfolk	  and	  Western	  Railway,	  as	  the	  city	  would	  
become	  a	  major	  distribution	  point	  for	  coal	  mined	  in	  the	  southwest	  corner	  of	  the	  
state.	  
The	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  witnessed	  a	  dramatic	  reshaping	  of	  
the	  United	  States	  iron	  industry	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  American	  steel	  industry	  in	  
both	  the	  North	  and	  South.	  	  Technological	  advancements	  in	  furnace	  and	  mill	  designs	  
as	  well	  as	  skyrocketing	  demand,	  primarily	  from	  railroads,	  helped	  to	  drive	  this	  
revolution	  in	  production	  and	  use.	  	  The	  introduction	  of	  coke	  as	  a	  fuel	  supply	  and	  the	  
entrance	  of	  ores	  from	  the	  Lake	  Superior	  districts	  also	  contributed	  greatly.	  	  The	  
American	  South,	  which	  had	  only	  been	  industrialized	  on	  a	  limited	  basis	  prior	  to	  the	  
Civil	  War,	  also	  experienced	  a	  boom	  in	  its	  iron	  industry.	  	  For	  much	  of	  this	  time	  
Birmingham,	  Alabama	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  an	  emerging	  southern	  Pittsburgh	  while	  
Tennessee	  and	  Virginia	  also	  saw	  dramatic	  advances	  in	  production.	  	  While	  the	  
quality	  of	  raw	  materials	  would	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Birmingham	  and	  
Appalachian	  iron	  industries	  in	  the	  face	  of	  steel,	  the	  region	  still	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  
reshaping	  American	  industry	  during	  the	  later	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  
century.
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Chapter	  Two	  –	  Late	  Nineteenth	  Century	  Industrial	  Modernization	  in	  Southern	  
Appalachia	  and	  the	  First	  Years	  of	  The	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  
While	  the	  ore	  fields	  of	  the	  Lake	  Superior,	  New	  York,	  and	  Alabama	  regions	  
gave	  rise	  to	  major	  steel	  centers	  in	  western	  Pennsylvania,	  Alabama,	  and	  the	  Midwest	  
during	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  capitalists	  also	  saw	  opportunity	  in	  modernizing	  
southern	  Appalachia’s	  iron	  industry	  during	  the	  later	  nineteenth	  century.	  	  During	  
this	  time	  the	  small	  charcoal	  furnaces	  that	  served	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  largely	  
agrarian	  regions	  of	  southwest	  Virginia	  and	  east	  Tennessee	  were	  quickly	  outmoded	  
as	  northern	  investors	  built	  much	  larger,	  modern	  coke	  fired	  iron	  furnaces	  region.	  	  It	  
was	  during	  the	  final	  two	  decades	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  that	  the	  conditions	  for	  
the	  formation	  of	  the	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  (VIC&CC)	  were	  made	  
possible.	  
When	  the	  VIC&CC	  formally	  organized	  in	  January	  1899	  as	  a	  vertically	  
integrated	  producer	  of	  pig	  iron	  and	  coal,	  it	  was	  the	  result	  of	  several	  decades	  of	  
speculation,	  capital	  investment,	  and	  industrial	  modernization	  in	  southwestern	  
Virginia	  and	  east	  Tennessee.	  	  During	  the	  company’s	  checkered	  first	  years	  
management	  faced	  several	  hurdles	  that	  ultimately	  led	  to	  receivership	  and	  
reorganization.	  	  Severe	  internal	  strife	  and	  accusations	  of	  sabotage	  at	  the	  company’s	  
highest	  levels,	  heavy	  property	  losses	  from	  fires,	  a	  shortage	  of	  working	  capital,	  and	  
logistical	  problems	  in	  transporting	  freight	  can	  all	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  company’s	  near	  
collapse	  in	  1901.	  	  When	  the	  reorganized	  company	  began	  operations	  in	  1903,	  the	  
company	  continued	  to	  produce	  pig	  iron,	  but	  during	  the	  next	  three	  decades	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management	  increasingly	  turned	  their	  interests	  towards	  their	  Pocahontas	  coal	  
interests.	  
In	  the	  years	  following	  the	  Civil	  War	  capital	  investment	  poured	  into	  southern	  
Appalachia	  to	  access	  the	  largely	  untouched	  and	  close	  concentrations	  of	  timber,	  
waterways,	  coal,	  iron	  ore,	  and	  other	  valuable	  ores	  and	  minerals.	  	  As	  Virginians	  
worked	  to	  rebuild	  the	  state’s	  economy	  and	  social	  fabric	  during	  the	  years	  following	  
the	  war,	  Virginia’s	  economy	  did	  grow,	  but	  at	  a	  slow	  pace.	  	  By	  the	  1880s,	  this	  had	  
changed.	  	  Historian	  Allen	  Moger	  characterized	  this	  decade	  in	  Virginia	  as	  a	  “time	  
when	  the	  commonwealth	  assumed	  a	  new	  spirit.	  	  No	  longer	  were	  its	  leaders	  in	  trade	  
and	  industry	  controlled	  by	  despair	  and	  hesitation.	  	  Theirs	  was	  a	  spirit	  of	  hope	  and	  
courage.	  	  Turning	  their	  backs	  on	  defeatism	  and	  inaction,	  they	  adopted	  the	  spirit	  of	  
confidence	  and	  vision	  which	  in	  that	  decade	  became	  characteristic	  of	  the	  ’New	  
South.’”61	  	  The	  state’s	  cities,	  towns,	  and	  counties	  eagerly	  promoted	  their	  resources	  
and	  potential	  for	  development	  in	  period	  of	  rapid	  overdevelopment	  and	  speculation.	  	  
The	  promotional	  efforts	  of	  southern	  newspapers	  such	  as	  the	  Richmond	  Whig,	  
journals	  such	  as	  the	  Manufacturers’	  Record,	  and	  wealthy	  Civil	  War	  veterans	  such	  as	  
General	  John	  Daniel	  Imboden	  and	  Major	  Jedediah	  Hotchkiss	  drew	  outside	  attention	  
to	  these	  resources,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  investors	  from	  the	  Northeast	  and	  Great	  Britain	  
flooded	  southern	  Appalachia.	  	  Land	  agents	  representing	  large	  timber	  and	  iron	  
interests	  purchased	  or	  leased	  land	  from	  individuals	  to	  a	  point	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
nineteenth	  century	  a	  single	  individual,	  group,	  railway,	  or	  company	  owned	  tracts	  of	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hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  acres.62	  	  In	  the	  remaining	  twenty	  years	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  
century,	  this	  general	  atmosphere	  created	  the	  conditions	  that	  made	  the	  formation	  of	  
the	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  possible.	  
Although	  the	  region’s	  rich	  coal	  fields	  and	  timber	  stands	  came	  to	  dominate	  
industrial	  activity	  in	  the	  area,	  for	  much	  of	  the	  later	  nineteenth	  century	  the	  
production	  of	  iron	  and	  steel	  offered	  great	  potential	  for	  investors.	  	  During	  this	  time	  
there	  was	  much	  speculation	  on	  the	  quality	  and	  volume	  of	  the	  ores	  present	  in	  
southern	  Appalachia,	  but	  excited	  investment	  poured	  into	  the	  region	  nonetheless.	  	  
According	  to	  historian	  Harold	  Mann,	  “The	  dominant	  iron	  ore	  found	  in	  the	  New	  River	  
counties,	  called	  ‘brown’	  with	  one	  version	  called	  limonite,	  and	  a	  less	  desirable	  kind	  of	  
‘brown’	  name	  ‘mountain	  ore.’”63	  	  Historian	  William	  Hogan	  notes	  that	  production	  of	  
iron	  ore	  and	  pig	  iron	  quadrupled	  between	  1880-­‐1890.64	  	  As	  the	  production	  and	  use	  
of	  steel	  slowly	  replaced	  cast	  and	  wrought	  iron	  during	  the	  later	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  
twentieth	  centuries,	  the	  ores	  of	  southern	  Appalachia	  proved	  less	  desirable	  for	  the	  
Bessemer	  process	  and	  slowly	  rendered	  them	  inferior.	  	  This	  process	  took	  decades	  to	  
become	  apparent,	  so	  during	  the	  1880s	  and	  early	  1890s	  southern	  Appalachia	  
investors	  were	  highly	  interested	  in	  developing	  iron	  works	  and	  several	  modernized,	  
coke	  fired	  iron	  furnaces	  and	  iron	  works	  were	  constructed	  in	  the	  region.	  
These	  modern	  iron	  furnaces	  were	  much	  larger	  than	  the	  small	  charcoal	  
furnaces	  that	  had	  met	  the	  region’s	  demands	  for	  well	  over	  a	  century.	  	  The	  stacks	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constructed	  stood	  between	  seventy	  and	  eighty	  feet	  tall,	  which	  was	  roughly	  twice	  the	  
height	  of	  older	  charcoal-­‐fueled	  furnaces.	  	  They	  primarily	  utilized	  coke	  fueled	  
Whitwell	  stoves;	  although	  coke	  fueled	  Cowper	  stoves	  were	  also	  used.	  	  The	  two	  
stoves	  were	  similar	  in	  design	  and,	  	  
contained	   fire-­‐brick	  chambers,	  within	  which	   the	  waste	  gases	  burned	  
for	  a	  period,	  until	  the	  fire-­‐bricks	  were	  at	  a	  red	  heat.	   	  The	  gases	  were	  
then	  turned	  off	  to	  the	  alternate	  stove,	  and	  the	  air	  for	  the	  blast-­‐furnace	  
was	   driven	   in	   through	   the	   heated	   stove	   until	   the	   other	   one	   had	  
become	  sufficiently	  heated.65	  
	  
This	  allowed	  a	  doubling	  in	  the	  output	  of	  iron	  without	  requiring	  much	  more	  energy,	  
and	  in	  many	  cases	  the	  output	  increased	  much	  more	  than	  that.66	  	  Constructing	  and	  
operating	  these	  new	  furnaces	  was	  very	  expensive,	  and	  although	  local	  investment	  
played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  the	  industry	  during	  this	  time,	  
many	  investors	  in	  Philadelphia,	  New	  York,	  and	  Great	  Britain	  financed	  these	  
furnaces.	  
The	  chief	  organizer	  of	  the	  VIC&CC,	  George	  L.	  Carter,	  was	  one	  such	  local	  
capitalist	  and	  entrepreneur.	  	  Born	  in	  1857	  to	  a	  relatively	  well-­‐to-­‐do	  family	  in	  Carroll	  
County,	  Virginia,	  Carter	  spent	  his	  life	  developing	  industry	  and	  railroads	  in	  southern	  
Appalachia.	  	  Carter	  began	  working	  as	  a	  clerk	  at	  a	  Hillsville,	  Virginia	  store,	  and	  in	  
1877	  he	  secured	  a	  position	  with	  the	  Wythe	  Lead	  and	  Zinc	  Company,	  located	  in	  
Wythe	  County	  outside	  Wytheville.	  	  At	  Wythe	  Lead	  and	  Zinc	  Company	  Carter	  served	  
as	  a	  buyer	  before	  becoming	  a	  manager	  and	  bookkeeper	  for	  the	  company.	  	  During	  
this	  time	  Carter	  also	  began	  his	  own	  business	  ventures	  and	  became	  associated	  with	  
George	  T.	  Mills,	  a	  railroad	  contractor	  with	  Norfolk	  &	  Western	  that	  built	  the	  Dora	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Iron	  Furnace	  in	  Pulaski,	  Virginia.	  	  Mills,	  who	  died	  during	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  
Dora	  Iron	  Furnace,	  began	  construction	  in	  1891	  and	  made	  Carter	  the	  company’s	  vice-­‐
president	  and	  general	  manager.67	  
The	  modern	  Dora	  Furnace	  began	  operation	  during	  May	  1892	  and	  employed	  
three	  Whitwell	  stoves	  fueled	  by	  coke	  from	  Tom’s	  Creek,	  to	  reduce	  limonite	  and	  
hematite	  ores	  into	  pigs	  branded	  “Dora.”68	  	  Graded	  No.	  1x	  foundry	  pig	  iron,	  “Dora”	  
pig	  was	  suited	  only	  for	  use	  in	  casting	  mills.69	  	  Cast	  iron	  is	  very	  hard,	  but	  is	  brittle	  and	  
suitable	  for	  products	  like	  manhole	  covers,	  drainpipes,	  and	  heavy	  cookware.	  	  
Although	  there	  was	  a	  pipe	  works	  in	  Radford,	  and	  Richmond	  had	  a	  developed	  
manufacturing	  core	  at	  this	  time,	  vast	  majorities	  of	  casting	  plants	  were	  in	  northern	  
cities.	  	  The	  Dora	  Company	  had	  sales	  agents	  in	  New	  York	  hoping	  to	  sell	  their	  pig	  iron	  
to	  northern	  casting	  mills.	  	  Developing	  and	  securing	  the	  necessary	  raw	  materials	  for	  
the	  “Dora”	  brand	  necessitated	  that	  Carter	  borrow	  heavily	  against	  the	  company’s	  
holdings,	  which	  Carter	  had	  expanded	  to	  include	  four	  charcoal	  furnaces	  and	  their	  
land	  holdings	  along	  Cripple	  Creek	  in	  Wythe	  County.70	  	  One	  of	  the	  few	  charcoal	  
furnaces	  purchased	  by	  Carter	  was	  located	  in	  Pulaski	  County	  along	  the	  Reed	  Island	  
branch	  of	  the	  Norfolk	  and	  Western	  Railway.	  	  Completed	  in	  1881,	  the	  Reed	  Island	  
Furnace	  produced	  pig	  iron	  for	  the	  manufacture	  of	  car	  wheels	  and	  remained	  active	  
into	  the	  twentieth	  century	  as	  charcoal	  furnaces	  quickly	  became	  outmoded.71	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To	  secure	  a	  consistent	  fuel	  supply,	  Carter	  purchased	  several	  coalmines	  along	  
Tom’s	  Creek	  in	  Wise	  County,	  which	  he	  outfitted	  with	  modern	  machinery	  and	  
organized	  into	  the	  Tom’s	  Creek	  Coal	  and	  Coke	  Company.	  	  The	  Tom’s	  Creek	  Coal	  and	  
Coke	  Company	  would	  serve	  as	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  main	  fuel	  supply,	  and	  with	  700	  coke	  
ovens	  in	  operation,	  it	  would	  be	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  coking	  operations	  in	  the	  region.	  	  
With	  the	  expanded	  operations	  at	  Tom’s	  Creek	  and	  Dora,	  Carter	  purchased	  the	  
properties	  of	  the	  Crozer	  Iron	  Company	  at	  Roanoke,	  Virginia	  in	  1898.	  	  Carter	  named	  
his	  consolidated	  holdings	  in	  the	  several	  furnaces	  the	  Carter	  Coal	  and	  Iron	  Company	  
(CC&IC).	  	  The	  formation	  of	  this	  company	  began	  the	  rapid	  series	  of	  mergers	  and	  
expansion	  that	  would	  result	  in	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  VIC&CC.72	  
Samuel	  A.	  Crozer,	  a	  Pennsylvania	  cotton	  manufacturer	  drawn	  to	  the	  region	  
because	  of	  the	  promotional	  work	  of	  Jedediah	  Hotchkiss,	  built	  the	  Crozer	  Iron	  
Company	  near	  Roanoke	  in	  1882	  and	  expanded	  it	  in	  1889.73	  	  Roanoke	  grew	  almost	  
overnight	  as	  a	  manufacturing	  center	  out	  of	  the	  small	  farming	  community	  of	  Big	  Lick	  
as	  the	  result	  of	  Norfolk	  and	  Western	  Railroad	  management’s	  decision	  to	  locate	  its	  
head	  offices	  close	  to	  southwest	  Virginia’s	  coal	  fields.	  	  Crozer’s	  company	  operated	  
two	  furnaces	  employing	  six	  Whitwell	  stoves	  fueled	  by	  Pocahontas	  coke	  to	  reduce	  
local	  hematite	  ores.	  	  The	  Crozer	  Iron	  Company	  had	  sales	  representatives	  in	  New	  
York,	  Boston,	  and	  Philadelphia	  to	  market	  the	  company’s	  “Crozer”	  brand	  foundry	  and	  
forge	  pig	  iron.	  	  By	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  when	  the	  VIC&CC	  was	  
organized,	  Roanoke	  had	  grown	  to	  include	  a	  locks	  works,	  engine	  works,	  carriage	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works,	  and	  bridge	  works,	  as	  well	  as	  some	  nearby	  iron	  works	  like	  Crozer.74	  	  By	  
expanding	  his	  operation	  into	  Roanoke,	  Carter’s	  CC&IC	  spanned	  distance	  of	  roughly	  
sixty	  miles,	  and	  his	  much	  larger	  company	  required	  that	  Carter	  look	  beyond	  local	  
investment	  for	  capital.	  	  	  
This	  took	  Carter	  to	  New	  York	  where	  he	  became	  associated	  with	  the	  Wall	  
Street	  firm	  of	  Moore	  &	  Schley.	  	  The	  group	  “had	  been	  trying	  to	  arrange	  a	  merger	  of	  
the	  Carnegie	  interests,”	  and	  in	  Carter	  they	  found	  an	  opportunity	  to	  organize	  a	  large,	  
promising	  iron	  company	  that	  also	  held	  vast	  coal	  reserves	  in	  southwestern	  Virginia.75	  	  
In	  working	  with	  Moore	  &	  Schley,	  Carter	  sold	  the	  CC&IC	  to	  Moore	  &	  Schley,	  who	  in	  
turn	  “advanced	  him	  $10,000,000	  to	  exploit	  the	  mineral	  wealth	  of	  his	  region.”76	  	  
Carter	  agreed	  to	  sit	  as	  the	  president	  of	  this	  much	  larger	  consolidated	  venture	  that	  
became	  the	  Virginia,	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company.	  	  When	  the	  company	  organized	  
in	  February	  1899	  it	  was	  a	  diverse	  operation	  that	  included	  fifteen	  blast	  furnaces	  
capable	  of	  producing	  500,000	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron,	  two	  rolling	  mills	  and	  planned	  steel	  
works,	  a	  cast	  iron	  pipe	  works,	  the	  Virginia	  and	  Southwestern	  Railway,	  its	  own	  
sawmill,	  grist	  mills,	  hundreds	  of	  coke	  ovens,	  and	  ownership	  or	  rights	  to	  over	  
125,000	  acres	  of	  iron	  ore,	  limestone,	  and	  coal	  properties.77	  
While	  George	  Carter	  expanded	  his	  own	  iron	  enterprise	  during	  the	  1880s	  and	  
1890s,	  northern	  and	  English	  interests	  financed	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  several	  
furnaces	  involved	  in	  the	  VIC&CC	  merger.	  	  These	  were	  located	  in	  or	  near	  the	  
manufacturing	  and	  distribution	  centers	  that	  developed	  throughout	  the	  mountainous	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hinterlands	  of	  southern	  Appalachian	  as	  railroads	  and	  feeder	  lines	  penetrated	  deeper	  
into	  the	  region.	  	  Historian	  Ronald	  Eller	  notes	  that	  these	  emerging	  cities	  are	  now	  
coined	  “growth	  centers”	  by	  modern	  planners	  and	  they,	  “served	  as	  convenient	  
extensions	  of	  the	  eastern	  industrial	  core	  into	  the	  Appalachian	  heartland.	  	  In	  many	  
ways,	  they	  functioned	  in	  the	  same	  exploitive	  relationship	  to	  their	  surrounding	  rural	  
counties	  as	  did	  the	  larger	  metropolises	  to	  their	  surrounding	  rural	  counties	  as	  did	  
the	  larger	  metropolises	  of	  the	  South	  and	  Northeast	  to	  the	  region	  as	  a	  whole.”78	  	  
William	  Cronon	  provides	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  study	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  industrial	  
urban	  centers	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  	  His	  Nature’s	  Metropolis	  details	  the	  
rapid	  growth	  of	  Chicago	  and	  the	  vital	  role	  railroads	  and	  waterways	  played	  in	  
making	  the	  city	  a	  “funnel”	  for	  meeting	  the	  natural	  resources	  of	  the	  American	  West	  
with	  the	  industrial	  economy	  of	  the	  East.79	  	  Railroads	  and	  city	  boosters	  fueled	  the	  
growth	  of	  the	  much	  smaller	  cities	  in	  Southern	  Appalachia	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  
nineteenth	  century,	  such	  as	  Bristol	  and	  Roanoke,	  and	  their	  patterns	  of	  growth	  are	  
comparable	  to	  those	  laid	  out	  by	  Cronon.	  
Three	  major	  railroad	  companies	  were	  organized	  during	  the	  later	  nineteenth	  
century	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  pattern	  consolidations	  and	  mergers	  similar	  to	  the	  ones	  the	  
iron	  industry	  underwent	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  In	  Virginia,	  the	  
Norfolk	  &	  Western	  (N&W)	  had	  operated	  for	  much	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  before	  
northern	  capital	  purchased	  and	  restructured	  the	  company	  in	  1881.	  	  The	  new	  
owners	  rapidly	  expanded	  westward	  into	  the	  territory	  that	  the	  VIC&CC	  would	  
operate	  in	  and	  the	  two	  companies	  would	  be	  closely	  related:	  	  the	  railroad	  providing	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the	  transportation	  to	  markets	  outside	  the	  region,	  and	  VIC&CC	  providing	  the	  freight.	  	  
The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  for	  the	  VIC&CC	  in	  eastern	  Tennessee	  and	  Kentucky,	  as	  the	  
company	  would	  come	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  oldest	  of	  the	  large	  rail	  networks,	  the	  Louisville	  
and	  Nashville	  (L&N),	  for	  shipping	  routes.80	  J.P.	  Morgan	  organized	  the	  Southern	  
Railway	  in	  1894	  out	  of	  the	  ruined	  Richmond	  &	  Danville	  System	  and	  several	  other	  
smaller	  networks	  to	  make	  it	  the	  largest	  of	  the	  rail	  networks	  in	  the	  South.	  	  The	  
Southern	  Railway	  would	  prove	  to	  share	  the	  most	  interesting	  relationship	  with	  the	  
VIC&CC	  during	  the	  twentieth	  century	  as	  it	  became	  a	  large	  purchaser	  of	  the	  
company’s	  coal	  and	  bought	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  rail	  line.81	  	  When	  the	  VIC&CC	  organized,	  
the	  company	  purchased	  its	  own	  small	  railroad,	  the	  Virginia	  &	  Southwestern	  
Railway,	  to	  penetrate	  into	  the	  Wise	  County	  coalfields	  and	  secure	  the	  cheap	  
transportation	  of	  coal	  to	  Bristol,	  Virginia	  and	  the	  larger	  coal	  markets	  of	  the	  eastern	  
seaboard	  and	  Great	  Lakes	  region	  via	  the	  N&W	  and	  L&N.82	  
The	  newly	  formed	  Virginia	  and	  Southwestern	  Railway	  (V&SW)	  ran	  a	  distance	  
of	  approximately	  93	  miles	  from	  Looney	  Creek,	  Tennessee	  to	  Elizabethtown,	  
Virginia.83	  	  Formerly	  two	  separate	  lines,	  the	  South	  Atlantic	  and	  Ohio	  Railroad	  
Company	  and	  the	  North	  Carolina	  Railway	  Company,	  the	  V&SW	  was	  in	  need	  of	  large	  
scale	  improvements	  and	  extensions	  in	  order	  to	  properly	  serve	  the	  company’s	  needs,	  
and	  would	  require	  large	  amounts	  of	  capital	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so.84	  	  From	  the	  outset,	  
directors	  of	  the	  VIC&CC	  recognized	  that	  because	  of	  the	  high	  costs	  in	  operating	  the	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railroad	  it	  would	  likely	  be	  necessary	  to	  separate	  the	  V&SW	  from	  the	  VIC&CC	  under	  a	  
separate	  incorporation.	  	  In	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  receivers	  briefly	  sold	  the	  
line	  before	  being	  buying	  it	  back.85	  	  Although	  the	  VIC&CC	  managed	  to	  retain	  
ownership	  of	  the	  V&SW	  after	  the	  company’s	  restructuring,	  it	  quickly	  sold	  the	  V&SW	  
to	  the	  Southern	  Railway	  Company	  in	  1906	  in	  order	  to	  retire	  outstanding	  VIC&CC	  
and	  CC&IC	  bonds.86	  	  The	  VIC&CC	  would	  continue	  to	  use	  the	  line	  after	  its	  sale,	  but	  
without	  extensive	  maintenance	  and	  operation	  costs.	  
Securing	  affordable	  transport	  of	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  pig	  iron	  and	  other	  raw	  
materials	  along	  these	  lines	  was	  essential	  in	  linking	  the	  company’s	  several	  furnaces	  
with	  fuel,	  raw	  materials,	  and	  markets.87	  	  The	  VIC&CC	  was	  initially	  headquartered	  in	  
Bristol,	  Virginia,	  a	  central	  location	  to	  these	  rail	  lines	  and	  the	  company’s	  properties.	  	  
Located	  along	  the	  border	  of	  Virginia	  and	  Tennessee,	  the	  city	  boomed	  during	  the	  late	  
nineteenth	  century	  as	  a	  “convenient	  extension	  of	  the	  eastern	  industrial	  core	  in	  the	  
Appalachian	  heartland.”88	  	  The	  VIC&CC’s	  furnace	  in	  Bristol	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  Dora	  
and	  Crozer	  furnaces.	  	  Completed	  in	  1891,	  the	  Bristol	  furnace	  had	  not	  been	  active	  
since	  the	  year	  of	  its	  completion,	  although	  it	  remained	  in	  good	  repair.	  	  Company	  
management	  purchased	  the	  Bristol	  Furnace	  from	  the	  Home	  Iron	  Company,	  and	  the	  
furnace	  fueled	  three	  Whitwell	  stoves	  with	  Pocahontas	  coke	  to	  reduce	  Cranberry	  ore	  
from	  North	  Carolina	  into	  high-­‐grade	  Bessemer	  pig	  iron.89	  	  The	  ores	  from	  the	  North	  
Carolina’s	  Cranberry	  ore	  field	  were	  among	  the	  few	  ores	  in	  southern	  Appalachia	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suited	  for	  use	  in	  the	  day’s	  primary	  method	  of	  steel	  production,	  the	  Bessemer	  
process.	  	  A	  majority	  of	  the	  region’s	  ore	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  “brown”	  and	  contains	  high	  
percentages	  of	  manganese,	  phosphorous,	  and	  sulfur.	  	  These	  properties	  caused	  a	  
caking	  to	  the	  furnace	  tiles	  and	  necessitated	  frequent	  and	  expensive	  repair	  to	  the	  
Bessemer	  converters.	  	  Most	  steel	  companies	  during	  this	  time	  employed	  the	  
Bessemer	  process	  and	  were	  not	  interested	  in	  such	  ores.90	  
North	  of	  Bristol	  and	  just	  north	  of	  Carter’s	  Dora	  Furnaces	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  
New	  River	  Valley,	  the	  city	  of	  Radford	  developed	  as	  a	  smaller	  railroad	  and	  
manufacturing	  hub	  that	  would	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  early	  
business.	  	  The	  VIC&CC	  would	  purchase	  a	  modern	  coke-­‐fired	  furnace	  and	  cast	  iron	  
pipe	  works	  in	  Radford,	  and	  was	  headquartered	  in	  the	  city	  between	  1903	  and	  1908.	  	  
The	  company	  relocated	  its	  headquarters	  from	  Bristol	  to	  Radford	  in	  1903	  on	  the	  
advice	  of	  then	  receiver	  Judge	  Archer	  A.	  Phlegar.	  	  The	  VIC&CC’s	  Radford-­‐Crane	  
furnace	  was	  built	  by	  Philadelphia	  financers	  between	  1890	  and	  1892,	  but	  was	  never	  
blown	  in	  prior	  to	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  purchase	  because	  of	  depressed	  economic	  conditions	  
in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  Panic	  of	  1893.	  	  When	  active,	  the	  furnace	  employed	  four	  
Whitwell	  stoves	  fueled	  by	  Pocahontas	  coke	  to	  reduce	  Virginia	  hematite	  ore	  into	  
foundry	  pig	  iron.	  91	  	  Along	  with	  the	  Radford-­‐Crane	  Furnace,	  the	  VIC&CC	  purchased	  
the	  Radford	  Pipe	  Works	  from	  the	  Radford	  Pipe	  and	  Foundry	  Company	  of	  Cincinnati,	  
Ohio.	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  purchase	  the	  pipe	  works	  was	  idle,	  but	  could	  produce	  pipe	  
ranging	  from	  two	  to	  thirty-­‐six	  inches	  in	  diameter.92	  	  The	  Radford	  Pipe	  Works	  would	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be	  quickly	  sold	  in	  1905	  after	  the	  company’s	  receivership	  would	  be	  used	  to	  retire	  
CC&IC	  first	  mortgage	  bonds.93	  
Aside	  from	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  holdings	  in	  Pulaski,	  Bristol,	  and	  Radford,	  the	  
company	  also	  included	  a	  modern	  coke-­‐fired	  furnace	  and	  horseshoe	  and	  iron	  works	  
at	  Max	  Meadows	  in	  Wythe	  County,	  Virginia.	  	  Owned	  by	  Philadelphia	  capitalists,	  the	  
Max	  Meadows	  Furnace	  was	  completed	  in	  1891,	  but	  would	  not	  be	  blown	  in	  until	  late	  
1895.	  	  The	  furnace	  employed	  three	  Whitwell	  stoves,	  which	  were	  fueled	  by	  
Pocahontas	  coke	  to	  reduce	  local	  brown	  hematite	  ores	  to	  foundry	  pig	  iron.	  94	  	  When	  
purchased	  by	  the	  VIC&CC,	  the	  Max	  Meadows	  furnace	  had	  been	  idle	  since	  1898	  and	  
would	  not	  be	  blown	  in	  until	  1901.95	  	  The	  Crescent	  Horse	  Shoe	  and	  Iron	  Works	  were	  
owned	  by	  the	  same	  Philadelphia	  interests	  and	  had	  been	  in	  operation	  since	  1892.	  	  
Pocahontas	  coke	  fueled	  these	  iron	  works,	  and	  included	  eight	  puddling	  furnaces,	  
three	  heating	  furnaces,	  three	  spike	  machines,	  six	  horseshoe	  machines,	  and	  two	  
trains	  of	  rolls.96	  
The	  only	  Virginia	  furnace	  located	  outside	  of	  the	  New	  River	  Valley	  or	  deep	  
southwest	  Virginia	  was	  located	  at	  Buena	  Vista	  in	  the	  James	  River	  Valley.	  	  Located	  in	  
Rockbridge	  County	  along	  the	  Maury	  River,	  the	  city	  of	  Buena	  Vista,	  like	  Bristol,	  
boomed	  as	  a	  manufacturing	  growth	  center	  throughout	  the	  1890s.	  	  A	  close	  
concentration	  of	  iron	  ores,	  limestone,	  and	  abundant	  waterpower	  attracted	  
Philadelphia	  investors	  represented	  by	  the	  Virginia	  Development	  Company.	  	  In	  1889	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construction	  began	  on	  the	  Buena	  Vista	  Furnace,	  and	  by	  1890	  the	  furnace	  was	  in	  
blast.	  	  Fueled	  by	  New	  River	  coke	  and	  employing	  three	  Whitwell	  stoves,	  the	  Buena	  
Vista	  Furnace	  reduced	  Craig	  Creek	  brown	  ore	  to	  produce	  foundry	  pig	  iron.	  	  When	  
the	  VIC&CC	  purchased	  the	  furnace	  at	  Buena	  Vista	  it	  had	  been	  leased	  to	  the	  
Alleghany	  Iron	  Company	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years.97	  
	   Aside	  from	  the	  furnaces	  and	  foundries	  located	  in	  Virginia,	  the	  VIC&CC	  
organization	  also	  included	  several	  furnaces	  in	  Tennessee	  and	  Kentucky.	  	  In	  later	  
years	  the	  company	  would	  invest	  heavily	  in	  developing	  the	  coalfields	  of	  eastern	  
Kentucky,	  but	  when	  the	  VIC&CC	  was	  organized,	  its	  primary	  focus	  was	  on	  its	  
holdings	  in	  Virginia.	  	  The	  largest	  furnace	  the	  company	  purchased	  in	  Tennessee	  was	  
at	  Embreeville	  in	  Washington	  County,	  Tennessee.	  	  One	  of	  two	  VIC&CC	  furnaces	  built	  
by	  English	  investors,	  the	  Embreville	  Furnace	  was	  constructed	  in	  1891	  and	  remained	  
active	  until	  1899	  when	  it	  was	  sold	  to	  the	  VIC&CC.	  	  Employing	  three	  Cowper-­‐
Kennedy	  stoves	  fueled	  by	  Pocahontas	  and	  Big	  Stone	  Gap	  coke	  to	  reduce	  brown	  
hematite	  ore,	  Embreville	  produced	  iron	  suitable	  for	  malleable	  castings	  and	  special	  
pig	  iron.98	  
	   The	  Carnegie	  Iron	  Company	  built	  the	  second	  coke-­‐fired	  furnace	  purchased	  in	  
Tennessee.	  	  Work	  began	  in	  the	  early	  1890s,	  but	  was	  suspended	  in	  1892	  with	  
tightening	  financial	  conditions	  in	  the	  Panic	  of	  1893.	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  its	  purchase	  the	  
Carnegie	  Furnace	  was	  not	  yet	  complete,	  but	  when	  active	  would	  employ	  three	  
Whitwell	  stoves	  fueled	  by	  Pocahontas	  or	  Stonega	  coke	  to	  reduce	  Cranberry	  ore	  and	  
produce	  a	  “special	  Bessemer”	  pig	  iron.	  	  The	  Carnegie	  Furnace	  would	  be	  one	  of	  the	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first	  furnaces	  the	  VIC&CC	  would	  sell	  after	  its	  reorganization	  in	  1902.99	  	  The	  
company	  also	  purchased	  a	  couple	  long-­‐idle	  charcoal	  furnaces	  in	  Tennessee,	  but	  
these	  were	  never	  utilized	  for	  production	  purposes.	  
	   In	  Kentucky,	  the	  VIC&CC	  purchased	  two	  stacks	  from	  the	  Watts	  Steel	  and	  Iron	  
Syndicate	  at	  Middlesborough.	  	  Middlesborough,	  Kentucky	  was	  another	  industrial	  
center	  that	  rapidly	  emerged	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  as	  the	  result	  of	  large-­‐
scale	  promotional	  work.	  	  Promoters	  managed	  to	  attract	  “investors	  from	  throughout	  
the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe,	  including	  over	  twenty	  million	  dollars	  of	  British	  
capital.”100	  	  Deemed	  the	  “Magic	  City,”	  Middlesborough	  grew	  from	  a	  population	  of	  
sixty	  families	  in	  1886	  to	  over	  5,000	  people	  in	  1889.	  	  One	  of	  the	  largest	  English	  
groups	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  city	  were	  led	  by	  Edgar	  and	  Frank	  Watts,	  of	  England’s	  
prestigious	  Watts	  Steel	  and	  Iron	  Company	  in	  Great	  Britain.	  	  The	  Watts	  built	  two	  
large	  coke	  fueled	  stacks	  between	  1889	  and	  1891.	  	  By	  the	  middle	  of	  1893	  both	  stacks	  
were	  blown	  in	  and	  producing	  pig	  iron	  suitable	  for	  conversion	  into	  basic	  open-­‐hearth	  
steel.	  	  The	  stacks	  employed	  seven	  Whitwell	  stoves	  fueled	  by	  Middlesborough	  coke	  
to	  reduce	  red	  fossiliferous	  and	  brown	  hematite	  ores.	  	  The	  more	  desirable	  red	  
fossiliferous	  ores	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  isolated	  and	  limited	  in	  concentration	  to	  a	  point	  
that	  they	  could	  not	  profitably	  sustain	  the	  large	  coke	  furnaces	  built	  in	  southern	  
Appalachia	  during	  this	  period.101	  
When	  the	  VIC&CC	  organized,	  beside	  the	  furnaces,	  foundries,	  and	  rail	  line,	  the	  
company	  owned	  or	  controlled	  125,000	  acres	  of	  producing	  lands.	  	  At	  the	  time	  there	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Annual Report of The Virginia Iron, Coal, and Coke Company, (1905), 5. 
100 Eller, Miners, Millhands, and Mountaineers, 81. 
101 Mann, “The Virginia, Iron, Coal, and Coke Company”, 50. 
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were	  five	  active	  mines	  and	  management	  would	  make	  it	  an	  immediate	  priority	  to	  
improve	  existing	  mines	  and	  open	  new	  operations.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  ore	  properties	  
controlled	  were	  directly	  adjacent	  to	  the	  existing	  furnaces.	  	  The	  same	  could	  be	  said	  of	  
the	  company’s	  limestone	  properties.	  	  In	  January	  1899	  the	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  
Coke	  Company	  formally	  began	  operation	  under	  President	  George	  L.	  Carter’s	  
leadership.	  	  During	  1899	  and	  1900,	  the	  prospect	  for	  a	  profitable	  iron	  conglomerate	  
in	  southern	  Virginia	  seemed	  promising,	  but	  by	  1901	  the	  company	  verged	  on	  
collapse.102	  
Backed	  not	  only	  by	  their	  iron	  interests,	  but	  also	  the	  United	  States	  Navy’s	  high	  
demand	  for	  the	  company’s	  Pocahontas	  coal,	  the	  VIC&CC	  moved	  quickly	  to	  continue	  
expanding	  their	  business.103	  	  By	  May	  1899,	  the	  group	  nearly	  completed	  a	  deal	  that	  
would	  have	  expanded	  their	  capital	  by	  50	  percent	  to	  $15,000,000.	  	  If	  completed,	  the	  
plan	  would	  have	  added	  several	  significant	  properties	  to	  the	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  
Coke	  Company.	  	  The	  additional	  properties	  would	  have	  included	  furnaces	  at	  Johnson	  
City,	  Tennessee,	  the	  holdings	  of	  the	  Pulaski	  Iron	  Company	  (a	  sister	  company	  to	  the	  
Dora	  Furnace	  Company),	  and	  the	  Camden	  Iron	  Works	  in	  Salem,	  Virginia.	  	  There	  is	  
little	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  why	  this	  deal	  did	  not	  happen,	  but	  the	  company’s	  shortage	  
of	  cash	  and	  withheld	  loans	  can	  likely	  be	  suggested	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  its	  failure.	  
Expansion	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  primary	  objective	  of	  the	  VIC&CC	  into	  1900.	  	  In	  
February	  1900,	  company	  president	  Carter	  announced	  plans	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  
new	  steel	  plant	  stating	  that,	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103 “Not in the Steel Trust,” Washington Post, June 11, 1899. 
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We	  feel	  very	  much	  encouraged.	   	  Business	   is	  excellent,	  and	   in	  a	  short	  
time	  we	  shall	  start	  an	  additional	  steel	  plant	  at	  Middlesborough,	  Tenn.	  	  
Much	   is	   being	   done	   to	   develop	   East	   Tennessee	   and	   Southwestern	  
Virginia,	   and	   the	   large	   naval	   orders	   which	   will	   soon	   be	   placed	   by	  
France	  and	  Germany	  must	  necessarily	  stimulate	  business.104	  
	  
Although	  VIC&CC	  management	  worked	  vigorously	  during	  the	  first	  years	  of	  
operation	  to	  grow	  their	  business	  by	  expanding	  the	  syndicate’s	  holdings	  and	  
investing	  in	  a	  new	  steel	  plant,	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  transporting	  freight	  and	  several	  
unforeseen	  events	  severely	  hampered	  the	  company’s	  momentum.	  	  	  
The	  acquisition	  of	  land	  rights	  was	  often	  a	  tense	  if	  not	  hostile	  affair.	  	  On	  
February	  10,	  1900	  a	  lawsuit	  involving	  VIC&CC	  land	  agents	  came	  to	  a	  violent	  
conclusion.	  	  John	  Wampler	  and	  Sam	  Ware,	  both	  VIC&CC	  land	  agents,	  fatally	  
wounded	  William	  Jenkins,	  a	  prominent	  lawyer,	  in	  East	  Radford,	  Virginia	  over	  a	  law	  
contest	  involving	  all	  three.105	  	  Aside	  from	  company	  employees	  murdering	  a	  lawyer,	  
in	  March	  1900	  a	  large	  fire	  at	  Embreeville,	  Tennessee	  destroyed	  the	  foundry,	  
machine	  shops,	  and	  blacksmith	  shops	  connected	  with	  the	  plants	  of	  the	  VIC&CC	  
valued	  at	  $60,000.106	  	  Only	  two	  months	  later	  during	  May	  a	  large	  fire	  destroyed	  
$100,000	  of	  property	  at	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  Toms	  Creek	  coal	  mines.	  	  Among	  the	  losses	  
were	  the	  operation’s	  coal	  disintegrator	  and	  washers.107	  	  	  
Not	  only	  did	  the	  company	  face	  hurdles	  involving	  murder	  and	  costly	  fires,	  but	  
transporting	  freight	  also	  proved	  more	  difficult	  than	  initially	  believed.	  	  Even	  though	  
the	  VIC&CC	  owned	  the	  Virginia	  &	  Southwestern	  Railway	  and	  could	  cheaply	  ship	  its	  
ores	  and	  coke	  to	  its	  furnaces,	  the	  company	  still	  had	  to	  rely	  almost	  exclusively	  on	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water	  transport	  to	  ship	  its	  Pocahontas	  coal	  and	  pig	  iron	  to	  buyers.	  	  When	  the	  
company	  was	  organized,	  it	  opened	  an	  office	  at	  Norfolk,	  Virginia	  to	  handle	  shipping	  
affairs	  to	  points	  north	  and	  south.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  company’s	  purchased	  coal	  and	  pig	  
iron	  left	  Norfolk	  at	  Lambert’s	  Point.	  	  Although	  the	  VIC&CC	  successfully	  negotiated	  an	  
acceptable	  shipping	  price	  with	  Norfolk	  &	  Western	  Railway	  to	  move	  its	  coal	  and	  pig	  
iron	  to	  Norfolk,	  the	  company	  found	  it	  exceedingly	  difficult	  to	  acquire	  water	  
transportation	  once	  at	  Norfolk.	  	  Because	  the	  ocean	  route	  to	  North	  Carolina	  ports	  
was	  among	  the	  most	  dangerous	  on	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean,	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  Norfolk	  agent	  
put	  his	  support	  behind	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  Dismal	  Swamp	  Canal	  in	  1900	  to	  secure	  
a	  route	  that	  would	  be	  both	  cheaper	  and	  safer.108	  
The	  VIC&CC	  also	  found	  an	  eager	  and	  dependable	  purchaser	  of	  its	  Pocahontas	  
coal	  in	  the	  United	  States	  Navy.	  	  The	  Navy	  found	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  Pocahontas	  coal	  to	  be	  
the	  most	  desirable	  fuel	  for	  its	  vessels,	  but	  in	  the	  crucial	  first	  years	  of	  operation	  the	  
company	  had	  difficulty	  in	  filling	  a	  Navy	  order	  to	  be	  delivered	  to	  Fort	  Caswell,	  North	  
Carolina.	  	  As	  noted	  by	  the	  VIC&CC	  Resident	  Manager	  at	  Norfolk	  in	  a	  letter	  lobbying	  
for	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  Dismal	  Swamp	  Canal	  and	  shipping’s	  logistical	  problems,	  
We	   have	   found	   it	   exceedingly	   difficult	   to	   make	   charters	   for	   small	  
cargoes	  going	  south	  of	  Hatteras,	  owing	  to	  the	  extreme	  danger	  of	  going	  
outside.	   	   There	   is	   considerable	   business	   that	   could	   be	   built	   up	  
provided	   we	   could	   move	   coal	   in	   small	   cargoes….Our	   company	   had	  
some	  experience	   along	   this	   line	   in	   the	  months	  of	   July	   and	  August	   in	  
trying	  to	  fill	  an	  order	  for	  the	  Government	  at	  Fort	  Caswell….	  [A]fter	  the	  
business	   was	   accepted	   we	   found	   it	   absolutely	   impossible	   to	   secure	  
transportation	   at	   any	  price,	   and	  we	  have	  been	   forced	   to	   handle	   this	  
coal	   by	   rail,	   at	   a	   very	   great	   loss	   to	   us….At	   this	   time	   there	   are	   from	  
30,000	   to	   40,000	   tons	   of	   coal	   going	   to	   the	  West	   Indies	   each	  month	  
from	  here.	  	  We	  are	  inclined	  to	  think	  that	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  this	  
tonnage	  might	  be	  diverted	  through	  this	  canal	  and	  handled	  at	  cheaper	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rate	   than	   we	   now	   have,	   with	   equally	   as	   good	   profits	   to	   the	  
transportation	  companies.109	  
	  
Difficulties	  with	  shipping	  logistics	  and	  fire	  were	  not	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  only	  problems.	  	  
Although	  management	  reopened	  the	  Bristol	  Furnace	  during	  the	  later	  portion	  of	  
1900,	  the	  company	  shut	  down	  several	  of	  its	  ore	  mines	  and	  had	  limited	  access	  to	  
some	  of	  the	  ore	  properties	  purchased	  by	  the	  company.110	  	  	  
	   Combined,	  these	  several	  problems	  put	  the	  company	  in	  a	  position	  that	  left	  it	  
unable	  to	  meet	  the	  cost	  of	  improvements	  or	  provide	  adequate	  working	  capital.	  	  
VIC&CC	  management	  “promptly	  borrowed	  $700,000,	  for	  which	  it	  gave	  its	  serial	  
notes	  secured	  by	  a	  junior	  mortgage	  given	  to	  the	  Morton	  Trust	  Company	  of	  New	  
York.”111	  	  This	  additional	  borrowing	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  what	  caused	  a	  divide	  
between	  President	  Carter	  and	  the	  company’s	  New	  York	  financiers.	  	  The	  additional	  
debt	  and	  the	  issues	  facing	  the	  company	  indicated	  serious	  financial	  problems.	  	  
Besides	  the	  company’s	  fiscal	  challenges,	  president	  Carter’s	  personality	  aggravated	  
the	  situation:	  over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  career	  he	  had	  a	  tendency	  to	  turn	  friends	  into	  
enemies,	  and	  his	  tenure	  at	  the	  head	  of	  the	  VIC&CC	  was	  no	  exception.112	  	  The	  board	  
of	  directors	  controlling	  the	  VIC&CC	  came	  to	  view	  Carter’s	  actions	  as	  reckless	  and	  the	  
company’s	  financial	  situation	  as	  desperate.	  	  They	  considered	  reorganization	  of	  the	  
company,	  allowed	  the	  company	  to	  move	  into	  receivership,	  and	  began	  what	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amounted	  to	  a	  hostile	  takeover.	  	  A	  brief	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  detailed	  Carter’s	  
infuriation	  with	  the	  receivership,	  and	  his	  unsuccessful	  effort	  to	  resist	  it.113	  
When	  the	  VIC&CC	  defaulted	  on	  its	  quarterly	  interest	  payments,	  control	  of	  the	  
VIC&CC	  was	  placed	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  receivers	  appointed	  by	  the	  United	  States	  
District	  Court	  of	  western	  Virginia.	  	  Henry	  K.	  McHarg,	  a	  vice-­‐president	  of	  the	  
Manhattan	  Company,	  and	  Cornelius	  Shields	  of	  Bristol	  were	  both	  appointed	  
receivers.	  	  According	  to	  Shields,	  “the	  receivership	  does	  not	  indicate	  a	  collapse,	  but	  
will	  rather	  conserve	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  concerned.”114	  	  This	  infuriated	  President	  
Carter	  and	  officers	  of	  the	  company	  who	  claimed	  (as	  reported	  by	  the	  New	  York	  
Times)	  that,	  	  
Moore	   &	   Schley	   charged	   $750,000	   for	   financing,	   but	   also	   retained	  
$830,000	   in	   bonds.	   	   When	   persistent	   demands	   were	   made	   for	   the	  
refunding	   of	   the	   latter	   sum,	   it	   is	   said	   that	   Grant	   B.	   Schley,	   who	  
controlled	   a	   majority	   of	   the	   board	   of	   seven	   Directors,	   caused	   the	  
concern	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  receivers	  .	  .	  .	  Mr.	  Carter,	  having	  no	  
faith	   in	   the	   receivers	   whom	   he	   regards	   as	   the	   friends	   of	   Moore	   &	  
Schley,	  has	  applied	  to	  Judge	  Paul	  of	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  the	  Western	  
District	   of	   Virginia	   to	   have	   the	   receivers	   removed.	   .	   .	   Other	   security	  
holders	   have	   brought	   similar	   proceedings	   to	   those	   instituted	   by	  
President	   Carter	   and	   asking	   that	   competent	   and	   impartial	   men	   be	  
appointed	  as	  receivers	  in	  the	  place	  of	  Messrs.	  McHarg	  and	  Shields.115	  
	  
Carter	  ultimately	  proved	  to	  be	  somewhat	  successful	  in	  his	  attempts	  to	  remove	  the	  
receivers	  as	  Carter’s	  close	  friend	  Judge	  A.A.	  Phlegar	  would	  ultimately	  be	  appointed	  
as	  a	  receiver	  as	  well.116	  	  Even	  though	  Carter	  was	  successful	  in	  ensuring	  his	  
continued	  interests	  with	  the	  company,	  his	  influence	  was	  essentially	  done.	  	  He	  did	  
receive	  some	  parting	  compensation	  “when	  the	  [VIC&CC]	  was	  sold,	  Carter	  received	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several	  hundred	  thousand	  dollars	  for	  his	  part	  in	  the	  business.”117	  	  Carter	  was	  forced	  
to	  resign	  as	  president	  of	  VIC&CC,	  as	  control	  went	  to	  receivers.	  
	   Carter’s	  career	  spent	  developing	  the	  coal	  fields	  of	  southern	  Appalachia	  was	  
just	  beginning.	  	  After	  his	  separation	  from	  the	  VIC&CC	  Carter	  went	  on	  to	  lead	  
development	  on	  the	  Carolina,	  Clinchfield,	  and	  Ohio	  Railroad	  linking	  the	  coal	  fields	  of	  
east	  Kentucky,	  West	  Virginia,	  Virginia,	  and	  Tennessee	  with	  the	  textile	  mills	  of	  South	  
Carolina.	  	  From	  the	  Clinchfield,	  Carter	  moved	  on	  to	  his	  Carter	  Coal	  Company	  before	  
passing	  in	  1936.118	  
	   Regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  Carter’s	  leadership	  led	  to	  his	  disassociation	  
with	  the	  VIC&CC,	  the	  insight	  offered	  by	  Benjamin	  L.	  Dulaney,	  showcases	  the	  highly	  
competitive	  and	  unsure	  nature	  of	  these	  newly	  organized	  iron	  companies	  at	  the	  turn	  
of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  Dulaney,	  a	  promoter	  heavily	  involved	  in	  the	  organization	  
of	  the	  VIC&CC	  and	  the	  V&SW,	  offered	  his	  first-­‐hand	  experience	  with	  the	  VIC&CC	  to	  
the	  sixty-­‐third	  session	  of	  Congress	  (1913-­‐15).	  	  The	  topic	  of	  discussion	  was	  the	  
establishment	  of	  permanent	  seaboard	  coal	  distribution	  points	  at	  Norfolk,	  Virginia	  
and	  Charleston,	  South	  Carolina.	  	  Dulaney	  had	  been	  intimately	  involved	  with	  the	  
organization	  of	  the	  VIC&CC	  and	  the	  V&SW	  and	  understood	  the	  company’s	  situation.	  	  
He	  argued	  that	  a	  small	  circle	  of	  financiers,	  including	  the	  company’s	  receiver	  and	  
future	  president	  Henry	  K.	  McHarg,	  intentionally	  wrecked	  the	  VIC&CC	  in	  order	  to	  
gain	  full	  control	  of	  the	  company.	  	  Dulaney	  disassociated	  with	  the	  VIC&CC,	  but	  
remained	  active	  in	  the	  coal	  industry	  and	  at	  the	  time	  of	  his	  testimony	  was	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responsible	  for	  a	  competing	  coal	  interest	  active	  in	  the	  Black	  Mountain	  coalfields	  of	  
Virginia	  and	  Kentucky.	  	  As	  Dulaney	  stated	  in	  his	  testimony:	  
You know I had much to do with the organization of the Virginia Iron, 
Coal & Coke Co. and that I severed my connection from it after being 
thoroughly convinced that Henry K. McHarg, E. J. Berwind, Grant B. 
Schley, and associates had planned to wreck that company, and I believe 
afterwards wrecked it and as a result secured that complete control they 
now have….the Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. was wrecked by 
practically this same circle of men; that one of the circle withheld about a 
million dollars which belonged to that company until a receivership had 
been forced and until after the securities of the company had been bought 
in by them or by their agents, after which the large sum was paid to the 
receivers, making the receivership no longer necessary; that both Mr. 
McHarg and Mr. Berwind were on the board of directors of the Virginia 
Iron, Coal & Coke Co. before the receivership and had knowledge of the 
fact that Grant B. Schley was withholding the large sum of money needed, 
and that they made no effort to collect the money until after the 
receivership.119 
 
Despite the fact that Dulaney’s testimony was primarily concerned with securing fair 
shipping rates for his Black Mountain coal interests to Charleston, South Carolina via the 
Southern Railway, his testimony supported claims made by President Carter in 1901 that 
the company had been unduly forced into receivership.   
Under	  the	  direction	  of	  receivers	  McHarg	  and	  Phlegar,	  the	  company’s	  finances	  
were	  quickly	  righted;	  they	  avoided	  the	  participation	  of	  their	  labor	  force	  in	  the	  coal	  
strike	  of	  1902,	  and	  were	  able	  to	  announce	  plans	  for	  reorganization	  by	  August	  
1902.120	  	  Control	  of	  the	  property	  and	  business	  of	  the	  VIC&CC	  would	  be	  transferred	  
from	  the	  receivers	  to	  company	  directors.	  	  Under	  the	  receivers	  multiple	  suits	  for	  
foreclosure	  were	  filed,	  and	  with	  the	  reorganization	  these	  would	  be	  dismissed	  and	  
the	  company’s	  failed	  obligations	  would	  be	  restructured.	  	  As	  well	  as	  negotiating	  the	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settlement	  of	  back	  interest	  accrued	  since	  January	  1901,	  the	  plan	  would	  also	  allow	  
for	  the	  financing	  of	  improvements	  to	  the	  Virginia	  &	  Southwestern	  Railway.	  	  With	  the	  
plan	  for	  restructuring	  put	  into	  action	  stockholders	  elected	  receiver	  Henry	  K.	  McHarg	  
as	  the	  president	  of	  the	  reorganized	  company.121	  	  The	  production	  of	  pig	  iron	  and	  sale	  
of	  coal	  were	  still	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  primary	  objectives,	  but	  George	  Carter	  was	  no	  longer	  
associated	  with	  the	  company	  and	  the	  new	  president	  Henry	  McHarg	  personally	  
invested	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  his	  own	  money	  into	  the	  company.	  
The	  forces	  that	  created	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  formation	  and	  subsequent	  
reorganization	  of	  the	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  reflect	  the	  colonial	  
nature	  of	  the	  iron	  and	  coal	  industries	  in	  southern	  Appalachia.	  	  Although	  these	  
industries	  were	  almost	  purely	  extractive	  in	  nature,	  the	  VIC&CC	  also	  does	  not	  reflect	  
disenfranchised	  southern	  leadership	  in	  the	  face	  of	  northern	  industrialists.	  	  George	  L.	  
Carter	  was	  perhaps	  the	  most	  successful	  iron	  master	  of	  his	  time	  in	  southern	  
Appalachia.	  	  Practically	  all	  the	  iron	  enterprises	  in	  the	  region	  that	  were	  organized	  by	  
Philadelphia	  and	  New	  York	  financiers	  during	  the	  1880s	  failed	  when	  economic	  
conditions	  worsened	  after	  1893,	  while	  Carter’s	  Dora	  Iron	  Company	  forged	  ahead.	  	  
Carter’s	  ambition	  led	  him	  to	  buy	  out	  the	  Crozer	  furnaces	  in	  Roanoke,	  which	  were	  
among	  the	  region’s	  most	  successful	  furnaces	  backed	  by	  northern	  capital.	  	  When	  
Carter	  and	  Moore	  &	  Schley	  formed	  the	  VIC&CC,	  Carter	  eagerly	  tried	  to	  enter	  steel	  
production	  in	  Tennessee	  and	  expand	  his	  company’s	  holdings,	  but	  when	  several	  of	  
the	  company’s	  properties	  were	  discovered	  to	  be	  overvalued,	  unforeseen	  accidents	  
incurred	  heavy	  costs,	  and	  internal	  disagreements	  all	  joined	  together	  the	  union	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between	  southern	  ironmaster	  and	  northern	  financier	  quickly	  disintegrated.	  	  Carter	  
was	  as	  adept	  at	  coal	  and	  iron	  production	  as	  any,	  but	  his	  inexperience	  with	  managing	  
such	  a	  large	  enterprise	  as	  the	  VIC&CC	  made	  it	  easy	  for	  Moore	  &	  Schley	  to	  exclude	  
Carter	  in	  favor	  of	  Henry	  K.	  McHarg,	  who	  also	  personally	  vested	  himself	  in	  the	  
company.	  	  McHarg’s	  previous	  experience	  as	  the	  vice-­‐president	  of	  a	  large	  bank	  and	  
experience	  with	  the	  Louisville	  &	  Nashville	  Railroad	  all	  made	  him	  a	  much	  more	  
proficient	  manager	  than	  Carter.	  	  McHarg	  brought	  a	  degree	  of	  organization	  and	  
personal	  finance	  to	  the	  company	  that	  the	  VIC&CC	  was	  lacking	  under	  Carter’s	  
management.	  
Despite	  the	  questionable	  actions	  of	  management	  and	  the	  Board	  of	  Directors	  
during	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  first	  years,	  the	  company	  was	  able	  to	  successfully	  continue	  
operations	  well	  into	  the	  twentieth	  century	  as	  management	  increasingly	  focused	  its	  
interests	  on	  developing	  the	  company’s	  coal	  operations,	  especially	  when	  it	  became	  
apparent	  that	  iron	  ore	  deposits	  were	  not	  suitable	  for	  the	  new	  steel	  industry.	  	  As	  the	  
entire	  region	  would	  come	  to	  be	  dominated	  by	  coal,	  Henry	  McHarg	  and	  the	  VIC&CC	  




Chapter	  Three	  –	  Virginia	  Iron	  Coal	  and	  Coke	  Company	  1901	  –	  1911	  
For	  the	  American	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry,	  the	  twentieth	  century	  opened	  on	  an	  
extremely	  high	  note.	  	  During	  1899	  the	  price	  of	  pig	  iron	  doubled	  in	  price	  on	  markets	  
across	  the	  country	  as	  domestic	  manufacturing	  increased	  and	  export	  orders	  poured	  
in.	  	  Wages	  too	  were	  at	  an	  all-­‐time	  high,	  and	  unsold	  stockpiles	  of	  pig	  iron	  were	  
greatly	  reduced.	  	  American	  furnaces	  worked	  at	  maximum	  capacity	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  
orders.	  	  There	  was	  little	  threat	  from	  imported	  iron	  and	  steel	  because	  minimal	  
foreign	  stockpiles	  of	  pig	  iron	  meant	  that	  there	  was	  little	  chance	  that	  the	  English	  
could	  flood	  American	  markets	  with	  cheaper	  English	  products.122	  	  Aside	  from	  high	  
market	  prices,	  busy	  furnaces,	  and	  high	  wages,	  a	  new	  era	  in	  corporate	  management	  
and	  ownership	  began	  in	  1899	  as	  several	  huge	  corporations	  were	  organized	  to	  
consolidate	  the	  production	  process	  into	  vertically	  integrated	  systems	  of	  production.	  	  
These	  new	  corporate	  entities	  were	  organized	  under	  ideal	  market	  conditions	  and	  
their	  performance	  over	  time	  remained	  to	  be	  known.	  	  This	  gave	  industry	  analysts	  
reason	  for	  concern.	  	  As	  noted	  by	  James	  C.	  Bayles,	  former	  editor	  of	  The	  Iron	  Age,	  a	  
leading	  industry	  trade	  journal,	  these	  consolidations	  “are	  not	  yet	  so	  well	  established	  
as	  to	  make	  them	  quite	  independent	  of	  Wall	  Street,	  and	  it	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  shown	  that	  they	  
have	  in	  every	  case	  secured	  the	  kind	  of	  talent	  in	  their	  management	  which	  is	  capable	  
of	  handling	  such	  vast	  and	  varied	  interests.”123	  
One	  of	  the	  first	  new	  corporations	  organized	  in	  1899	  was	  the	  Virginia,	  Iron,	  
Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  (VIC&CC).	  	  George	  L.	  Carter,	  with	  the	  financial	  backing	  of	  
the	  Wall	  Street	  firm	  Moore	  and	  Schley,	  organized	  the	  VIC&CC	  after	  nearly	  three	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decades	  of	  capital	  investment	  and	  industrial	  modernization	  of	  the	  iron	  industry	  in	  
southern	  Appalachia.	  	  When	  organized,	  pig	  iron	  and	  coke	  production	  were	  the	  
VIC&CC’s	  primary	  objectives,	  but	  the	  company’s	  iron	  interests	  faltered,	  their	  focus	  
shifted	  to	  developing	  their	  extensive	  coal	  properties	  for	  coal	  production.	  	  In	  the	  case	  
of	  the	  VIC&CC	  the	  hesitancy	  expressed	  by	  Bayles	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  justified	  and	  in	  
January	  1901	  the	  company	  fell	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  receivers	  after	  only	  two	  years	  of	  
operation.	  	  During	  the	  receivership,	  the	  company	  underwent	  a	  complete	  financial	  
and	  management	  restructuring	  before	  the	  dismissal	  of	  the	  receivers	  on	  January	  1,	  
1903.	  	  It	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  chapter	  to	  detail	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  reorganized	  
VIC&CC.	  
The	  reorganized	  VIC&CC	  failed	  to	  remain	  a	  competitive	  producer	  of	  pig	  iron	  
for	  several	  reasons.	  	  A	  large	  bonded	  debt	  financially	  limited	  the	  company	  even	  
during	  the	  most	  prosperous	  years.	  	  Management	  also	  struggled	  with	  the	  high	  costs	  
of	  labor	  while	  continuing	  to	  improve	  and	  maintain	  the	  company’s	  plants	  and	  
equipment.	  	  Although	  noted	  as	  being	  adequately	  managed,	  the	  company	  was	  also	  
described	  as	  being	  “capable	  of	  improvement	  along	  modern	  scientific	  lines.”124	  	  
Although	  these	  reasons	  were	  all	  severe	  hurdles	  to	  the	  company’s	  iron	  holdings,	  the	  
most	  crippling	  challenge	  the	  company	  faced	  was	  plainly	  a	  dwindling	  supply	  of	  high	  
quality	  ore.	  	  This	  necessitated	  that	  the	  company	  begin	  purchasing	  large	  quantities	  of	  
ore	  on	  the	  open	  market	  rather	  than	  relying	  on	  their	  own	  ore	  supply.	  	  By	  purchasing	  
on	  the	  open	  market	  the	  company	  had	  to	  compete	  with	  other	  buyers,	  pay	  a	  mark	  up,	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and	  deal	  with	  increased	  shipping	  rates.	  	  Such	  purchases	  significantly	  increased	  the	  
cost	  of	  the	  essential	  raw	  material	  in	  iron	  production.	  	  In	  addition,	  this	  put	  their	  
interests	  at	  a	  severe	  disadvantage	  against	  the	  better,	  less	  expensive	  pig	  irons	  being	  
produced	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  regions	  and	  in	  Alabama.125	  
Even	  though	  the	  company	  struggled	  to	  survive	  as	  a	  producer	  of	  pig	  iron,	  
management	  took	  several	  measures	  in	  the	  decades	  following	  the	  company’s	  
restructuring	  to	  retain	  a	  degree	  of	  profitability.	  	  Beginning	  during	  the	  receivership,	  
their	  primary	  objective	  was	  to	  reduce	  the	  stockholder’s	  bonded	  debt	  so	  normal	  
operation	  of	  the	  company	  could	  resume.126	  	  This	  policy	  continued	  long	  after	  the	  
receivership	  ended,	  and	  an	  auditing	  firm’s	  1916	  independent	  study	  of	  the	  
company’s	  financial	  standing	  suggests	  that	  this	  policy	  was	  pursued	  to	  a	  point	  of	  
“impairing	  the	  working	  capital	  required	  to	  carry	  on	  the	  business	  .	  .	  ..	  ”127	  	  Another	  
consistent	  measure	  was	  the	  sale	  of	  property	  and	  mineral	  lands.	  	  Several	  furnaces	  
were	  quickly	  sold	  or	  shut	  down	  and	  scrapped	  as	  the	  company	  concentrated	  their	  pig	  
iron	  production	  into	  a	  few	  furnaces.	  	  As	  well	  as	  furnaces	  and	  mineral	  lands,	  the	  
company	  subsidized	  the	  Virginia	  Land	  Development	  Company	  to	  handle	  the	  
improvement	  and	  sale	  of	  lots	  and	  dwellings	  the	  company	  owned	  in	  the	  small	  cities	  
and	  towns	  in	  the	  region.128.	  	  The	  subsidiary	  company	  to	  the	  VIC&CC	  was	  an	  active	  
developer	  in	  cities	  such	  as	  Radford	  during	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  and	  further	  study	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of	  the	  Virginia	  Land	  Development	  Company	  could	  greatly	  enrich	  historical	  
interpretations	  of	  southwest	  Virginia.	  
From	  the	  company’s	  outset	  in	  1899,	  coal	  offered	  strong	  potential.	  	  Improving	  
the	  company’s	  coal	  mining,	  refining,	  and	  transport	  capacities	  drew	  a	  considerable	  
amount	  of	  management’s	  resources	  and	  attention.	  	  Aside	  from	  coal	  orders	  from	  the	  
United	  States	  Navy	  during	  the	  company’s	  first	  years	  of	  operation,	  the	  VIC&CC	  sold	  
their	  coal	  primarily	  to	  railroads.	  	  By	  1916	  their	  buyers	  were	  the	  Boston	  &	  Maine	  
Railroad,	  Southern	  Railway,	  and	  Norfolk	  &	  Western	  Railway.129	  	  Along	  with	  coal	  
sales,	  management	  sought	  to	  purchase	  securities	  “from	  time	  to	  time	  as	  
investment.”130	  	  These	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  purchasing	  their	  own	  VIC&CC	  first	  
mortgage	  bonds,	  Virginia	  &	  Southwestern	  Railway	  first	  mortgage	  bonds,	  and	  heavy	  
investment	  in	  the	  American	  and	  Canadian	  war	  efforts	  during	  World	  War	  I	  via	  the	  
purchase	  of	  Liberty	  and	  Victory	  Bonds.131	  	  Keeping	  in	  mind	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  basic	  
management	  strategy	  was	  to	  reduce	  the	  company’s	  bonded	  indebtedness	  by	  means	  
of	  consolidating	  pig	  iron	  production,	  to	  expand	  the	  company’s	  coal	  interests,	  to	  sell	  
unnecessary	  facilities	  and	  land,	  and	  occasionally	  to	  invest	  in	  securities.	  
Under	  the	  announced	  reorganization	  plans	  in	  1903,	  control	  of	  the	  property	  
and	  business	  of	  the	  VIC&CC	  would	  be	  transferred	  from	  the	  receivers	  to	  company	  
directors.	  	  The	  company’s	  failed	  obligations	  would	  be	  restructured.	  	  As	  well	  as	  
negotiating	  the	  settlement	  of	  back	  interest	  accrued	  since	  January	  1901,	  the	  plan	  
would	  also	  allow	  for	  the	  financing	  of	  improvements	  to	  the	  Virginia	  &	  Southwestern	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Railway	  as	  well	  as	  developing	  profitable	  sections	  of	  the	  company.	  	  With	  the	  plan	  for	  
restructuring	  put	  into	  action,	  stockholders	  elected	  receiver	  Henry	  K.	  McHarg	  as	  the	  
new	  company	  president.132	  
As	  co-­‐receivers	  McHarg	  and	  A.A.	  Phlegar	  (who	  separated	  himself	  from	  the	  
company	  shortly	  after	  reorganization)	  were	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  improving	  
market	  conditions	  for	  pig	  iron	  during	  1901	  and	  1902,	  and	  that	  momentum	  carried	  
into	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1903.133	  	  This	  period	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  times	  that	  the	  company	  
was	  able	  to	  record	  a	  net	  profit	  from	  practically	  every	  sector	  of	  its	  enterprise	  with	  its	  
coke	  ovens,	  grist	  mills,	  Crescent	  Horseshoe	  Works,	  and	  Dora	  Foundry	  (which	  
produced	  tram	  car	  wheels)	  all	  recording	  profits.	  	  The	  only	  loss	  during	  the	  first	  half	  
of	  1903	  came	  from	  the	  company’s	  saw	  mill,	  although	  this	  was	  the	  only	  period	  this	  
sector	  recorded	  a	  loss.	  	  In	  the	  six	  months	  following	  reorganization,	  the	  company	  
recorded	  a	  total	  net	  profit	  of	  $424,442.29.	  	  The	  company’s	  furnaces	  were	  in	  full	  blast	  
at	  this	  time	  with	  an	  average	  selling	  price	  of	  $17.51/ton	  for	  pig	  iron	  and	  $26.35/ton	  
for	  charcoal	  iron.	  	  With	  these	  high	  selling	  prices	  the	  company’s	  furnaces	  recorded	  a	  
profit	  of	  $713,416.78	  after	  selling	  $2,232,	  524.47	  of	  iron.134	  	  During	  the	  same	  period	  
coal	  recorded	  a	  profit	  of	  $36,456.35	  after	  selling	  $378,181.52	  and	  costing	  $0.64/ton	  
to	  produce.135	  	  The	  first	  few	  years	  of	  reorganization	  seemed	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  
reorganized	  company	  could	  recover	  from	  its	  tumultuous	  beginnings,	  as	  it	  made	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progress	  toward	  paying	  off	  its	  debt	  after	  ending	  receivership.	  	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  
1904,	  this	  momentum	  carried	  into	  1907	  when	  the	  near	  collapse	  of	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  
backers,	  Moore	  &	  Schley,	  helped	  fuel	  an	  economic	  downturn	  that	  the	  company	  
would	  never	  fully	  recover	  from.	  
Between	  June	  30,	  1903	  and	  June	  30,	  1904,	  the	  VIC&CC	  incurred	  a	  
considerable	  loss,	  and	  during	  fiscal	  year	  (FY)	  1904	  the	  company	  recorded	  a	  net	  loss	  
of	  $351,439.66.	  	  Although	  profits	  from	  the	  company’s	  furnaces	  fell	  to	  only	  
$177,330.36	  and	  the	  selling	  price	  for	  pig	  and	  charcoal	  iron	  dropped	  to	  $13.17/ton	  
and	  $23.45/ton	  respectively,	  the	  company	  produced	  more	  pig	  and	  charcoal	  iron	  
with	  less	  expenses	  than	  it	  had	  in	  FY1903.	  	  Coal	  did	  see	  significant	  gains	  during	  
FY1904	  and	  recorded	  a	  profit	  of	  $125,984.58	  after	  mining	  996,362	  tons	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  
$0.68/ton.	  	  A	  majority	  of	  the	  company’s	  loss	  during	  FY1904	  came	  from	  bond	  
interest	  on	  VIC&CC	  bonds	  and	  a	  rare,	  but	  considerable,	  depreciation	  on	  stocks	  
owned	  in	  other	  companies.136	  	  Although	  FY1904	  saw	  a	  huge	  net	  loss,	  the	  following	  
three	  years	  would	  be	  a	  profitable	  period.	  
Even	  though	  the	  VIC&CC	  recorded	  a	  small	  profit	  of	  $79,458.87	  during	  
FY1905,	  the	  year	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  unsatisfactory	  one.137	  	  Poor	  market	  prices	  and	  
even	  bad	  weather	  kept	  the	  company	  from	  selling	  any	  iron	  until	  October	  1904.	  	  As	  
noted	  by	  President	  Henry	  K.	  McHarg	  in	  his	  opening	  address	  to	  the	  stockholders,	  
market	  prices	  during	  the	  summer	  of	  1904	  for	  the	  pig	  iron	  produced	  by	  the	  company	  
did	  not	  cover	  the	  costs	  of	  production.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  company	  only	  kept	  its	  Dora	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furnace	  at	  blast	  during	  this	  time,	  only	  to	  have	  heavy	  rains	  during	  the	  month	  of	  
October	  flood	  the	  facility’s	  stock	  house	  and	  shut	  down	  the	  furnace	  for	  several	  weeks.	  	  
Limited	  by	  these	  untimely	  events,	  VIC&CC	  pig	  iron	  and	  coke	  production	  fell	  
significantly	  while	  coal	  production	  remained	  steady.	  	  Pig	  iron	  production	  fell	  12.3	  
percent	  from	  1904	  to	  143,305	  total	  tons;	  coke	  fell	  a	  similar	  11.4	  percent	  to	  290,832	  
total	  tons.	  	  Coal	  production	  remained	  constant	  from	  1904	  and	  actually	  saw	  a	  slight	  
increase	  of	  2,000	  tons	  from	  the	  previous	  year	  and	  produced	  a	  total	  of	  998,362	  
tons.138	  
Although	  poor	  market	  prices	  for	  pig	  iron	  hampered	  the	  company,	  and	  the	  
prices	  for	  coal	  and	  coke	  were	  no	  better,	  not	  all	  news	  was	  bad.	  	  The	  company	  was	  
able	  to	  sell	  or	  separate	  from	  properties	  that	  had	  not	  been	  profitable,	  improve	  the	  
facilities	  which	  were,	  and	  even	  expand	  their	  holdings	  of	  ore	  properties.	  	  The	  
Cranberry	  Furnace	  Company	  that	  had	  been	  leasing	  the	  Carnegie	  furnace	  exercised	  
their	  option	  to	  buy	  the	  property	  from	  the	  company	  for	  $70,000.	  	  The	  VIC&CC	  also	  
separated	  from	  The	  Radford	  Pipe	  Works,	  which	  was	  sold	  for	  $160,000,	  and	  the	  
buyers	  of	  the	  Embreville	  property	  were	  able	  to	  settle	  their	  debt	  with	  the	  company.	  	  
The	  monies	  received	  for	  these	  properties	  would	  be	  applied	  to	  retiring	  the	  first	  
mortgage	  bonds	  from	  the	  Carter	  Coal	  and	  Iron	  Company.	  	  Company	  management	  
was	  also	  able	  to	  settle	  a	  longstanding	  conflict	  with	  the	  Norfolk	  &	  Western	  Railroad	  
that	  finally	  enabled	  the	  company’s	  Virginia	  &	  Southwestern	  trains	  to	  move	  coal	  and	  
coke	  from	  their	  Toms	  Creek	  facility	  to	  markets	  to	  the	  south	  and	  west	  via	  the	  
Louisville	  and	  Nashville	  Railway.	  	  With	  the	  sale	  of	  these	  facilities	  and	  improvements	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




to	  others,	  the	  increase	  in	  ore	  properties,	  and	  easily	  accessible	  coal	  and	  improved	  rail	  
links	  beyond	  the	  region,	  the	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  seemed	  close	  to	  
separating	  itself	  from	  its	  tumultuous	  beginnings	  and	  period	  of	  operation	  under	  
receivers.139	  	  
The	  fiscal	  year	  of	  1906	  showed	  a	  marked	  improvement	  over	  the	  previous	  
two	  years.	  	  The	  company	  recorded	  a	  total	  net	  profit	  of	  $147,274.03	  as	  both	  pig	  iron	  
and	  coal	  sales	  expanded.	  	  The	  company’s	  furnaces	  drew	  a	  profit	  of	  $287,400.42,	  a	  3	  
percent	  increase	  from	  the	  previous	  year,	  as	  market	  prices	  for	  pig	  iron	  rose	  from	  
over	  $1/ton	  to	  $14.06/ton	  and	  the	  company	  shipped	  224,149	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron	  for	  the	  
year,	  a	  14.3	  percent	  increase	  from	  1905.	  	  Charcoal	  iron	  also	  saw	  an	  increased	  selling	  
price,	  although	  the	  company	  only	  shipped	  1,573	  tons.	  	  On	  average,	  charcoal	  iron	  
sold	  for	  double	  the	  price	  per	  ton	  that	  pig	  iron	  did,	  but	  the	  VIC&CC	  never	  shipped	  
more	  than	  3,179	  tons	  in	  a	  year	  between	  1903-­‐1915	  when	  data	  is	  available.	  	  
Typically	  the	  company	  shipped	  less	  than	  2,000	  tons	  of	  charcoal	  iron	  in	  a	  year	  and	  
that	  number	  steadily	  declined	  into	  1915,	  and	  most	  of	  what	  they	  did	  produce	  was	  
consumed	  at	  their	  own	  Crescent	  Horseshoe	  Iron	  Works	  facility.140	  	  During	  FY1906	  
profits	  from	  coal	  production	  grew	  32.3	  percent	  to	  $185,978.93	  after	  1,264,564	  tons	  
were	  extracted	  at	  an	  average	  cost	  of	  $0.60/ton.	  	  Coke	  shipments	  reached	  a	  record	  
high	  during	  the	  year	  as	  411,708	  tons	  were	  shipped	  at	  a	  profit	  of	  $69,868.24.141	  	  In	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1906	  President	  McHarg	  reached	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  Southern	  Railway	  Company	  that	  
was	  advantageous	  to	  both	  corporations.	  
The	  VIC&CC’s	  railroad,	  the	  Virginia	  &	  Southwestern,	  connected	  its	  coal	  and	  
ore	  holdings	  in	  southwest	  Virginia	  and	  eastern	  Tennessee	  to	  its	  furnaces	  in	  Bristol	  
and	  the	  larger	  rail	  networks	  of	  the	  region.	  	  The	  company	  invested	  heavily	  in	  
improving	  this	  line	  from	  the	  outset	  of	  reorganization,	  and	  coal	  sales	  to	  the	  south	  
were	  growing	  at	  a	  rapid	  rate	  and	  shipped	  via	  the	  Southern,	  McHarg	  found	  that	  the	  
Southern	  Railway	  system	  was	  greatly	  interested	  in	  purchasing	  his	  company’s	  line.	  	  
As	  McHarg	  stated	  in	  his	  1907	  letter	  to	  company	  stockholders,	  “the	  amount	  of	  coal	  
that	  we	  have	  been	  able	  to	  dispose	  of	  in	  that	  territory	  has	  been	  only	  limited	  by	  our	  
ability	  to	  get	  cars	  for	  its	  transportation,	  and	  miners	  in	  our	  mines	  to	  produce	  it.”142	  	  
When	  the	  deal	  was	  finalized	  the	  Virginia	  &	  Southwestern	  Railway	  was	  sold	  to	  the	  
Southern	  at	  a	  profit	  of	  $1,004,500.143	  	  Securing	  affordable	  freight	  rates	  was	  essential	  
to	  the	  survival	  of	  coal	  producers	  and	  the	  VIC&CC	  managed	  to	  obtain	  affordable	  
access	  to	  Charleston,	  South	  Carolina,	  and	  when	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  V&SW	  was	  completed,	  
“Mr.	  McHarg,	  as	  bondholder	  of	  the	  road,	  was	  continued	  as	  a	  director	  of	  the	  Virginia	  
&	  Southwestern,	  and	  remained	  such	  up	  until	  the	  last	  annual	  meeting	  of	  the	  
company.”144	  	  By	  remaining	  as	  both	  the	  director	  of	  the	  line	  now	  owned	  by	  the	  
Southern	  Railway	  and	  the	  President	  of	  the	  VIC&CC	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  McHarg	  
managed	  to	  manipulate	  freight	  rates	  that	  were	  advantageous	  to	  the	  VIC&CC.	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Besides	  now	  having	  access	  to	  an	  Atlantic	  port	  without	  having	  to	  switch	  lines,	  the	  
sale	  of	  the	  small	  railroad	  also	  removed	  the	  burdensome	  costs	  of	  maintaining	  a	  rail	  
line,	  locomotive	  and	  car	  fleet	  from	  the	  company’s	  balance	  sheet.	  
Fiscal	  year	  1907	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  company’s	  most	  successful	  in	  the	  four	  
years	  since	  the	  reorganization	  took	  effect	  in	  January	  1903.	  	  The	  agreement	  with	  
Norfolk	  and	  Western	  Railroad	  noted	  in	  the	  1905	  report	  continued	  to	  serve	  the	  
company	  well	  as	  the	  movement	  of	  coal	  from	  their	  Toms	  Creek	  facility	  was	  only	  
limited	  by	  the	  number	  of	  cars	  VIC&CC	  owned.	  	  Also	  during	  1907	  the	  Southern	  
Railway	  Corporation	  paid	  the	  VIC&CC	  25	  percent	  of	  the	  amount	  owed	  and	  remained	  
on	  schedule	  to	  meet	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  sale	  agreed	  upon.	  	  In	  addition,	  iron	  production	  
for	  the	  year	  was	  up,	  and	  in	  1907	  the	  company	  produced	  202,453	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron	  
entirely	  from	  local	  sources	  of	  ore.	  	  The	  total	  tonnage	  of	  coal	  mined	  also	  increased	  
from	  1905	  to	  1,166,445	  tons,	  an	  increase	  of	  14	  percent,	  and	  the	  company	  managed	  
to	  increase	  its	  coke	  production	  to	  394,791	  tons,	  a	  slight	  decrease	  of	  1.5	  percent	  from	  
the	  previous	  year	  as	  iron	  production	  also	  fell	  slightly.145	  
One	  interesting	  note	  from	  1907	  regarded	  labor	  (which	  is	  largely	  absent	  from	  
the	  Annual	  Reports),	  the	  cost	  of	  production,	  and	  market	  prices.	  	  Henry	  McHarg	  noted	  
incredible	  difficulties	  in	  acquiring	  the	  labor	  necessary	  to	  operate	  the	  company’s	  
mines,	  which	  could	  have	  been	  a	  comment	  on	  increasing	  mechanization,	  
modernizing	  the	  company.	  	  McHarg	  noted:	  	  
If	  it	  were	  not	  for	  the	  steam	  shovels	  which	  your	  management	  has	  
bought	  during	  the	  last	  two	  or	  three	  years	  it	  would	  have	  been	  
impossible	  for	  us	  to	  have	  obtained	  enough	  ore	  from	  our	  mines	  to	  keep	  
our	  furnaces	  going.	  	  This	  labor	  situation	  has	  added	  to	  the	  cost	  of	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production	  of	  iron	  very	  materially,	  but	  owing	  to	  the	  quite	  rapid	  
advance	  in	  the	  prices	  this	  was	  more	  than	  counterbalanced	  by	  the	  
figures	  received	  for	  iron	  sold.146	  
	  
Along	  with	  good	  prices	  for	  pig	  iron	  and	  good	  coal	  and	  coke	  markets,	  1907	  proved	  to	  
be	  another	  successful	  year	  in	  cancelling	  the	  bonds	  owed	  on	  the	  company’s	  first	  
mortgage	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Carter	  and	  Iron	  Company	  bonds.	  	  The	  company	  was	  able	  to	  
cancel,	  or	  pay	  back	  $766,000	  worth	  of	  outstanding	  bonds	  with	  the	  monies	  made	  
from	  iron,	  coal,	  and	  coke.	  	  Management	  also	  increased	  their	  ore	  property	  holdings	  
with	  the	  purchase	  of	  20,000	  acres	  of	  the	  “Scott”	  properties	  in	  Tennessee,	  which	  
President	  McHarg	  believed	  would	  supply	  their	  Bristol	  furnace	  for	  many	  years	  to	  
come.	  	  With	  all	  of	  this	  accomplished	  in	  1907,	  the	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  
Company	  continued	  to	  recover	  from	  its	  disastrous	  beginnings.147	  
Consistency	  certainly	  did	  not	  define	  the	  iron	  markets	  of	  the	  early	  20th	  
century,	  and	  an	  economic	  recession	  in	  late	  1907	  hit	  the	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry	  and	  
its	  related	  businesses	  particularly	  hard.	  	  A	  feared	  nation-­‐wide	  shortage	  of	  money,	  
the	  failure	  of	  a	  prominent	  New	  York	  City	  bank,	  and	  the	  near	  collapse	  of	  an	  over-­‐
extended	  brokerage	  house	  that	  had	  invested	  heavily	  in	  southern	  industries	  in	  the	  
fall	  of	  1907	  had	  set	  the	  tone	  for	  the	  1908	  financial	  year.	  	  Only	  the	  timely	  
intervention	  of	  J.P.	  Morgan	  and	  other	  bankers	  prevented	  a	  near	  failure	  of	  the	  
banking	  system,	  but	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  a	  number	  of	  companies	  failed	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and	  production	  slowed	  considerably.	  	  The	  economic	  recession	  clearly	  affected	  the	  
VIC&CC.148	  	  
For	  the	  VIC&CC	  in	  1908,	  only	  the	  Bristol	  and	  Roanoke	  furnaces	  operated,	  
while	  newly	  improved	  furnaces,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  at	  Radford,	  sat	  idle.	  	  The	  company’s	  
ore	  mines	  were	  shut	  down	  for	  nearly	  six	  months	  and	  when	  mining	  resumed	  in	  
February	  1908,	  the	  production	  of	  pig	  iron	  would	  outpace	  its	  sales.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
year	  the	  company	  had	  over	  100,000	  tons	  of	  raw	  iron	  ore	  simply	  stockpiled	  at	  the	  
company’s	  various	  furnaces.	  	  According	  to	  President	  McHarg,	  the	  company’s	  coal	  
business	  suffered	  from	  the	  same	  poor	  conditions;	  its	  coalmines	  were	  closed	  during	  
much	  of	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  ore	  mines.	  	  While	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1908	  saw	  decreased	  
activity	  at	  the	  company’s	  facilities,	  the	  VIC&CC	  did	  increase	  its	  land	  holdings.	  	  This	  
included	  purchasing	  1,000	  acres	  of	  iron	  ore	  properties	  in	  Cartersville,	  Georgia	  and	  a	  
property	  in	  Ashe	  County,	  North	  Carolina	  containing	  a	  vein	  of	  high	  grade	  ore	  as	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  Scott	  properties	  purchased	  in	  1907	  were	  yielding	  positive	  
results.149	  	  	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  sudden	  business	  slowdown	  the	  fiscal	  year	  1908	  proved	  to	  
largely	  be	  a	  disastrous	  one.	  	  Total	  production	  numbers	  for	  all	  three	  of	  the	  company’s	  
main	  products	  -­‐	  coal,	  coke,	  and	  iron	  -­‐	  were	  down	  for	  the	  year.	  	  The	  company	  posted	  
a	  net	  loss	  of	  $694,303.30	  when	  the	  year	  previous	  it	  posted	  an	  impressive	  
$655,686.91	  net	  profit.	  	  Pig	  iron	  shipments	  plummeted	  65.1	  percent	  from	  221,599	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tons	  during	  FY1907	  to	  a	  mere	  77,316	  tons	  during	  FY1908.	  	  Coke	  production	  
suffered	  a	  33.8	  percent	  decline	  from	  FY1907	  to	  FY1908,	  and	  even	  though	  the	  
company	  had	  recently	  opened	  two	  new	  leased	  coalmines	  at	  Linden	  and	  Marion,	  coal	  
production	  fell	  a	  relatively	  small	  17	  percent	  from	  FY1907	  to	  968,131	  tons	  at	  a	  net	  
cost	  of	  $0.69/ton	  during	  FY1908.150	  	  Even	  though	  the	  company’s	  production	  
suffered	  a	  huge	  decline	  during	  the	  year,	  shortly	  after	  the	  close	  of	  the	  1908	  fiscal	  
year,	  the	  Southern	  Railway	  also	  made	  its	  final	  payment	  on	  the	  Virginia	  &	  
Southwestern	  railway	  stock,	  which	  the	  VIC&CC	  used	  to	  increase	  its	  cash	  holdings	  in	  
bank	  to	  $250,000.151	  
As	  was	  the	  case	  in	  1907,	  the	  company’s	  production	  of	  iron	  continued	  to	  
outpace	  its	  sales	  and	  at	  the	  close	  of	  FY1908,	  70,000	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron	  sat	  unsold	  at	  the	  
company’s	  facilities.	  	  Although	  this	  was	  the	  case,	  President	  McHarg	  noted	  that	  “this	  
is	  all	  paid	  for	  and	  no	  money	  has	  been	  borrowed	  on	  it	  and	  as	  it	  does	  not	  deteriorate	  
and	  is	  piled	  on	  our	  own	  property,	  the	  only	  loss	  by	  holding	  same	  is	  the	  question	  of	  
interest	  on	  the	  money.”152	  	  High	  production	  costs,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  producers,	  and	  
the	  speculative	  expansion	  of	  the	  nation’s	  rail	  network	  all	  meant	  that	  over	  
production	  was	  common	  in	  the	  period’s	  national	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry,	  and	  as	  
noted	  in	  the	  1908	  Annual	  Report,	  national	  market	  prices	  had	  plummeted	  by	  ten	  
dollars	  a	  ton	  and	  production	  had	  decreased	  from	  1907	  by	  almost	  50	  percent.	  	  
Although	  the	  company’s	  iron	  interests	  were	  not	  panning	  out	  as	  had	  been	  hoped	  at	  
the	  company’s	  outset,	  the	  production	  of	  coal	  was	  proving	  to	  be	  hugely	  profitable.	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McHarg	  noted	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  coal	  holdings	  as	  having	  “enhanced	  very	  much	  in	  value	  
during	  the	  time	  mentioned	  [Jan.	  1903-­‐	  July	  1908]	  and,	  my	  own	  personal	  opinion	  is,	  
that	  .	  .	  .	  what	  we	  have	  now	  is	  worth	  from	  25%	  to	  33.33%	  more	  than	  when	  the	  
Company	  was	  reorganized	  .	  .	  ..”153	  
In	  1903,	  when	  the	  company	  was	  reorganized	  it	  was	  saddled	  with	  
approximately	  $7,744,000	  in	  liabilities	  from	  outstanding	  accounts,	  bonds	  and	  bond	  
interest,	  unpaid	  payrolls,	  vouchers,	  and	  depreciation	  in	  land	  values	  caused	  by	  
mining.	  	  In	  the	  five	  years	  since	  the	  reorganization,	  VIC&CC	  management	  had	  
remarkably	  reduced	  that	  number	  by	  over	  50	  percent,	  and	  in	  1908	  had	  only	  
$3,777,000	  in	  liabilities	  ahead	  of	  the	  company’s	  capital	  stock.	  	  Despite	  poor	  markets	  
for	  the	  sale	  of	  pig	  iron,	  the	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  was	  making	  rapid	  
progress	  in	  improving	  the	  company’s	  financial	  footing.154	  	  The	  Panic	  of	  1907	  had	  set	  
back	  the	  company’s	  continued	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  the	  overall	  debt	  and	  remove	  
receivership.	  
McHarg’s	  ever-­‐optimistic	  outlook	  for	  improving	  iron	  markets	  once	  again	  fell	  
short	  during	  the	  financial	  year	  ending	  June	  30,	  1909.	  	  The	  company	  relocated	  its	  
headquarters	  to	  Roanoke,	  Virginia	  and	  although	  Virginia	  iron	  continued	  to	  sell	  at	  
practically	  its	  cost	  of	  production,	  the	  VIC&CC	  continued	  to	  mine	  iron	  ore	  and	  smelt	  
pig	  iron	  throughout	  the	  year.	  	  By	  the	  year’s	  close	  it	  had	  stockpiled	  139,486	  tons	  of	  
ore	  at	  their	  furnaces.	  	  With	  the	  poor	  markets,	  VIC&CC	  management	  operated	  only	  
two	  of	  its	  furnaces	  and	  by	  year’s	  end	  had	  produced	  119,659	  tons	  of	  coke	  iron	  and	  
3,899	  tons	  of	  charcoal	  iron,	  but	  only	  25,692	  tons	  were	  actually	  sold.	  	  Besides	  the	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company’s	  large	  stockpiles	  of	  raw	  ore,	  157,594	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron	  now	  accompanied	  it.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  poor	  sales,	  the	  company	  was	  still	  unable	  to	  reach	  by	  rail	  valuable	  ore	  
properties	  it	  had	  purchased	  in	  North	  Carolina,	  while	  several	  of	  their	  oldest	  ore	  
mines	  were	  worked	  out.	  	  Furthermore,	  fiscal	  year	  1909	  also	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  first	  
year	  that	  the	  company	  was	  unable	  to	  pay	  back	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  bonds	  
remaining	  from	  the	  company’s	  reorganization.	  	  Management	  was	  pleased,	  however,	  
with	  the	  results	  of	  improvements	  made	  at	  their	  Radford	  furnace	  which	  they	  
believed	  to	  now	  be	  the	  most	  efficient	  furnace	  in	  the	  state	  and	  competitive	  with	  
Birmingham	  iron	  prices.155	  	  Despite	  the	  gloomy	  iron	  market	  and	  the	  economic	  
stagnation	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  economic	  recession,	  the	  company	  seemed	  poised	  
to	  return	  to	  profitability	  once	  the	  economy	  improved.	  
The	  momentum	  gained	  in	  the	  national	  iron	  market	  during	  the	  summer	  of	  
1909	  proved	  to	  be	  short	  lived.	  	  President	  McHarg	  noted	  that	  after	  November	  1909	  
sales	  began	  to	  decrease	  along	  with	  the	  market	  prices	  for	  pig	  iron,	  and	  prices	  
continued	  falling	  into	  1910.	  	  Although	  the	  year	  was	  unsatisfactory	  on	  the	  whole,	  the	  
company	  was	  able	  to	  reduce	  its	  stockpiles	  of	  finished	  coke	  and	  charcoal	  irons	  to	  
approximately	  148,134	  tons.	  	  Gains	  were	  also	  made	  regarding	  improvements	  to	  
furnaces	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  rail	  lines	  to	  ore	  properties	  that	  had	  previously	  been	  
unreachable	  for	  mineral	  extraction.	  	  The	  opening	  of	  these	  new	  lands	  reduced	  the	  
cost	  of	  mining	  iron	  and	  negated	  the	  increased	  mining	  costs	  gained	  in	  1909,	  again	  
indicating	  that	  the	  company	  was	  seemingly	  prepared	  to	  make	  a	  profit	  in	  iron	  
production.	  	  The	  company’s	  coal	  interests	  continued	  to	  be	  the	  most	  profitable	  aspect	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of	  the	  company,	  and	  in	  1910,	  1,128,327	  tons	  of	  coal	  was	  mined,	  an	  increase	  of	  35.6	  
percent	  over	  from	  the	  previous	  year,	  and	  coke	  production	  increased	  19.5	  from	  the	  
previous	  year	  to	  275,768	  tons.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  in	  1910	  VIC&CC	  management	  were	  
beginning	  to	  turn	  more	  of	  their	  attention	  to	  their	  coal	  interests	  as	  McHarg	  noted	  in	  
his	  report:	  
	  	  	  	  	  .	  .	  .this	  Company	  has	  very	  large	  and	  valuable	  holdings	  of	  coal	  lands,	  
which,	   if	   retained	   and	   developed	   as	   the	   demand	   for	   coal	   increases,	  
must,	  in	  the	  future,	  become	  extremely	  valuable.156	  
	  
Aside	  from	  their	  coal	  and	  iron	  interests,	  the	  company	  was	  again	  only	  able	  to	  
purchase	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  bonds,	  and	  the	  outlook	  for	  1911	  was	  certainly	  not	  
optimistic.157	  	  McHarg	  had	  continued	  to	  try	  making	  the	  company	  a	  profitable	  
producer	  of	  pig	  iron,	  but	  as	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  came	  to	  a	  close,	  
the	  likelihood	  of	  this	  ever	  happening	  was	  slowly	  becoming	  evident.	  
McHarg’s	  views	  about	  the	  shift	  in	  company	  focus	  would	  finally	  prove	  to	  be	  
correct	  as	  the	  company	  continued	  to	  struggle	  in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  economic	  
recession.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1911	  the	  company’s	  iron	  interests	  continued	  to	  slump	  
while	  coal	  production	  continued	  to	  expand.	  	  This	  year	  would	  also	  prove	  to	  be	  the	  
last	  that	  the	  VIC&CC	  operated	  under	  Henry	  McHarg.	  	  Demand	  for	  iron	  remained	  low,	  
while	  the	  company	  continued	  to	  produce	  pig	  iron	  at	  two	  furnaces	  and	  spend	  
liberally	  on	  improvements	  to	  the	  company’s	  facilities.	  	  By	  year’s	  end	  their	  stockpiles	  
of	  iron	  had	  increased	  to	  187,611	  tons	  from	  148,134	  tons	  in	  1910,	  an	  increase	  of	  
39,477	  tons,	  or	  26.6	  percent.	  	  The	  company’s	  mines	  increased	  production	  by	  19.7	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percent	  to	  1,404,638	  tons	  of	  coal	  in	  FY1911,	  while	  coke	  production	  fell	  17.9	  percent	  
to	  226,379	  tons	  as	  the	  company	  shut	  down	  its	  Inman	  coke	  ovens	  during	  the	  final	  
year	  of	  McHarg’s	  leadership.158	  	  Coal	  was	  the	  one	  significant	  source	  of	  income	  
during	  the	  final	  two	  years	  of	  McHarg’s	  tenure	  and	  netted	  the	  company	  $120,086.72	  
in	  FY1910	  and	  $226,698.00	  in	  FY1911.159	  
Henry	  McHarg	  had	  been	  with	  the	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  
since	  his	  appointment	  as	  a	  receiver	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Federal	  Court	  in	  early	  1901.	  	  
Under	  his	  leadership,	  the	  company	  had	  made	  great	  strides	  towards	  recovering	  from	  
its	  disastrous	  beginnings.	  	  In	  his	  ten	  years	  of	  leadership,	  he	  greatly	  reduced	  the	  
company’s	  bonded	  debt	  and	  modernized	  many	  of	  the	  company’s	  furnaces.	  	  But	  
between	  increases	  in	  the	  company’s	  coal	  land	  holdings	  and	  the	  rapid	  increase	  in	  
market	  prices	  for	  coal,	  by	  McHarg’s	  estimate,	  the	  VIC&CC	  coal	  interests	  had	  doubled	  
in	  value	  during	  his	  decade	  of	  leadership.	  	  When	  McHarg	  took	  the	  helm	  in	  1903,	  coal	  
netted	  the	  company	  a	  meager	  $36,456.35	  and	  this	  annual	  profit	  from	  coal	  had	  
grown	  steadily	  and	  by	  McHarg’s	  departure	  was	  bringing	  in	  over	  a	  quarter	  million	  
dollars	  a	  year.160	  	  The	  inverse	  can	  be	  said	  for	  iron	  production	  during	  McHarg’s	  
tenure.	  	  During	  FY1904,	  the	  first	  full	  year	  of	  McHarg’s	  tenure,	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  iron	  
furnaces	  posted	  a	  profit	  of	  $177,330.36.	  	  Although	  that	  number	  fluctuated	  over	  time	  
by	  FY1911,	  the	  company’s	  furnaces	  only	  recorded	  $87,006.76	  in	  profit,	  roughly	  half	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of	  what	  it	  had	  netted	  in	  1904.161	  	  While	  much	  of	  McHarg’s	  tenure	  focused	  on	  iron	  
production,	  he	  was	  perceptive	  enough	  to	  see	  that	  the	  company	  was	  no	  longer	  
competitive	  in	  this	  capacity	  and	  was	  able	  to	  begin	  developing	  the	  vast	  coal	  holdings.	  	  
During	  McHarg’s	  tenure	  he	  significantly	  reduced	  the	  company’s	  bonded	  debt.	  	  
When	  the	  reorganized	  company	  began	  it	  had	  an	  outstanding	  debt	  of	  $7,747,000	  and	  
by	  the	  end	  of	  McHarg’s	  tenure	  he	  had	  reduced	  this	  by	  $2,459,500,	  or	  31.75	  percent.	  	  
This	  was	  a	  fairly	  remarkable	  accomplishment	  considering	  the	  business	  slump	  of	  
1907-­‐1908.	  	  McHarg	  reduced	  the	  debt	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  	  The	  company	  opened	  
three	  new	  coal	  mines	  in	  southwest	  Virginia	  and	  generally	  expanded	  mining	  
operations,	  negotiated	  close	  ties	  and	  affordable	  freight	  rates	  with	  the	  Louisville	  and	  
Nashville,	  Norfolk	  and	  Western,	  and	  Southern	  railways	  to	  many	  markets	  outside	  the	  
region.	  	  McHarg	  also	  consolidated	  iron	  production	  into	  the	  Radford,	  Crozier,	  Bristol,	  
and	  Dora	  furnaces,	  sold	  several	  furnaces	  in	  the	  process,	  invested	  heavily	  in	  new	  ore	  
properties	  and	  mining	  equipment.	  	  As	  McHarg	  claimed	  in	  his	  final	  address	  to	  
stockholders	  “it	  would	  take	  a	  smart	  man	  three	  years	  to	  become	  fully	  acquainted	  
with	  [the	  company’s]	  affairs.”162	  	  After	  a	  decade	  at	  the	  helm	  of	  the	  VIC&CC	  McHarg	  
nominated	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  Vice	  President	  and	  General	  Manager,	  John	  B.	  Newton,	  as	  
the	  next	  company	  president.	  	  Aside	  from	  his	  long	  tenure	  with	  the	  company,	  Newton	  
had	  worked	  alongside	  McHarg	  since	  he	  was	  associated	  with	  the	  Atlanta,	  Knoxville	  
and	  Northern	  Railway	  that	  became	  part	  of	  the	  Louisville	  and	  Nashville	  Railway.	  	  To	  
replace	  Newton	  as	  company	  Vice	  President	  and	  General	  Manager,	  McHarg	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nominated	  his	  son,	  Henry	  K.	  McHarg,	  Jr.,	  who	  had	  worked	  as	  a	  furnace	  manager	  in	  
Radford	  for	  eight	  years.163	  	  It	  was	  believed	  that	  these	  two	  men,	  with	  their	  long	  
association	  with	  the	  company	  and	  its	  practices,	  would	  lead	  the	  company	  toward	  
greater	  profitability	  in	  the	  coming	  years	  because	  they	  were	  the	  most	  intimately	  
familiar	  with	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  business.	  	  	  
The	  years	  following	  McHarg’s	  departure	  would	  continue	  to	  see	  a	  decline	  in	  
iron	  production,	  and	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  American	  involvement	  in	  World	  War	  
I,	  iron	  and	  coke	  production	  dwindled	  until	  it	  completely	  ceased	  during	  the	  1920s.	  	  
Management	  was	  able	  to	  successfully	  develop	  their	  coal	  properties	  for	  several	  
decades,	  but	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  iron	  production	  had	  peaked	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century.	  	  During	  this	  decade	  the	  speculative	  and	  highly	  positive	  tone	  that	  
accompanied	  the	  expansion	  of	  southern	  Appalachia’s	  iron	  industry	  during	  the	  final	  
two	  decades	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  began	  to	  fade.	  	  As	  the	  twentieth	  century	  
rolled	  on	  coal’s	  rise	  helped	  to	  rapidly	  disassociate	  iron	  production	  with	  southern	  
Appalachia.
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Chapter	  Four	  –	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  1912	  –	  1920s	  
	   After	  Henry	  McHarg	  Sr.’s	  departure	  from	  the	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  
Company	  (VIC&CC)	  John	  Newton	  led	  the	  company’s	  continued	  transformation	  from	  
a	  producer	  of	  pig	  iron	  to	  a	  provider	  of	  coal.	  	  While	  the	  company’s	  ore	  supply	  was	  
failing,	  it	  was	  hoped	  that	  the	  new	  management	  team	  would	  be	  able	  to	  successfully	  
manage	  its	  iron	  department	  and	  produce	  results	  that	  could	  accommodate	  its	  coal	  
department.	  	  The	  continued	  emphasis	  on	  iron	  led	  the	  new	  management	  team	  to	  try	  
producing	  iron	  by	  purchasing	  ore	  on	  the	  open	  market.	  	  This	  method	  was	  not	  
sustainable	  and	  aside	  from	  a	  huge	  increase	  in	  production	  during	  World	  War	  I	  the	  
variables	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  company’s	  iron	  department	  were	  in	  place	  by	  1912.	  	  
Chapter	  Four	  tracks	  the	  final	  decade	  of	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  iron	  production	  as	  coal	  came	  to	  
dominate	  the	  company’s	  business	  model.	  
	   Despite	  the	  work	  of	  VIC&CC	  management	  in	  the	  years	  before	  1912,	  several	  
factors	  worked	  against	  the	  company	  and	  its	  iron	  interests.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  
financially	  burdensome	  of	  these	  problems	  was	  the	  bonded	  debt	  of	  the	  company.	  	  
Henry	  McHarg	  himself	  had	  loaned	  significant	  amounts	  to	  the	  company	  to	  provide	  
working	  capital,	  and	  in	  1916	  the	  VIC&CC	  still	  owed	  him	  $1,150,000.	  	  As	  noted	  by	  the	  
1916	  Report	  on	  Examination	  of	  Financial	  Condition,	  “the	  wisdom	  of	  this	  method	  of	  
financing	  is	  plainly	  open	  to	  criticism,	  as	  it	  changed	  the	  Company’s	  liability	  from	  a	  
long	  term	  obligation	  (the	  bonds	  being	  due	  only	  in	  1949)	  to	  a	  demand	  obligation.”164	  	  
Because	  much	  of	  the	  company’s	  income	  was	  immediately	  put	  towards	  paying	  down	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its	  significant	  debt,	  the	  company’s	  cash	  supply	  to	  improve	  its	  facilities	  and	  purchase	  
new	  properties	  was	  constantly	  limited.	  	  This	  allowed	  limited	  room	  for	  the	  company	  
to	  improve	  itself	  in	  any	  manner	  beyond	  reducing	  its	  debt.	  	  Another	  problem	  facing	  
management	  was	  the	  diminishing	  productivity	  of	  the	  company’s	  iron	  ore	  mines.	  	  As	  
noted	  in	  the	  same	  report,	  “The	  chief	  reason	  for	  the	  steady	  losses	  incurred	  by	  the	  
Company	  of	  late	  years	  is	  the	  relatively	  high	  cost	  of	  producing	  pig	  iron	  as	  against	  the	  
price	  received	  for	  it.”165	  	  The	  ore	  deposits	  that	  were	  sold	  as	  being	  rich	  and	  abundant	  
a	  few	  short	  years	  ago	  were	  proving	  to	  be	  limited	  in	  quality	  and	  quantity.	  	  The	  
company’s	  few	  open	  pit	  mines	  were	  being	  exhausted	  and	  the	  company	  was	  forced	  to	  
mine	  underground;	  a	  costly	  operation	  that	  often	  did	  not	  produce	  a	  quality	  product.	  	  
By	  seeking	  ores	  on	  the	  open	  market	  the	  company	  was	  able	  to	  acquire	  quality	  ore,	  
but	  by	  purchasing	  their	  ore	  while	  also	  paying	  for	  leases	  on	  inactive	  or	  exhausted	  ore	  
properties	  the	  company’s	  iron	  department	  consistently	  lost	  money.	  
	   Until	  1911,	  the	  company’s	  mines	  produced	  around	  300,000	  tons	  of	  ore	  per	  
year	  for	  less	  than	  a	  $1.70/ton.	  	  Iron	  ore	  production	  dropped	  from	  294,427	  tons	  in	  
FY	  1911	  to	  204,383	  tons	  in	  FY1912,	  a	  decline	  of	  nearly	  33	  percent.	  	  The	  cost	  per	  ton	  
jumped	  from	  $1.58/ton	  in	  FY1911	  to	  $1.76	  in	  FY1912.	  	  By	  1916	  the	  VIC&CC	  barely	  
mined	  100,000	  tons/year	  at	  their	  mines	  and	  the	  production	  cost	  per	  ton	  had	  risen	  
to	  over	  $2.16/ton.	  	  This	  was	  barely	  one	  third	  of	  what	  they	  had	  been	  only	  a	  few	  short	  
years	  ago	  while	  costing	  approximately	  25	  percent	  more.	  	  The	  policy	  of	  purchasing	  
supplemental	  ores	  from	  the	  open	  market	  meant	  that	  the	  company	  had	  to	  ship	  these	  
ores	  to	  their	  furnaces	  and	  compete	  with	  other	  pig	  iron	  producers	  for	  the	  best	  price,	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which	  only	  drove	  their	  final	  production	  costs	  up.	  	  Even	  though	  management	  
invested	  heavily	  in	  modernizing	  their	  equipment,	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  open	  pit	  mines	  
and	  limited	  quality	  of	  ores	  only	  exacerbated	  the	  problem.166	  	  Between	  the	  
company’s	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  their	  bonded	  debt	  and	  the	  increasingly	  high	  cost	  of	  
producing	  pig	  iron,	  the	  VIC&CC	  made	  less	  and	  less	  pig	  iron.	  
	   Henry	  McHarg’s	  departure	  from	  the	  company	  seemed	  to	  signal	  the	  decline	  of	  
pig	  iron	  production	  as	  John	  Newton	  assumed	  control.	  	  During	  the	  final	  year	  of	  
McHarg’s	  tenure,	  the	  company	  posted	  a	  loss	  of	  $276,143.53,	  and	  the	  first	  year	  of	  
Newton’s	  leadership,	  the	  company	  posted	  a	  net	  loss	  of	  $385,857.97.	  	  Pig	  iron	  
production	  fell	  33.4	  percent	  from	  the	  previous	  year	  to	  79,431	  tons,	  although	  the	  
company	  did	  manage	  to	  reduce	  its	  pig	  iron	  stockpiles	  by	  23,785.25	  tons	  and	  shipped	  
a	  total	  of	  103,216.25	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron	  during	  FY1912.	  	  The	  average	  selling	  price	  for	  
pig	  iron	  dropped	  approximately	  $1.50/ton,	  which	  was	  well	  below	  the	  cost	  of	  
production	  in	  that	  year.	  	  The	  company	  continued	  to	  produce	  its	  own	  coke	  and	  would	  
continue	  during	  the	  company’s	  life	  as	  an	  iron	  producer.	  	  Largely	  due	  to	  pig	  irons	  
drop	  in	  selling	  price	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  furnaces	  posted	  a	  loss	  of	  $29,094.91	  for	  FY1912.	  	  
This	  signified	  the	  continuing	  decline	  of	  the	  company’s	  iron	  department	  as	  the	  
company’s	  ore	  cost	  continued	  to	  rise.	  	  Only	  the	  year	  previous	  the	  company	  had	  
managed	  to	  net	  $87,006.76	  from	  its	  iron	  furnaces.	  	  While	  their	  overall	  production	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




for	  the	  year	  had	  fallen	  by	  33	  percent,	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  their	  iron	  ore	  only	  fell	  19	  
percent,	  which	  signified	  the	  growing	  cost	  of	  company’s	  ore.	  167	  
	   While	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  pig	  iron	  production	  numbers	  for	  FY1912	  were	  dismal,	  
coal	  production	  showed	  an	  increase	  for	  the	  year.	  	  The	  amount	  of	  coal	  mined	  
increased	  by	  11.3	  percent	  from	  FY1911,	  and	  the	  company’s	  five	  operating	  coalmines	  
were	  in	  full	  swing	  during	  the	  year.	  	  During	  FY1912	  coal	  netted	  the	  company	  
$308,419.08	  profit,	  a	  dramatic	  36	  percent	  increase	  from	  the	  previous	  years.168	  	  This	  
increase	  in	  profit	  and	  the	  growing	  demand	  for	  coal,	  led	  management	  to	  continue	  
pouring	  money	  into	  coal	  production	  and	  turn	  away	  from	  iron	  production.	  
	   Even	  though	  the	  fiscal	  year	  of	  1913	  showed	  a	  considerable	  profit	  from	  both	  
its	  iron	  and	  coal	  departments	  the	  company	  still	  posted	  a	  loss	  for	  the	  year.	  	  This	  was	  
largely	  due	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  a	  prospective	  iron	  ore	  property.	  	  Although	  the	  company	  
posted	  a	  net	  loss	  of	  $190,392.32	  for	  FY1913,	  agents	  did	  manage	  to	  book	  sales	  for	  
230,000	  tons	  of	  iron	  during	  the	  market	  jump	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1912.	  	  This	  allowed	  
the	  company	  to	  keep	  its	  Radford	  and	  Roanoke	  blast	  furnaces	  in	  operation	  
throughout	  FY1913	  and	  to	  reduce	  its	  large	  pig	  iron	  stockpiles	  by	  over	  100,000	  tons	  
to	  only	  60,000	  tons	  by	  the	  summer	  of	  1913.	  	  During	  the	  year	  the	  company’s	  furnaces	  
produced	  133,347	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron	  for	  a	  total	  profit	  of	  $185,827.75.	  	  Coal	  also	  posted	  
a	  considerable	  profit	  during	  1913	  and	  profits	  increased	  15.3	  percent	  from	  the	  
previous	  year	  to	  $355,655.04.169	  	  Even	  though	  coal	  and	  iron	  both	  netted	  the	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company	  considerable	  profits	  during	  FY1913	  the	  company	  still	  posted	  a	  
considerable	  loss	  for	  the	  year.	  	  Aside	  from	  the	  heavy	  interest	  payments	  that	  the	  
company	  paid	  on	  its	  outstanding	  debt	  every	  year,	  the	  VIC&CC	  posted	  a	  considerable	  
loss	  of	  $143,642.62	  on	  its	  additions	  and	  improvements	  made	  at	  its	  Potts	  Valley	  iron	  
ore	  lease	  in	  the	  two	  rural	  Virginia	  counties	  of	  Craig	  and	  Giles.170	  	  	  
	   Purchased	  early	  in	  the	  McHarg	  tenure,	  the	  Potts	  Valley	  lease	  held	  iron	  ore	  
deposits	  and	  the	  company	  began	  the	  initial	  steps	  toward	  mining	  the	  ore;	  several	  
structures	  were	  built	  and	  a	  proposed	  mining	  site	  was	  developed.	  	  The	  only	  access	  to	  
the	  Potts	  Valley	  lands	  was	  along	  a	  proposed	  branch	  of	  the	  Norfolk	  &	  Western	  
Railway,	  but	  before	  the	  rail	  line	  reached	  the	  mining	  site,	  the	  railroad	  company	  
abandoned	  these	  iron	  prospects.	  	  Instead	  the	  Norfolk	  &	  Western	  sought	  to	  exploit	  
the	  Potts	  Valley’s	  rich	  timber	  stands.	  	  According	  to	  historian	  Will	  Sarvis,	  the	  Norfolk	  
and	  Western	  took	  this	  course	  of	  action	  because	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  iron	  ore	  industry	  
held	  “more	  advanced	  technology	  and	  better	  freight	  rates”	  for	  shipping	  iron	  ore.171	  	  
The	  VIC&CC	  was	  able	  only	  to	  pay	  royalties	  on	  the	  Potts	  Valley	  lands	  since	  they	  
leased	  the	  property	  and	  invested	  considerably	  in	  building	  facilities	  for	  their	  miners	  
and	  ore	  storage	  before	  the	  Norfolk	  &	  Western	  ever	  bought	  iron	  ore	  from	  the	  
company.172	  	  This	  cost	  the	  VIC&CC	  considerably	  and	  was	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  how	  
the	  iron	  ores	  of	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  slowly	  overshadowed	  the	  entire	  iron	  industry	  of	  
Virginia	  and	  Tennessee.	  	  Although	  FY1913	  saw	  increased	  coal	  and	  pig	  iron	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171 William Sarvis, “The Potts Valley Branch Railroad and Tri-State Incline Lumber Operation in West 
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production	  for	  the	  VIC&CC,	  the	  year	  was	  still	  a	  loss	  for	  iron	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  
termination	  of	  the	  Potts	  Valley	  lease.	  
	   The	  VIC&CC’s	  trend	  of	  diminishing	  pig	  iron	  production	  as	  coal	  production	  
expanded	  continued	  into	  fiscal	  year	  1914.	  	  For	  the	  year,	  the	  company	  posted	  a	  total	  
net	  loss	  of	  $146,712.71.	  	  But	  the	  company	  also	  began	  to	  reduce	  its	  iron	  
manufacturing.	  	  The	  company	  put	  one	  of	  its	  two	  furnaces	  in	  Roanoke	  out	  of	  blast,	  
leaving	  only	  its	  furnace	  at	  Radford	  and	  charcoal	  furnace	  to	  continue	  operation.	  	  This	  
action,	  coupled	  with	  falling	  sale	  prices	  resulted	  in	  a	  22.5	  percent	  decline	  in	  pig	  iron	  
production	  for	  the	  year.	  	  The	  company’s	  unsold	  stockpiles	  grew	  by	  29	  percent	  to	  
84,631	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron.	  	  Iron’s	  poor	  showing	  during	  the	  year	  was	  indicative	  of	  
Virginia	  and	  Tennessee’s	  declining	  iron	  industry,	  but	  coal	  production	  continued	  to	  
grow	  during	  1914.173	  
	   Coal	  profits	  soared	  by	  26.5	  percent	  during	  the	  year	  to	  $449,775.40	  after	  
1,988,015	  tons	  were	  mined.	  	  These	  jumps	  in	  production	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  
company’s	  continued	  modernization	  of	  its	  coalmines.	  	  Its	  largest	  coal	  operation	  at	  
Toms	  Creek	  saw	  the	  completion	  of	  a	  large	  all-­‐steel	  tipple	  and	  washery	  that	  easily	  
handled	  the	  increasing	  volume	  being	  pulled	  from	  the	  mines.174	  	  	  
	   The	  VIC&CC’s	  continued	  decline	  in	  iron	  production	  and	  increase	  in	  coal	  
production	  continued	  through	  1915.	  	  The	  company	  reduced	  its	  production	  of	  pig	  
iron	  by	  only	  keeping	  one	  furnace	  in	  blast	  during	  the	  year;	  it	  was	  unable	  to	  sell	  as	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much	  as	  they	  produced.175	  	  This	  led	  to	  a	  fall	  in	  pig	  iron	  production	  by	  nearly	  50	  
percent,	  and	  its	  unsold	  stockpiles	  grew	  35.6	  percent	  to	  114,720	  tons.	  	  Coal	  profits	  
for	  the	  year	  actually	  fell	  10	  percent	  to	  $405,242.32.	  	  During	  the	  year	  the	  VIC&CC	  
posted	  a	  total	  net	  loss	  of	  $285,079.93,	  and	  Henry	  McHarg,	  Sr.,	  formally	  separated	  
himself	  entirely	  from	  the	  VIC&CC.	  	  McHarg,	  Sr.	  had	  remained	  on	  the	  company’s	  
Board	  of	  Directors	  since	  stepping	  down	  as	  president,	  but	  in	  1915,	  he	  resigned	  from	  
the	  board.	  
	   The	  VIC&CC	  did	  not	  see	  an	  increase	  in	  business	  until	  January	  1916	  when	  
wartime	  production	  and	  sales	  brought	  a	  boom	  to	  iron	  and	  coal	  production.	  	  With	  a	  
dismal	  first	  half	  of	  FY1916	  the	  company	  still	  posted	  a	  net	  loss	  of	  $262,266.29,	  but	  
was	  able	  to	  put	  all	  of	  their	  iron	  furnaces	  into	  blast	  and	  output	  for	  the	  year	  increased	  
by	  50	  percent	  from	  the	  previous	  year.176	  	  Although	  it	  is	  unclear	  as	  to	  who	  was	  
purchasing	  the	  pig	  iron	  the	  company	  shipped	  224,302	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron	  during	  the	  
year,	  which	  signified	  a	  dramatic	  reduction	  of	  the	  company’s	  stockpiles	  that	  had	  
increased	  greatly	  over	  the	  last	  few	  years.	  	  Profits	  from	  coal	  production	  fell	  a	  
dramatic	  41	  percent	  to	  $239,231.80	  during	  FY1916	  because	  the	  company	  was	  
suddenly	  using	  more	  of	  its	  coal	  for	  coke	  production	  to	  fuel	  the	  blast	  furnaces	  now	  in	  
operation.177	  
	   During	  World	  War	  I	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  iron	  furnaces	  ran	  at	  full	  blast	  and	  produced	  
numbers	  similar	  to	  the	  results	  expected	  when	  the	  company	  first	  organized	  in	  1899.	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For	  instance,	  between	  June	  1916	  and	  December	  1917	  the	  company’s	  furnaces	  
produced	  354,508	  tons	  of	  iron	  ore	  and	  shipped	  372,738	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron.	  	  They	  also	  
managed	  to	  do	  this	  after	  selling	  their	  Bristol	  and	  Graham	  furnaces.	  	  This	  suggests	  
that	  the	  improvements	  made	  at	  their	  Radford	  and	  Roanoke	  furnaces	  were	  paying	  
off.	  	  During	  the	  boom	  in	  iron	  production	  more	  of	  the	  company’s	  coal	  went	  to	  the	  
production	  of	  coke	  for	  their	  furnaces,	  so	  coal	  profits	  actually	  shrank	  during	  the	  war	  
while	  coal	  production	  increased.	  	  The	  staggering	  jump	  in	  its	  iron	  production	  also	  
produced	  a	  staggering	  profit	  for	  the	  company	  between	  June	  1916	  and	  December	  
1917	  of	  $1,897,543.72.178	  	  The	  iron	  boom	  experienced	  by	  the	  company	  during	  
World	  War	  I	  allowed,	  “the	  company’s	  indebtedness	  [to	  be]	  cut	  in	  half.”179	  	  This	  boom	  
proved	  to	  last	  only	  as	  long	  as	  the	  war	  did	  and	  soon	  after	  the	  war	  concluded,	  so	  too	  
did	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  pig	  iron	  production	  decline.	  	  Within	  a	  few	  years	  the	  company	  
found	  itself	  in	  a	  familiar	  position	  as	  a	  pig	  iron	  producers	  and	  its	  pigs	  could	  not	  
compete	  with	  the	  superior	  pigs	  of	  the	  Pittsburgh,	  the	  Great	  Lakes,	  and	  Birmingham.	  	  
This	  led	  to	  the	  total	  abandonment	  of	  its	  pig	  iron	  department	  after	  nearly	  two	  
decades	  of	  consistent	  losses	  in	  producing	  iron.	  	  By	  1921,	  the	  VIC&CC	  had	  shut	  down	  
all	  of	  its	  iron	  furnaces	  after	  operating	  at	  less	  than	  10	  percent	  of	  their	  normal	  
capacity	  only	  a	  short	  time	  after	  producing	  record	  numbers	  during	  the	  First	  World	  
War.180	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   Although	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  iron	  department	  excelled	  during	  the	  American	  
involvement	  in	  World	  War	  I,	  it	  was	  recognized	  by	  management	  that	  it	  was	  doubtful	  
the	  company	  would	  ever	  succeed	  as	  a	  pig	  iron	  producer	  during	  normal	  market	  
conditions.	  	  The	  reasons	  for	  irons	  failure	  in	  southwest	  Virginia	  and	  east	  Tennessee	  
were	  abundantly	  clear	  by	  1917.	  	  In	  an	  in	  depth	  financial	  report	  performed	  by	  the	  
accounting	  firm	  Arthur	  Young	  &	  Company,	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  shortcomings	  were	  clearly	  
laid	  out.	  	  Aside	  from	  the	  company’s	  huge	  burdening	  bonded	  debt,	  its	  pig	  iron	  
department	  was	  increasingly	  forced	  to	  purchase	  iron	  ore	  on	  the	  open	  market	  to	  
blast.	  	  This	  dramatically	  raised	  the	  cost	  of	  production,	  especially	  considering	  how	  
much	  the	  company	  invested	  in	  ore	  properties.	  	  The	  irregular	  operation	  of	  its	  
furnaces	  was	  also	  costly	  because	  blowing	  furnaces	  in	  and	  out	  of	  blast	  was	  both	  a	  
timely	  and	  cost	  intensive	  process.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  rising	  cost	  to	  produce	  iron,	  the	  pig	  
iron	  industry	  of	  Virginia	  and	  east	  Tennessee,	  and	  especially	  the	  VIC&CC	  simply	  
could	  not	  compete	  with	  other	  producing	  regions	  in	  the	  country.	  	  	  
	   During	  the	  decade	  following	  World	  War	  I,	  the	  company	  shut	  down	  its	  pig	  
iron	  department	  at	  a	  heavy	  loss	  to	  the	  company.	  	  The	  1930s	  saw	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  
VIC&CC’s	  coal	  and	  coke	  operations.	  	  Diminishing	  returns	  and	  the	  ultimate	  
exhaustion	  of	  their	  once	  profitable	  coal	  mines	  and	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  entire	  iron	  
industry	  of	  southern	  Appalachia	  left	  little	  local	  market	  for	  coke.	  	  During	  the	  early	  
1940s	  the	  company	  closed	  its	  remaining	  mines,	  sold	  its	  equipment	  and	  became	  a	  
lessor	  of	  coal	  properties.181	  	  The	  VIC&CC	  continued	  as	  a	  lessor	  of	  coal	  properties	  
until	  1969	  when	  Bates	  Manufacturing	  Company,	  a	  larger	  manufacturing	  group,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 New York Curb Exchange Listing Application NO. 1802, November 1, 1951, Virginia Iron, Coal, and 
Coke Company Records 1899-1969, McConnell Library, Radford, VA. 
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purchased	  it.182	  	  Although	  the	  company’s	  coal	  properties	  provided	  the	  company	  a	  
source	  of	  liquidity	  for	  several	  decades	  after	  the	  failure	  of	  its	  iron	  interests,	  the	  
company’s	  original	  purpose	  to	  be	  a	  pig	  iron	  producer	  became	  a	  thing	  of	  the	  past	  
barely	  two	  decades	  after	  it	  began.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




	   As	  a	  region,	  southern	  Appalachia	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  emergence	  
of	  the	  New	  South.	  	  At	  the	  close	  of	  Reconstruction	  much	  of	  the	  timber,	  iron,	  and	  coal	  
reserves	  in	  the	  region	  remained	  untouched.	  	  The	  rush	  of	  investment	  into	  the	  region	  
signified	  a	  break	  from	  the	  slave	  based	  plantation	  economy	  of	  the	  antebellum	  South.	  	  
Although	  racial	  segregation	  persisted	  well	  into	  the	  twentieth	  century	  the	  industrial	  
economy	  that	  emerged	  in	  southern	  Appalachia	  looked	  much	  different	  that	  the	  
textile	  and	  agricultural	  driven	  economies	  of	  the	  southern	  piedmont	  and	  delta	  
regions.	  	  Timber	  and	  railroad	  companies	  eager	  to	  access	  the	  mountains’	  resources	  
consolidated	  the	  ownership	  of	  large	  tracts	  of	  land	  and	  fueled	  a	  burst	  of	  economic	  
growth	  during	  the	  1880s.	  	  This	  included	  a	  large-­‐scale	  modernization	  and	  expansion	  
of	  the	  iron	  industry	  of	  southwest	  Virginia	  and	  east	  Tennessee.	  	  Although	  much	  of	  the	  
financing	  for	  this	  growth	  failed	  with	  the	  Panic	  of	  1893,	  the	  modernized	  furnaces,	  ore	  
deposits,	  coalfields,	  and	  timber	  stands	  remained.	  	  During	  this	  time,	  several	  of	  these	  
furnaces,	  foundries,	  and	  resource	  bases	  were	  consolidated	  under	  the	  ownership	  of	  
larger,	  integrated	  companies.	  	  The	  Virginia	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  (VIC&CC)	  
represents	  one	  such	  company.	  
When	  the	  VIC&CC	  organized	  in	  1899	  it	  seemed	  poised	  to	  become	  a	  
competitive	  producer	  of	  pig	  iron	  on	  a	  national	  level.	  	  The	  region’s	  brown	  ores	  and	  
rich	  deposits	  of	  bituminous	  coal	  had	  been	  accessed	  and	  charted	  during	  the	  last	  
several	  decades	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  large	  vertically	  
integrated	  VIC&CC	  promised	  an	  optimistic	  future	  for	  pig	  iron	  production	  in	  
southwest	  Virginia	  and	  east	  Tennessee.	  	  This	  optimistic	  vision	  for	  the	  future	  proved	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to	  be	  short	  lived	  as	  the	  competitive	  realities	  of	  more	  developed,	  better-­‐located	  
regions	  slowly	  reduced	  the	  company’s	  market	  share.	  	  Although	  by	  the	  1880s	  the	  
nation’s	  growing	  railroad	  and	  communications	  networks	  had	  integrated	  the	  region	  
into	  the	  national	  economy,	  by	  the	  1920s	  the	  entire	  pig	  iron	  industry	  of	  southwest	  
Virginia	  and	  east	  Tennessee	  had	  been	  completely	  overshadowed	  by	  those	  along	  the	  
Great	  Lakes	  and	  southwest	  Pennsylvania.	  	  On	  top	  of	  having	  a	  more	  established	  
industrial	  base,	  these	  regions	  were	  taking	  advantage	  of	  being	  situated	  between	  the	  
rich	  ore	  beds	  of	  the	  Lake	  Superior	  region	  and	  the	  rich	  coal	  deposits	  of	  southern	  
Appalachia.	  	  As	  steel	  overtook	  iron	  the	  pigs	  produced	  in	  these	  northern	  areas	  were	  
better	  suited	  for	  the	  Bessemer	  and	  open-­‐hearth	  furnaces,	  which	  were	  the	  primary	  
modes	  of	  steel	  conversion	  during	  the	  day.	  
The	  man	  responsible	  for	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  VIC&CC,	  George	  L.	  Carter,	  
also	  represents	  the	  break	  in	  regional	  economic	  power	  from	  the	  antebellum	  period.	  	  
Carter	  was	  a	  child	  during	  the	  Civil	  War,	  and	  although	  he	  was	  born	  to	  a	  well	  
respected	  farming	  family,	  he	  was	  introduced	  to	  the	  industrial	  world	  as	  a	  young	  man.	  
Carter	  worked	  as	  a	  store	  clerk	  in	  Hillsville	  before	  entering	  the	  mineral	  industry	  as	  
an	  assistant	  manager.	  	  Through	  contacts	  he	  made	  with	  the	  Norfolk	  &	  Western	  
Railway,	  Carter	  entered	  the	  iron	  industry,	  and	  capitalized	  on	  the	  most	  active	  period	  
of	  industrial	  expansion	  in	  the	  region.	  	  He	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  adept	  iron	  master	  and	  
businessman	  until	  he	  grew	  his	  iron	  enterprise	  to	  what	  became	  the	  VIC&CC.	  	  By	  
agreeing	  to	  run	  such	  a	  large	  enterprise	  backed	  by	  the	  brokerage	  firm	  of	  Moore	  &	  
Schley,	  Carter	  quickly	  exceeded	  his	  managerial	  ability	  and	  became	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  
limited	  value	  of	  Appalachia’s	  iron	  resources	  and	  the	  financial	  power	  of	  Wall	  Street.	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From	  the	  outset	  the	  VIC&CC	  struggled	  as	  an	  iron	  producer	  and	  the	  few	  profitable	  
periods	  they	  experienced	  were	  early	  in	  the	  company’s	  existence	  and	  corresponded	  
with	  national	  iron	  booms.	  	  In	  only	  two	  years	  the	  company	  defaulted	  on	  interest	  
payments,	  Carter	  was	  forced	  out	  of	  the	  enterprise	  all	  together,	  and	  the	  company	  fell	  
into	  receivership.	  
The	  man	  called	  in	  to	  restructure	  the	  VIC&CC,	  Henry	  K.	  McHarg,	  represents	  
more	  fully	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  colonial	  economy	  in	  the	  region.	  	  McHarg’s	  experience	  
in	  running	  large	  enterprises	  and	  personal	  wealth	  allowed	  him	  to	  essentially	  make	  
the	  company	  his	  own	  source	  of	  income.	  	  McHarg	  took	  a	  huge	  personal	  stake	  in	  the	  
company,	  and	  although	  he	  did	  much	  to	  modernize	  the	  company	  and	  streamline	  
production	  as	  company	  president,	  his	  personal	  loan	  to	  the	  company	  allowed	  him	  to	  
enjoy	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  the	  company’s	  profit	  during	  the	  VIC&CC’s	  few	  flush	  
years.	  	  In	  addition,	  McHarg	  also	  made	  significant	  progress	  in	  reducing	  the	  
company’s	  debt.	  	  By	  1911	  he	  had	  reduced	  the	  debt	  by	  $2,459,500,	  or	  31.75	  percent,	  
a	  remarkable	  accomplishment.	  	  It	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  McHarg	  personally	  
benefitted	  from	  his	  leadership	  of	  the	  company	  as	  he	  made	  it	  a	  primary	  policy	  to	  pay	  
down	  the	  debt	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible.	  	  By	  the	  time	  McHarg	  retired	  as	  president	  in	  
1911	  the	  company’s	  indebtedness	  was	  drastically	  reduced,	  but	  it	  was	  becoming	  
increasingly	  clear	  that	  the	  company	  would	  never	  succeed	  as	  a	  pig	  iron	  producer.	  
The	  company	  slowly	  recognized	  that	  its	  future	  was	  in	  its	  coal	  holdings,	  which	  
were	  vast	  and	  of	  a	  quality	  that	  was	  high	  in	  demand	  among	  railroads,	  steam	  engines,	  
and	  as	  home	  heating	  fuel.	  	  The	  company’s	  failing	  iron	  department	  and	  the	  
profitability	  of	  coal	  was	  temporarily	  reversed	  during	  World	  War	  I	  when	  the	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company	  briefly	  recorded	  record	  high	  profit	  margins	  as	  a	  pig	  iron	  producer,	  but	  
shortly	  after	  the	  war	  ended	  the	  company’s	  iron	  department	  failed.	  	  By	  1922,	  the	  
company	  shut	  down	  its	  iron	  furnaces	  and	  slowly	  sold	  them	  off	  as	  the	  inevitable	  was	  
finally	  recognized.	  	  For	  the	  next	  two	  decades	  the	  company’s	  coal	  mines	  succeeded	  in	  
supporting	  the	  company,	  but	  by	  the	  early	  1940s	  its	  developed	  mines	  were	  
exhausted	  and	  the	  company	  switched	  to	  the	  position	  of	  a	  coal	  lessor	  as	  it	  still	  owned	  
hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  acres	  of	  coal	  lands	  in	  eastern	  Kentucky,	  Virginia,	  and	  
Tennessee.	  	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Virginia,	  Iron,	  Coal,	  and	  Coke	  Company	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  
colonial	  thesis	  largely	  holds	  true	  as	  absentee	  owners	  controlled	  the	  company	  and	  
much	  of	  the	  coal	  and	  iron	  was	  shipped	  directly	  to	  ports	  at	  either	  Norfolk	  or	  
Charleston	  for	  use	  in	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  country.	  	  George	  Carter	  represents	  the	  rise	  
of	  a	  southern	  business	  class	  that	  eagerly	  participated	  in	  the	  capitalistic	  industrial	  
economy	  of	  the	  day,	  but	  his	  shortcomings	  as	  president	  were	  exposed	  when	  the	  size	  
and	  complexity	  of	  the	  company	  grew	  beyond	  his	  means.	  	  This	  allowed	  for	  his	  
complete	  removal	  from	  the	  company	  and	  gave	  space	  for	  a	  New	  York	  banker	  to	  seize	  
near	  complete	  control	  of	  the	  company.	  	  Even	  though	  the	  VIC&CC	  was	  originally	  
structured	  to	  produce	  its	  own	  pig	  iron	  and	  iron	  products	  with	  its	  own	  ore	  and	  fuel	  
supply,	  the	  company	  rapidly	  came	  to	  rely	  on	  profits	  from	  the	  sale	  of	  its	  cheaply	  
mined	  coal.	  	  Through	  the	  VIC&CC,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  view	  the	  dramatic	  restructuring	  of	  
southwest	  Virginia	  and	  east	  Tennessee’s	  economy	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  New	  
South.	  	  The	  continued	  study	  of	  this	  company	  will	  provide	  important	  insight	  into	  the	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